VZCZCXYZ0017
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDJ #0156/01 0601658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADDEDD ADDEE AD037A278 TOQ3640 508)
R 011658Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0171
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0001
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0001
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMCSUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 000156 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, EAP/J AND PM 
AFRICOM, PACOM, AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (ADDRESSEES) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-03-01 
TAGS: PREL PHSA MARR MOPS JA DJ SO XA
SUBJECT: JAPAN SEEKS TO DEPLOY P-3 AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS TO DJIBOUTI FOR 
COUNTER-PIRACY 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibo 
 
uti; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Mid-February discussions with visiting Japanese 
officials--from the Diet, MFA, MOD, and Japanese embassies in Addis 
Ababa and London--suggest that Japan is preparing to deploy two 
P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and possibly two JMSDF frigates to 
Djibouti, in order to support international counter-piracy efforts. 
As constitutional limits restrict the JMSDF to protecting only 
"Japanese interests", new legislation would be required; Japanese 
parliamentarians comprising a delegation that visited CJTF-HOA (the 
only U.S. military base in Africa) included former defense minister 
Gen Nakatani and former senior vice minister of foreign affairs 
Katsuhito Asano.  Japanese MFA officials report that Japan may 
establish a liaison office in Djibouti, and is considering a SOFA 
with Djibouti.  Japanese planners express interest in using U.S. 
military facilities in Djibouti, but limited ramp space is a 
constraint; U.S. officials also underscore that Japan must engage 
in bilateral talks with Djibouti to gain the host government's 
approval.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
P-3 PLANES "ALMOST CERTAIN" TO DEPLOY TO DJIBOUTI 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) During a February 19 working luncheon with Emboffs, Japanese 
Ambassador Kinichi Komano (resident in Addis Ababa) said Japan was 
"almost certain" to deploy P-3 maritime patrol aircraft to 
Djibouti, to conduct counter-piracy operations.  Japan was also 
deciding where to deploy 2 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
(JMSDF) ships; Komano said he was recommending that both the ships 
and aircraft deploy to Djibouti, as supporting them would be easier 
if they were co-located.  He expected Japan's Prime Minister to 
decide in early March, following a report from MFA and MOD 
technical experts.  According to Komano, JMSDF ships would likely 
 
arrive first, taking 20 days to travel from Japan to Djibouti.  On 
the other hand, P-3 aircraft would likely not deploy until early 
May or June. 
 
¶3. (C) Citing constitutional restrictions on the overseas 
deployment of Japan's military, Komano said he expected the Diet to 
draft legislation in early March expanding the limited scope of 
Japan's "national defense", to allow protection of foreign 
shipping.  Currently, Japan's Self-Defense Force could only protect 
"Japanese interests," which even under the "most expansionist" 
interpretation was limited to Japanese ships or sailors, or to 
goods originating from Japan.  It was "almost impossible" to change 
Japan's constitution, as amendments required approval of two-thirds 
of the Diet; thus, new legislation was needed, Komano explained. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
JAPAN: STILL DOES NOT RECOGNIZE SOMALI GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) Responding to the observation that Japan had not recognized 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, Amb. Komano 
explained that Japan was following "the Afghanistan model":  i.e., 
recognition would follow only after "a period" of security. 
Despite being a major donor country, Japan would not provide 
financial assistance until a conference on reconstruction was 
convened, he said.  (NOTE: Amb. Komano's previous assignment was as 
Japan's ambassador to Afghanistan.  END NOTE.)  Nevertheless, 
recognizing that President Sheikh Sharif led an expanded 
administration recognized by the United Nations, the EU, and the 
United States, Komano said he was recommending to Tokyo that Japan 
recognize the new government of Somalia.  Japan needed to be part 
of the political process, not just serve as a donor after the fact, 
he said. 
 
¶5. (C) On other regional issues, Amb. Komano reported the following 
from his bilateral consultations: 
-- Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mohamoud Ali Youssouf had reported 
that Somali President Sharif had said that parliamentary committees 
comprised of 30-40 MPs would work on behalf of the entire Somali 
parliament, as there was no conference building that could 
accommodate all 500-plus MPs.  On the Djibouti-Eritrea border 
 
 
 
conflict, Komano noted that Djiboutian President Guelleh had been 
invited to participate as an observer in Sana'a Forum talks, as the 
Forum originally comprised countries experiencing tensions with 
Eritrea (e.g., Ethiopia, Sudan, and Yemen), although Yemen no 
longer felt threatened by Eritrea. 
-- Russian Ambassador Alexander Bregadze said Russia was looking at 
developing Berbera as one of two possible alternative ports to 
Djibouti (no explanation was given for this move). 
-- Brigadier General Philippe LeFort, Commander of French forces in 
Djibouti, reportedly said France would seek this year to extend its 
use of French military bases in Djibouti for another 20-30 years. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARIANS VISIT U.S. MILITARY 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In a separate February 11 meeting at the headquarters of the 
U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Japanese 
officials (from the Diet, MOD, MFA, and Japanese embassies in 
London and Addis Ababa) focused on Japan's intent to deploy P-3C 
aircraft to Djibouti, and asked whether Japanese aircraft could use 
U.S. facilities in Djibouti.  Japanese ships were already deployed 
in the Indian Ocean in support of counter-terrorism and Operation 
Enduring Freedom; Japan hoped next to deploy forces to support 
counter-piracy.  Katsuhito Asano, member of Japan's House of 
Representatives and a former senior vice minister of foreign 
Affairs, reported that Japan had ninety (90) P-3C aircraft, most of 
which were deployable. 
 
¶7. (C) While responding that Japan's request for P-3C assistance 
would be conveyed to the Department and to AFRICOM, U.S. officials 
noted that although ramp space was being expanded, work would not 
be completed until the end of 2009; U.S. facilities in Djibouti 
were already at maximum capacity with existing aircraft, and other 
space available belonged to the Government of Djibouti. 
 
¶8. (C) Asano said the principal purpose of the delegation's visit 
to Djibouti was to prepare the way for bilateral Japan-Djibouti 
talks: the delegation had already met with President Guelleh and 
Foreign Minister Youssouf.  Asano concluded by noting that the 
delegation would meet the CTF-151 (counter-piracy) task force 
commander, and by expressing hope that the United States would 
implement intelligence-sharing with Japanese forces.  (NOTE: In 
addition to Asano, the delegation also included former defense 
minister Gen Nakatani and Shigeki Sato, both ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party members of the House of Representatives, as well 
as senior research officer Shigenobu Tamura of the LDP Policy 
Research Council.  END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
JAPAN CONSIDERING MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE IN DJIBOUTI 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶9. (C) In a February 12 meeting with DCM and Emboffs, Japanese MFA 
officials reported that Japan was considering establishing a 
liaison office in Djibouti.  According to Makita Shimokawa, 
Director of the National Security Policy Division in the MFA's 
Foreign Policy Bureau, the liaison office could comprise a 
political officer and a defense attache.  MFA First Africa Division 
officer Masakazu Hisaeda said Japan currently had no plans to 
establish a full-fledged embassy in Djibouti; Japan's embassy in 
Addis Ababa covered Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti, whereas other 
Japanese embassies in Africa typically covered 5-7 countries. 
 
¶10. (C) Shimokawa said the Japanese defense ministry was 
considering deploying two frigates, and between two to three P-3C 
aircraft, to either Djibouti, Yemen, or Oman.  The JMSDF had 
dispatched technical fact-finding teams to the region, to examine 
options for both air and naval operations.  Shimokawa, who stated 
his portfolio included responsibility for the deployment of Japan 
Self-Defense Forces outside the Japan-U.S. alliance, said Japan 
sought a cooperative framework with the United States:  Japan was 
currently participating in CTF-150 (counter-terrorism), and needed 
 
 
 
to work on engagement with AFRICOM. 
 
¶11. (C) Shimokawa said he had met with the Djiboutian MFA's 
director of bilateral affairs to discuss a possible status of 
forces agreement (SOFA).  The GODJ sought to include a clause on 
assistance to the Djibouti military--not from Japan's MOD but from 
the Ministry of Transport, to build capacity for developing a coast 
guard, and to support the establishment of an IMO maritime training 
center.  Shimokawa noted that Japan lacked a mechanism such as 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for foreign military cooperation; 
Japanese constitutional limits may even forbid training of foreign 
troops, he said. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT.  Japanese proposals to deploy military assets and 
possibly establish a liaison office in Djibouti would significantly 
enlarge Japanese engagement in the Horn of Africa.  Japan currently 
has no diplomatic representation in Djibouti (except for a sole 
Djiboutian businessman who serves as honorary consul); however, 
Japan sends 2-3 Djiboutian officials annually to study in Japan, 
and has several JICA volunteers working in Djibouti.  China has a 
small embassy in Djibouti but has financed several high-profile 
construction projects (e.g., the foreign ministry headquarters, 
convention hall, and stadium); Korea (which has also sent 
representatives to Djibouti to examine possible counter-piracy 
deployments) currently only has a single liaison officer seconded 
to CJTF-HOA.  The possible deployment of East Asian counter-piracy 
assets to Djibouti (and their desire to use U.S. military 
facilities) would be a counterpoint to the growing number of EU 
naval forces in Djibouti currently using French facilities.  END 
COMMENT. 
  
WONG 
 
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