VZCZCXRO5239
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #0565 0790942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200942Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8899
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 6433
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3141
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3005
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS NAIROBI 000565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETRD EPET KE IR
SUBJECT: KENYA'S FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDS RECENT IRAN VISIT 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 553 
     ¶B. NAIROBI 342 
     ¶C. 08 NAIROBI 2137 
 
¶1. Summary: On March 9, post received a formal response from 
Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula to the Ambassador's February 
24th letter expressing U.S. concerns about the visit of 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Kenya. Ahmedinejad 
headed a large delegation for a two-day visit that was almost 
entirely focused on strengthening trade and economic ties. 
Wetangula defended the visit as an opportunity to discuss 
issues of international concern with Iran and reiterated 
Kenya's commitment to engage with Iran on issues of nuclear 
weapons and terrorism. Separately, the head of the MFA's 
Middle East Division stressed to Econoff Kenya's pragmatic, 
trade-centered approach to Iran and other Middle East trading 
partners. (More details on the visit reported in ref A.) 
Summary. 
 
¶2. On February 24, Ambassador Ranneberger sent a letter to 
Foreign Minister Wetangula expressing U.S. concerns at the 
visit of a high-level Iranian delegation led by President 
Ahmedinajad. During the two-day visit, the Kenyan government 
(GOK) focused almost entirely on promoting Iranian investment 
in Kenya (notably in construction and oil storage capacity) 
and simultaneously seeking to boost Kenyan exports of tea, 
coffee, and meat to Iran and beyond to Iran's central Asian 
trading partners. The GOK also sought (mostly unsuccessfuly) 
to obtain concessional rates on Iranian oil imports. (Details 
of the visit and prospects for future economic cooperation 
between Iran and Kenya are reported septel.) This visit is 
one in a series of exchanges between Kenya and Iran, 
including reciprocal visits by their respective Ministers of 
Culture, as well as by lower-level trade missions. (See 
reftels.) 
 
¶3. In his March 9 response to the Ambassador, Wetangula 
described Ahmedinajad's visit as an opportunity to engage 
Iran on "issues of international concern," and noted that the 
GOK used the visit "to impress upon Iran its role and 
responsibilities as a key regional player in the Middle East 
peace process and the need to address the concerns of the 
international community on the alleged nuclear and terrorism 
threats." He added that Kenya, along with the rest of the 
international community, would continue to urge Iran to 
resolve issues that threaten global peace and security. 
 
¶4. In a separate post-visit conversation with Econoff, 
however, the Head of the Middle East Division at the MFA, Ken 
Vitisia, said that Kenya's focus for this visit was solely on 
trade and investment promotion. Vitisia noted that it is in 
Kenya's best interest to remain on friendly terms with both 
Israel and Kenya's trading partners in the Arab world 
(including Libya, the Gulf states, and Iran), and therefore 
said, in contrast to Wetangula's assertions, that Kenya 
largely avoided raising issues such as the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, Gaza, and nuclear weapons with the Iranian 
delegation. 
 
¶5. Post will continue to track Kenya's growing relationship 
with Iran and will report accordingly. 
 
RANNEBERGER