VZCZCXRO4054
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0789/01 0891515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301515Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8022
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018 
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL KHUM
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADERS ANNOUNCE TWO OPTIONS FOR 
INTERIM PERIOD 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 28 opposition leaders announced that 
they had agreed among themselves on two possible options for 
resolving the post-May 22 presidential continuity issue to a 
gathering of diplomatic representatives:  a transitional 
mechanism based on political consensus or a caretaker 
government based on the presidential succession articles of 
the Constitution.  Presidential candidates Anwarulhaq Ahadi 
and Abdullah Abdullah explained the options and answered the 
diplomatic attendees' questions during the politically and 
religiously influential Gailani family-hosted event.  The DCM 
stated that there is a need for continuity and stability of 
government from May 22 until the next inauguration as 
Afghanistan cannot afford the distraction of a prolonged 
political crisis while facing an insurgency, adding that we 
recognize the concerns of the opposition about a "level 
playing field" and believe addressing those concerns should 
be the focus of discussions leading to a political consensus 
on the way forward. During the ensuing discussion, the 
organizers made clear their preference for the caretaker 
government option, but implied they would accept President 
Karzai remaining in office through the next inauguration if 
election stakeholders could decide and implement conditions 
ensuring a level playing field for opposition candidates. 
The event was billed as a meeting of all opposition forces 
but the absentees (inter alia VP Massoud, Speaker Qanooni, 
Hazara Leader Mohaqqeq) were as noteworthy as the attendees. 
The presentation, explanation, and subsequent sidebar 
discussions as well as the absence and vague terms of the 
actual declaration all suggest disarray among the opposition 
rather than unity.  To the extent this was designed to force 
Karzai to negotiate on the opposition's terms, the initiative 
is likely to be seen as stillborn. 
 
Attendees 
---------- 
¶2. (C) The Afghan attendees included the organizers, Pir 
Gailani, head of the religiously and politically influential 
Gailani family and his son Hamid Gailani, Deputy Speaker of 
the Upper House, United Front presidential candidate Dr. 
Abdullah Abdullah, announced presidential candidate Dr. 
Anwarulhaq Ahadi, Junbesh Party leader Sayed Noorullah, 
United Front Leader and MP Burhanuddin Rabbani, royalist 
Mustafa Zahir, MP Ishaq Gailani (Hamid's cousin), MP Mahmud 
Gailani (Pir's grandson), and MP Mohammad Akbari.  Noorullah, 
Ishaq Gailani, and Zahir left abruptly at the speeches, 
conclusion, not staying for the following reception and 
informal conversation.  The foreign attendees included 
representatives from the U.K., German, Italian, Polish, 
Norwegian, and Saudi Embassies, among others. 
 
Notable Absentees 
---------- 
¶3. (C) Likely presidential candidate Ahmad Ali Jalali and 
United Front leader First Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud 
did not attend.  Hamid Gailani announced that Herat Governor 
Anwari represented Shia leader Ayatollah Mohseni and 
Ayatollah Orfani represented Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqqeq, 
although neither Anwari nor Orfani spoke up to confirm this 
assertion. Lower House Speaker and UF Leader Yunus Qanooni 
told poloff he participated in the drafting of the two 
options but did not attend the reception because he felt it 
was inappropriate as Parliament's leader to do so. 
 
Discussion 
----------- 
¶4. (C) Ahadi outlined the group's two options for the interim 
period:  1) a transition mechanism based on political 
consensus 2) an interim government following the line of 
succession delineated in the Afghan Constitution for cases of 
death or resignation of the President and Vice Presidents, 
which would likely mean Upper House Speaker Mojaddedi would 
serve as caretaker president.  Under pressure from the 
questions and comments of the international community, Ahadi 
admitted that one possible consensus approach would be for 
Karzai to remain in office until a new president is 
inaugurated. 
 
¶5. (C) The DCM presented the U.S. position:  the USG's new 
strategic plan announced on March 27 is a serious renewal of 
our commitment to Afghanistan, and it is designed to 
reinforce stability in Afghanistan precisely to help set the 
conditions for free and fair elections.  We would not welcome 
any solution which puts our commitment at risk especially one 
which would lead to a period of distraction, political 
turmoil, and weak governance in the critical electoral 
period.  There is a need for continuity and stability of 
government from May 22 until the next inauguration as 
Afghanistan cannot afford the distraction of a prolonged 
political crisis while facing an insurgency.  That said, we 
 
KABUL 00000789  002 OF 003 
 
 
recognize the concerns of the opposition about a "level 
playing field" and believe that should be the focus of any 
discussions leading to a political consensus on the way 
forward. 
 
¶6. (C) Later in the discussion, the British Charge presented 
the U.K. position: Afghan political leadership should take 
the lead in deciding how to resolve the continuity of 
authority issue.  However, there is a clear need for a stable 
government.  To that end, conditions to ensure a level 
playing field should be considered. 
 
¶7. (C) Ahadi rebutted the assertion that a caretaker 
government would negatively affect the country's security. 
The leadership of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of 
Defense, and National Directorate of Security would remain 
the same. Thus, the major ministries controlling security 
would continue as before, as would international military 
support.  Abdullah added that delaying making a decision 
about the interim period, rather than making the decision to 
put in a caretaker government, would lead to insecurity. 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to the German Ambassador's question 
regarding conditions necessary to guarantee a free and fair 
election, Abdullah claimed the voter registration numbers 
were artificially high and questioned the competence, 
effectiveness, and independence of the Independent Election 
Commission.  Ahadi alleged that some government departments 
are essentially campaigning for Karzai and claimed the group 
could provide detailed evidence of these activities if 
requested. 
 
¶9. (C) In conversation on the margins with the DCM, Ahadi 
said the opposition leaders' first choice was to have an 
interim government, led by someone other than Karzai.  Due to 
the international community's pressure for Karzai remaining 
in office, however, the leaders decided to present the second 
option of a political consensus, allowing Karzai to stay in 
office with limitations geared towards reducing his ability 
to unfairly tilt the election in his favor.  The 
international community should present its ideas for ways to 
limit Karzai's power and to level the playing field for the 
opposition, Ahadi said. 
 
Comment 
---------- 
¶10. (C) Mohaqqeq's absence and Noorullah's quick departure 
hints that both leaders (and thus at least factions of the 
Hazara Wahdat Party and the Uzbek Junbesh Party) are 
uncomfortable openly supporting the opposition.  Although the 
organizers were at pains to stress that the declaration had 
the support of such prominent figures as VP Massoud, Speaker 
Qanooni, Mohaqqeq, and others, and that these three had 
participated in all the discussions, their absence was 
noticeable.  That, the silence of key figures like Rabbani 
and the differing interpretations of what was meant by the 
phrase "transitional mechanism" suggest that there is little 
agreement on a way ahead even among those supposedly united 
in their opposition to Karzai.  In fact, what they mostly 
signaled was growing frustration that Karzai is in a 
commanding position to control the direction and pace of any 
negotiation. Finally, the weakness and inconsistency of the 
groups' self-serving arguments were on display to all: we 
accept the extra-constitutional election date but reject an 
extra-constitutional extension of Karzai's term of office; we 
are only concerned about a fair electoral process but want to 
change the government to achieve that; and, no one except us 
(especially not the Supreme Court or the Independent Election 
Commission) can be trusted to act only for the good of the 
nation. 
 
Declaration 
---------- 
BEGIN TEXT. 
In the Name of God 
Declaration of Heads of Political Parties and Prominent 
Political Personalities of Afghanistan 
On March 28th, 2009, a large number of Afghan political 
leaders met to discuss the issue of the end of the 
presidential term and the need for a transitional mechanism 
(May 22nd, 2009 until the taking of the oath of office by the 
newly elected president). The participants unanimously 
decided that: 
 
¶I. In accordance with article 61 of the constitution of 
Afghanistan, the term of the president ends on May 22nd of 
the 5th year after his or her election.  Thus, it is 
unconstitutional for the president and his vice presidents to 
remain in office after that date.  Any disregard of this 
provision of the constitution will cause serious political 
unrest throughout the country. 
 
 
KABUL 00000789  003 OF 003 
 
 
II. Taking into consideration the fact that elections are not 
going to be held within a time frame specified by the 
constitution, to avoid any vacuum of legitimate power and to 
ensure the transparency of the upcoming elections, it is 
imperative that all important stakeholders agree on one of 
the following two options: 
 
i. a political consensus on a transitional mechanism. 
 
ii. a transitional mechanism that is based on articles 67 and 
68 of the constitution. 
 
Given the urgency of the matter, and taking into 
consideration the importance of legitimacy of government and 
the transparency of elections, we hope that all stakeholders 
will, as soon as possible, accept one of the two alternatives 
for appointing a transitional head of state. 
END TEXT. 
 
WOOD