O 141125Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3957
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL LAHORE

S E C R E T LAHORE 000049 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/14/2034 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PTER PK
SUBJECT: SHARIFS REMAIN OPEN TO NEGOTIATION 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan D. Hunt, Principal Officer, American 
Consulate Lahore, Department of State. 

REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  In a March 14 meeting, Pakistan Muslim League -  Nawaz (PML-N) President Shahbaz Sharif told Principal Officer  that he and his brother -- former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif --  welcomed efforts by the United States, United Kingdom, and the  Pakistan Army to negotiate a political settlement between his  party and the government.  Shahbaz stated that the Sharifs' key  demands in these negotiations were: (1) restoration of the  electoral eligibility of both Sharif brothers; (2) restoration  of Shahbaz Sharif's government in the Punjab; (3) some sort of  face-saving restoration of former Chief Justice Iftikhar  Chaudhry; and (4) agreement on transfers of powers between the  President and the Prime Minister in accordance with the Charter  of Democracy.  Shahbaz noted that the lawyers would need to be  brought into the discussion on Iftikhar Chaudhry's restoration  and that, in his assessment, both current Chief Justice Dogar  and Punjab Governor Salman Taseer would be unable to play a role  in the new system.  Shahbaz rejected the proposal for a  provincial unity government headed by the Pakistan Muslim League  (PML), as contrary to the clear will of the electorate.  Shahbaz  accepted Interior Minister Rehman Malik's proposal to negotiate  an appropriate venue for the lawyers' planned sit-in in the  Islamabad/Rawalpindi area, but stated that Advisor Malik would  need to negotiate such a deal with the lawyers, not simply the  PML-N.  As demonstrated in the meeting, the PML-N has hardened  its demands and displayed little flexibility.  End Summary. 
  Negotiation 
 
¶2. (S) PML-N President Shahbaz Sharif welcomed efforts by the  United States, United Kingdom, and the Pakistan Chief of Army  Staff to negotiate a political settlement between the leadership  of the PML-N and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).  Shahbaz  stated that the three parties working in concert should  eventually be able to place sufficient pressure on both sides to  find a durable solution to the crisis and that the Sharifs were  satisfied that any deal guaranteed by the three would be  implemented.  Shahbaz stressed that he and his brother -- former  Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif -- were sincere in desiring a  negotiated settlement to the outstanding issues and promised  that they would show ""maximum flexibility"" in trying to find a  workable approach in concert with international donors and the  Pakistan army.  Shahbaz, however, assessed that it was President  Zardari's intransigence on restoration of former Chief Justice  Iftikhar Chaudhry and his misreading of Punjabi politics that  had created the current crisis and that would likely be the  greatest stumbling block to quick progress in the discussions. 
 
¶3. (S) Shahbaz Sharif highlighted that the PML-N currently had  four core goals in the negotiation process.  First, the  restoration of the eligibility of both Sharif brothers to  contest in national elections was a prerequisite to progress on  any other issues.  Shahbaz bluntly stated that his party had no  room for maneuver on this demand.  Second, Shahbaz insisted that  his government in the Punjab province would have to be restored. 
 Principal Officer raised the possibility of a provincial unity  government headed by the minority PML, which Shahbaz rejected. 
The former Chief Minister argued that his party had a clear  plurality in the provincial assembly, which had been established  through an election that had been judged by the international  community to be free, fair, and credible.  Shahbaz stated that  this gave his party the mandate to form the government and that  the public would never accept a deal that did not restore his  government to power.  Shahbaz stressed that his party was not  open to negotiation on this point.  Shahbaz underscored that  Punjab Governor Salman Taseer would need to be replaced. 
 
¶4. (S) On the issue of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry,  Shahbaz claimed that the PML-N was open to negotiation, provided  that Chaudhry was symbolically restored as Chief Justice of  Pakistan.  Shahbaz stressed that his party could not afford the  political humiliation of abandoning what had become a  long-standing principle in favor of Chaudhry's restoration.  At  the same time, Shahbaz claimed to understand that Chaudhry was a  problematic jurist, whose powers would need to be carefully  curtailed.  Shahbaz underscored that the Sharifs were prepared  to adopt any safeguards that President Zardari desired prior to  Chaudhry's restoration, including curtailment of his powers to  create judicial benches, removal of his suo moto jurisdiction,  and/or establishment of a constitutional court as a check on the  Supreme Court.  Shahbaz also stated that following the  restoration, the PML-N was prepared to end the issue and remove  Chaudhry once and for all by adopting legislation proposed in  the Charter of Democracy that would ban all judges who had taken  an oath under a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) from  serving.  Asked about the PML-N's openness to a new role for  current Chief Justice Hameed Dogar, Shahbaz stated that Dogar  was a completely discredited jurist and that his party did not  believe that he should play any role in a future set-up after  his mandatory retirement on March 20.  Shahbaz left the clear  impression that the PML-N was unwilling to show any flexibility  on Dogar. 
 
¶5. (S) Shahbaz raised that his party also believed any  negotiated settlement should include movement towards full  adoption of the Charter of Democracy, particularly its  provisions related to the repeal of Musharraf's controversial  17th amendment and the transfer of powers from the President to  the Prime Minister.  Shahbaz stated that this had been a  long-standing demand of the PML-N (although it had not  previously been raised with the international community in the  context of the current political crisis) and that given the  problems Zardari had caused, it was prudent to move forward. 
Shahbaz indicated that the actual implementation of this part of  the agreement could be prolonged, but felt that his party would  require, at a minimum, a guarantee from Zardari that it would  eventually move forward on an agreed-upon timeframe. 
  Long March 
 
¶6. (S) Shahbaz noted that both he and Nawaz Sharif were very  concerned about the potential for criminal and/or terrorist  elements to exploit the chaos created by the long march and  induce violence.  He thanked the Principal Officer for USG  efforts to encourage former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take  greater precautions with his personal security, noting that  Nawaz had understood the message and had promised to modify his  behavior.  Shahbaz stated that he was disappointed that Interior  Minister Rehman Malik had only belatedly advised the Sharifs  formally of threats to their security in a March 13 letter.  He  noted that even this had only come following the Sharifs'  independent gathering and sharing of information with the  federal government on criminal elements' intentions to make  trouble during the long march.  Nonetheless, Shahbaz conceded  that Malik's fears were well-founded and promised that the  senior leadership would take ""full-proof"" security precautions  during the rallies and minimize their exposure to the public. 
 
¶7. (S) Principal Officer asked Shahbaz whether his party was  prepared to negotiate the venue for the planned Islamabad sit-in  with the federal government in order to minimize the security  threat and disruption to governance in the capital.  Shahbaz  stated that ""unofficially"" the PML-N was fully prepared to  discuss the issue with Malik and to compromise on a venue  acceptable to both parties, even if it meant holding the sit-in  in Rawalpindi or on the outskirts of Islamabad.  However,  Shahbaz stated that the PML-N was not the primary organizer of  the event and that if Malik wished to discuss such matters, he  should include the other sit-in participants, principally the  lawyers' movement leadership in the negotiations.  Shahbaz was  adamant that while the PML-N was prepared to be helpful, the  party would have to follow the lawyers lead on this question, as  the lawyers were the primary event organizers.  (Note:  Ambassador conveyed Shahbaz's message to Interior Minister  Rehman Malik, who requested that the PML-N take the lead in  organizing a trilateral discussion including himself and the  lawyers.  Post has conveyed Malik's request to Shahbaz Sharif. 
Shahbaz, after consulting with senior leadership of the PML-N,  refused to assist.  End Note.) 
  Comment 
 
¶8. (S) As was expected, the Sharifs are expanding the issues on  which they want progress as part of negotiations with President  Zardari.  The removal of Governor Taseer, the final retirement  of Chief Justice Dogar, and progress on the Charter of Democracy  provisions related to the 17th amendment are all new PML-N  demands that will likely be highly controversial with President  Zardari.  Post believes that the Sharifs are likely flexible on  the 17th amendment but will hold firm to both the Dogar and  Taseer removals -- for largely personal reasons.  The offer to  negotiate on the sit-in venue is an important concession that  has the possibility to help improve security and minimize direct  confrontation during the long-march and that could serve as a  confidence building measure for future negotiations.  However,  Shahbaz's insistence on the lawyers' involvement in this process  could easily complicate the discussions significantly, and we  will need to continue to lean on the Sharifs to show leadership  and bring the lawyers to a reasonable compromise.  End Comment. 
 
  HUNT 
: 1.4 (d...