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Viewing cable 09YEREVAN203, ARMENIA ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09YEREVAN203 2009-03-23 12:59 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Yerevan
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYE #0203/01 0821259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231259Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8851
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0151
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0088
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0688
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0163
UNCLAS YEREVAN 000203 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT (ISN/MNSA) 
GENEVA (CD) 
UNVIE (IAEA) 
USUN (POL) 
UNNATO (POL) 
USEU (POL) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM MNUC PGOV PREL ENRG AORC KNNP UNGA IAEA NPT
CDG, AM 
SUBJECT: ARMENIA ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 
 
REF:  STATE 6970 
 
(SBU) In response to reftel demarche, Post received the following 
information from Armenia's Foreign Ministry regarding the GOAM's 
views on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
 
Begin text (informal Embassy translation from Armenian): 
 
Fulfillment of the commitments under the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Protocol 
Additional to the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the Republic of Armenia on Safeguards in 
Connection with the NPT is a priority for the GOAM. GOAM has always 
been keen on NPT issues since there has been a nuclear power-plant 
in Armenia from 1970s. 
 
Armenia became a signatory of the NPT on 09/24/1991 (Resolution on 
NPT Accession). The Agreement on Safeguards in Connection with the 
NPT between Armenia and the IAEA was ratified on 09/23/1993. The 
Protocol Additional to the Agreement on Safeguards in Connection 
with the NPT between Armenia and the IAEA was ratified on 
06/08/2004. 
On 10/26/2004 the GOAM passed a decree on fulfillment of commitments 
undertaken by the Protocol Additional to the Agreement on Safeguards 
in Connection with the NPT between Armenia and the IAEA (GOAM Decree 
1751-N). 
 
In accordance with the above-referenced agreements jointly with the 
IAEA inspectors the safeguards in connection with the NPT are being 
implemented and available nuclear materials are being reported in 
accordance with the specified procedures and timeframes. Armenia's 
commitments undertaken by the Agreement on Safeguards in Connection 
with the NPT and Protocol Additional to the Agreement on Safeguards 
in Connection with the NPT are fully met. 
 
While Armenia is not a member to Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) it 
has committed to implement all the provisions of the NPT. Armenia is 
not a member to NSG because the country is not a large supplier of 
nuclear materials and technology, and its membership to the group is 
not deemed feasible given country's economic focus. 
 
The fundamental national law in this area is the Law of the Republic 
of Armenia on Safe Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes 
enacted on 03/01/1999, as amended on 04/18/2004. 
 
Armenia has enacted several non-proliferation legislative documents, 
including: 
 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, ratified 
on 06/22/1993; 
Agreement on Safeguards in Connection with the NPT between Armenia 
and the IAEA, (comprehensive agreement), ratified on 09/23/1993; 
Convention on Nuclear Safety, ratified on 12/20/1998 
Protocol Additional to the Agreement on Safeguards in Connection 
with the NPT between Armenia and the IAEA, signed on 09/29/1997; 
and 
GOAM Decree No. 1231-N on Approving the Strategy for Strengthening 
and Rules of Physical Safety and Security of Nuclear Materials and 
the ANPP, adopted on 09/11/2003. 
 
The institute of export control was established in 1999. There is a 
governmental commission for export control for dual use substances 
and technology and for regulating transit of such substances and 
technology. Regulations of the Commission and its composition were 
approved by GOAM Decree No. 212, dated 02/19/2004. 
 
Rules and the procedure for monitoring of controlled substances and 
technologies were set by GOAM Decree No. 765, dated 05/20/2004. 
On September 14, 2003 the National Assembly (parliament) enacted the 
Law of the Republic of Armenia on Control of the Export of Dual-Use 
Commodities and Technologies and their Transit through the Republic 
of Armenia. The law became effective on 11/08/2003 and prevailed 
over the existing statutory provision for export control. 
 
In accordance with this law the export control commission was 
additionally authorized to collect information on end-use and 
end-users. Export permission for controlled commodities and 
technology is issued when there is a written document from the 
end-user (end-user certification) that the commodities and 
technology will not be used for mass destruction weapons or in means 
for their transfer. 
 
In recent years amendments have been made to the Criminal Code of 
the Republic of Armenia on prosecution for proliferation of 
substances and technologies that could be used in nuclear weapons. 
Specifically on 04/18/2003 was enacted and on 08/02/2003 became 
effective the provision that criminalizes procurement, production, 
possession, transportation, transfer and use of nuclear weapons and 
means for their transfer. Article 215 of the Criminal Code prohibits 
smuggling of nuclear weapons or dual-use substances, equipment and 
technology that could be used in weapons of mass destruction or 
missile systems. The penalty defined by this article is imprisonment 
4-8 years with or without forfeiture of property. 
 
The Republic of Armenia enjoys a positive cooperation with the 
United States which has contributed to significantly increasing 
capacities of the Republic of Armenia in non-proliferation of mass 
destruction weapons following country's independence. 
 
In 2008 (via the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative), Armenia and 
U.S. Government developed the following 6 projects aimed at 
improvement and enhancement of Armenia's capabilities in preventing 
smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials: 
 
Detection and disposal of orphaned sources; 
Improving security along Armenia's green borders at the points of 
entry; 
Improving response and nuclear forensics capabilities of Armenia, 
improving the national response plan to respond when nuclear and 
radiological materials or sources are detected; 
Improving capabilities for responding incidents of nuclear crime in 
cooperation with the international forensics community; 
Enhancing Armenia's legal and prosecution abilities to prevent 
nuclear smuggling; and 
Strengthening anti-corruption effects. 
 
The GOAM is expecting assistance from the U.S. in the 6 
above-mentioned areas. Furthermore, the Department of State was 
provided with brief descriptions of 4 projects on prevention of 
illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. 
 
Recently IAEA, the U.S., Russia and governments of several other 
countries on different levels have touched upon the need of creating 
facilities for enrichment of uranium and for processing and storage 
of nuclear fuel. We believe this issue is topical since many 
countries intend to establish and/or develop capabilities of nuclear 
energy and availability of such centers/facilities can have a 
positive impact both for NPT countries and its new members in 
developing their capabilities in the area of generating nuclear 
energy. 
 
Given the above-mentioned considerations the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources of the Republic of Armenia in 2008 initiated the 
process to join the international uranium enrichment center in 
Angarsk, which will considerably improve the processes of transfer, 
storage and disposal of nuclear fuel for Armenia. Currently Russia 
and Kazakhstan are members of Angarsk Center. 
 
GOAM believes that more active cooperation between the NPT courtiers 
under the auspices of the IAEA is essential in ensuring use of 
nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and transparency in this 
area. 
 
GOAM supports the NPT and the initiative of new countries joining 
together for peaceful use of nuclear energy. This creates additional 
guarantees for the countries to meet their NPT commitments, 
particularly strict compliance with the provision of using nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, as well as creates a favorable 
environment for international cooperation in this area. 
 
GOAM also expects to make more efforts towards bringing non-NPT 
Nuclear Weapon States, namely India, Pakistan, North Korea and 
Israel (the latter does not officially recognize being a NWS) into 
NPT membership. 
 
Given the potential threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons in 
the neighboring areas of Armenia, and its consequences, Armenia 
welcomes the efforts of the U.S. Government, particularly to engage 
in direct talks with Iranian authorities, the initiative of the U.S. 
President to renew the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between 
the U.S. and Russia (the existing treaty expires in 2009), etc. 
 
By export control regulations of Armenia there are no restrictions 
for any country, including Iran and North Korea, however the export 
control commission exercises more stringent control over exports to 
these countries. 
 
Armenia disapproves of the countries that violate their 
non-proliferation commitments or give up membership to such 
treaties. More robust requirements of the NPT will contribute to 
improved non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
 
In the future Armenia will also contribute to the process of other 
countries joining multilateral non-proliferation agreements, full 
implementation of such agreements, and to their 
improvement/strengthening, if necessary. 
 
End text. 
 
Pennington