VZCZCXRO5449
RR RUEHAT RUEHSK
DE RUEHGV #0269/01 0901547
ZNR UUUUU ZZH PSA RMA
R 311547Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8229
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2993

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000269 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR IO-RHS, L-HRR, DRL-MLGA, 
 
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNHRC
 
SUBJECT: Human Rights Council 10th Session - Postmortem 
 
Ref: (A) Storella-IO-RHS-DL et al email March 23, 2009 
(B) Chambers-IO-RHS-DL et al email March 27, 2009 (vote count) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Human Rights Council (HRC) concluded its 10th session 
on March 27.  The United States participated actively as an observer 
in the Council for the first time in nearly a year.  Passing over 30 
resolutions, the session produced mixed results, continuing some of 
the disappointing trends  that have characterized the work of the 
Council since its inception.  Positive highlights included solid 
resolutions on Burma, the DPRK, arbitrary detention, torture, and 
human rights while countering terrorism, all with U.S. support and 
co-sponsorship.  Lowlights were the passage of yet another 
defamation of religion resolution, a Cuban resolution to create a 
special procedures mandate on Cultural Diversity, and a weak 
resolution on the DRC.  The HRC paid very little attention to 
burning human rights issues such as Sri Lanka or Darfur, and 
continued its structurally unbalanced criticism of Israel.  Of 
equally negative consequence were the many procedural attacks and 
counter-productive initiatives that diverted the CouncilQs attention 
and further demonstrated the powerful and entrenched interests of 
delegations such as Egypt, Pakistan, and South Africa. 
 
¶2. (SBU) USG participation in the negotiations directly improved 
many resolutions; however, those gains attributable to the United 
States were marginal when compared with the overall need to improve 
the general direction of the HRC. 
 
¶3. Nevertheless, many delegations and NGOs spoke positively about 
U.S. reengagement, saying that our presence helped shape the debate 
and provide a voice that others needed to hear.  End summary. 
 
Poor Grades for the Council Session 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Although still early to evaluate fully the results, 
diplomats and NGOs we have spoken with to date have given the 10th 
session mixed but largely negative reviews.  A well-respected NGO 
representative told us that in his long career of observing the 
Human Rights Council and its predecessor Commission, this session 
was the worst.  He equated it to adolescents picking fights and 
calling votes to win points, as opposed to a serious body addressing 
serious issues. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Many diplomats with whom we spoke were disappointed with 
the session, but found it to be comparable with previous ones.  Some 
diplomats took solace in the several solid resolutions (see below 
and Ref B for full list of resolutions and vote counts). 
 
Evaluating U.S. Reengagement 
---------------------------- 
¶7. (U) Based on Ref A outlines for success, the USG did reasonably 
well this session. 
 
8.(SBU) CHANGING THE TONE: Active USG engagement and broad coverage 
made clear the U.S. had returned to the Council.  We met with a 
large number of special procedures mandate holders, most of whom 
lauded the USGQs new approach and policies.  Our public remarks in 
side events and in plenary about detainee policies, the PresidentQs 
Executive Orders and many other issues were extremely well received. 
 Using our voice often in plenary interventions attracted press 
inquiries, requests for our statements, and frequent comments that 
the U.S. was taking a new approach to many issues.  Our PA section 
maintained real-time updates on the Mission website of our 
interventions, which were picked up by international media outlets. 
Most notable to the diplomatic community was the professional 
competence that the USG brought to the table during the negotiations 
of resolutions.  Delegations of all stripes told us repeatedly that 
U.S. viewpoints were often able to carry the day because they were 
well-articulated and founded on a clear understanding of law and 
practice. 
 
¶9. (SBU) That said, the session featured typical over-emphasis on 
Israel (per the structural imbalance codified in an agenda item 
dedicated to the Occupied Palestinian Territories) and a 
particularly egregious effort by Egypt and some other OIC countries 
to hold Israel to a different standard than any other country with 
respect to the Universal periodic Review (UPR) process, by demanding 
that Israel explicitly indicate its acceptance or rejection of each 
of the recommendations made, something very few countries have done 
and which is not required by the rules.  Our quick intervention in 
Geneva, Cairo, and Washington helped prevent the Egyptians from 
making a bad situation worse. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Council also lost an opportunity seriously to address 
 
GENEVA 00000269  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
human rights in the DRC, and paid only scant attention to burning 
human rights issues in countries such as Sri Lanka or Darfur.  Of 
equally negative consequence were the many procedural attacks and 
counter-productive initiatives that diverted the CouncilQs attention 
and further demonstrated the powerful and entrenched interests of 
delegations such as Egypt, Pakistan, and South Africa. 
 
¶11. (SBU) USG objections to the worst attempts to undermine the 
Council may have helped bolster others who agree with us, and our 
efforts to raise important country-specific issues did draw some 
attention to those problems.  However, the overall tone of the HRC 
remained confrontational and unbalanced, and the USGQs presence this 
session may have had only a marginal effect in altering that. 
 
¶12. (SBU) ADVANCING KEY MANDATES:  The renewal of the special 
procedures mandates on Burma and DPRK was particularly positive. 
The Burma resolution passed by consensus and active negotiation by 
the USDel ensured that the compromise language remained strong.  The 
Somalia mandate renewal, although only six months in duration, was 
an improvement from the initial three months proposed by the African 
Group.  Heavy USG lobbying over the past several weeks may better 
position us to engage positively when the mandate comes up for 
renewal in September. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Of great disappointment was the extremely weak resolution 
on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  The African Group, 
led by Egypt, squelched the EUQs efforts to create an independent 
expert mandate, despite heavy USG lobbying in Geneva and Kinshasa. 
Egypt tabled a weak, competing resolution and eventually used a 
rarely invoked procedural vote to sideline the EU text.  Repeated 
EU, U.S. and like-minded proposals and concessions that would have 
only minimally altered the African Group text met with continued 
refusals by the DRC and the African Group (read: Egypt) to make any 
compromise at all.  In the end, Egyptian and DRC intransigence 
prompted the EU to table a very modest package of amendments from 
the floor, which failed to pass.  The only silver lining was that 
the vote against the EU amendments (21N 18Y 8A) was only narrowly 
lost--and included abstentions by Senegal, Ghana, and Burkina Faso, 
demonstrating a rare break from monolithic African Group voting. 
 
¶14. (SBU) IMPROVING RESOLUTIONS: The greatest USG contribution to 
this session can possibly be found in the many small and large 
improvements to individual resolutions.  We were able to co-sponsor 
seven (DPRK, Burma, Torture, Arbitrary Detention, Counter-Terrorism, 
Disabilities, and for the first time the Argentine QRight to 
TruthQ/Forensics resolution).  USG lobbying in capital and in Geneva 
helped press Egypt to postpone its freedom of religion resolution. 
 
¶15. (SBU)After lengthy negotiations, the EUQs resolution on 
religious intolerance was rejected by Pakistan on behalf of the OIC. 
 In a last minute attempt to secure consensus, the EU reverted to 
their original tabled text for adoption by the HRC, which resulted 
in adoption of a weaker text than the USG was ultimately able to 
co-sponsor.  The resolution passed without a majority.  The OIC, led 
by Pakistan, abstained because the resolution did not include 
adequate language condemning expressions of religious intolerance, 
among other reasons. 
 
¶16. For the first time South Africa cast the lone opposing vote, 
claiming the text insufficiently addressed redress to victims of 
discrimination based on religion or belief, and thereby diminished 
the real plight of those who suffer from such discrimination. 
 
¶17. (SBU) The USG also secured a slight increase in support to 
oppose the defamation of religions resolution.  In a first for the 
Group of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (GRULAC), Chile voted 
against the resolution, signaling that this problematic concept is 
not a fight between the QNorthQ and QSouth.Q  The defamation 
resolution passed as expected, but with the QnoQ and Qabstention 
votes again greater than the QyesQ votes.  Although the vote was 
similar to previous years, an increasing number of abstaining 
countries, particularly among the GRULAC, indicated to us privately 
that they were moving towards no votes.  Japan and Brazil issued 
explanations of vote for their abstentions that offered hope that 
they may be moving towards no votes and ChileQs strongly worded 
defense of their no vote provided added pressure on states that 
traditionally abstain or support the resolution. Other delegations 
such as Ghana and Bosnia were grateful for our outreach on 
defamation, which helped them articulate arguments to their capitals 
in favor of abstentions or no votes. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Several very problematic resolutions passed, such as the 
Cuban initiative to create a mandate on Cultural Diversity, South 
African resolutions on racism and on complementary standards, plus 
five resolutions related to Israel. 
 
Comments 
 
GENEVA 00000269  003 OF 003 
 
 
-------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) The U.S. managed our reengagement competently and in a 
manner that elicited substantial good will.  However, the sessionQs 
true successes appear outweighed by its failures and shortcomings. 
We will long be fighting the many problematic resolutions adopted, 
such as the resolution on complementary standards to the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.  While presented as a procedural resolution for the 
purpose of confirming the continued mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, 
its legacy will be substantive.  The resolution expresses the need 
to enhance the momentum of the process of elaborating complementary 
standards with a view to ensuring the timely fulfillment of the Ad 
Hoc CommitteeQs mandate.  That mandate has been interpreted-Qdespite 
vigorous protest from the EU and other like-minded delegations--by 
OIC and African Group delegations to include the elaboration of new 
normative instruments, such as an Optional Protocol to the ICERD 
that would seek to protect against, among other things, the 
defamation of religions.  Equally worrisome is the level of support 
this resolution received: it was adopted with 34 votes in favor 
(including Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico) and 13 against 
(primarily EU members). 
 
¶20. (SBU) As both the closing act and one of the defining moments of 
the session, a debate about the usefulness of the vote on the DRC 
resolution will likely ensue.  The vote on the EUQs modest 
amendments was surprisingly close and demonstrated two things: the 
Europeans and other like-mindeds will not always go-along to get 
along, and the African Group moderates will not always support Egypt 
and the hardliners when the situation merits better action by the 
Council.  If the DRC vote is subsequently spun as a confrontational 
fight, it could become a rallying call for the NAM to push against 
the Qwest.Q  If it is characterized as a principled disagreement and 
effort to improve human rights in a dire situation, it could provide 
the opportunity to encourage greater cooperation with African 
moderates who generally prefer to keep their heads down.  We will 
continue our efforts to court greater independence by those 
moderates. 
 
¶21. (SBU) In the bigger picture, the HRC remains a problematic body. 
 Its membership is skewed in favor of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference and the African Group.  Key players from those 
groups -Q particularly Egypt, South Africa and Pakistan -- guard 
their entrenched dominance with vigor.  Their secure majority 
translates into a readiness to be confrontational without concern 
for the consequences.  Even if the USG is more influential than 
other like-minded delegations, improving the HRC and changing its 
dynamics is a long-term project, will be a significant struggle, and 
will require a coordinated effort in Washington, New York, Geneva, 
and foreign capitals.  These dynamics Q- and the desire of many to 
keep them -Q will also shape the upcoming 2011 review of the HRC. 
End comment.