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S E C R E T USEU BRUSSELS 000206 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA NDEAN, EUR/RPM PCHISHOLM, PM 
JFREDERICK, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR DGORDNER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHSA EWWT EAID PTER XI XO XW
ZR, EUN 
SUBJECT: WORKING WITH THE EU,S COUNTER-PIRACY HEADQUARTERS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 4610 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 5934 
 
Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C//NF)  Summary:  USEU representatives visited the EU's 
counter-piracy Operational Headquarters (OHQ) on January 16, 
where interlocutors described the EU's operations and 
information sharing arrangements with the U.S. and NATO.  To 
make maximum use of a limited force,  the OHQ  collects 
information about merchant ships transiting the Gulf of Aden, 
conducts a risk-based assessment of each vessel, provides 
advice to the merchant, and sends guidance to EU naval forces 
on which commercial ships are at greatest risk.  This 
economy-of-force approach also ensures strong links to 
industry.  OHQ interlocutors described strong coordination 
between U.S., NATO, and EU forces and headquarters, 
expressing concerns only about technical obstacles to U.S.-EU 
information sharing.  They also described  planning for 
potential EU involvement in longer-term capacity building  in 
the region.  We can leverage the structures and processes 
that the EU's OHQ has designed to increase the EU's 
involvement in counter-piracy, and to improve NATO-EU 
cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The EU's naval counter-piracy operation, Atalanta, 
launched in December 2008, has a one-year mandate to escort 
World Food Program shipments to Somalia, to provide 
protection to vulnerable merchant shipping, and to conduct 
surveillance of the area.  The UK is leading the operation 
from its headquarters in Northwood, outside London.  On 
January 16, USEU representatives visited the UK-led 
Operational Headquarters (OHQ) for Atalanta.  The 
operation,s chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, deputy 
assistant chief of staff for intelligence, chief of plans and 
policy, and political adviser described the OHQ,s approach 
to protecting merchant vessels.  Our interlocutors described 
the conduct of operations, the OHQ,s links to industry, 
liaison and information sharing with the U.S. and NATO, and 
planners, early thinking about how else the EU could provide 
counter-piracy support. 
Creative Approach to Protecting Commercial Shipping 
¶3.  (C)  Our interlocutors stressed that with only four to 
six frigates ) one of which is almost always dedicated to 
World Food Program escort duties ) and two maritime patrol 
aircraft, EU naval forces cannot protect the hundreds of 
merchant ships that move through the Gulf of Aden each day. 
Instead, the OHQ has devised a Group Transit Concept, whereby 
the OHQ collects information from merchant ships via its 
website, then advises those ships on when they should transit 
a pre-designated corridor.  This allows EU forces to monitor 
those vessels at greatest risk and to ensure that a number of 
merchant ships are clustered when they reach particular areas 
at particular times of the day.  The group of merchant ships 
can provide mutual reassurance, while EU naval forces know 
where those ships are positioned so they can respond rapidly 
to pirate attacks. 
Reaching Out to Industry 
¶4.  (C)  This approach relies heavily on cooperation from and 
coordination with industry, something the OHQ ensures through 
its Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa website 
(www.mschoa.eu).  According to our interlocutors, in its 
first six weeks of operation, the website collected 4,700 
registrations from 1,200 companies and ship operators.  When 
a merchant registers, it provides the EU with a description 
of its vessel, its cargo and its destination.  The OHQ uses 
that information to perform a risk-based assessment, after 
which it sends advice to the merchant ship.  The OHQ also 
alerts the forward Force Headquarters ) currently aboard the 
Greek frigate Psara ) to the vulnerability of various 
vessels.  In this way, EU naval forces not only know which 
merchant vessels are most at risk, they also encourage those 
vessels to participate in the Group Transits described in 
paragraph 3.  (The EU does not provide industry with its 
risk-based assessment, but uses it internally to evaluate 
those ships it says are in the greatest danger.)  While the 
OHQ admits that it is too early to judge the effectiveness of 
this system, the initial results are encouraging. 
¶5.  (S//NF)  With growing cooperation from the shipping 
industry, the Northwood OHQ has already laid the foundation 
for the counter-piracy coordination center (CPCC) under 
discussion in the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of 
Somalia  (REF A).  USEU contacts at the OHQ and the UK 
Permanent Representation in Brussels stress that London could 
probably agree politically to have the OHQ serve as an 
interim CPCC, but security and bandwidth are concerns. 
Specifically, with the Northwood base being home to EU, NATO, 
and UK national headquarters, and with the base undergoing 
significant construction, the UK is concerned about providing 
access to all the countries in the Contact Group, especially 
Russia and China.  The lack of bandwidth may have a simpler 
solution, with interlocutors at the OHQ suggesting that the 
Contact Group could provide the funding to furnish sufficient 
bandwidth. 
Strong Cooperation With U.S. and NATO 
¶6.  (C)  Our interlocutors described cooperation with the 
United States as &extremely good,8 praising the meetings in 
Bahrain earlier that week between the EU,s operation 
commander, Rear Admiral Philip Jones, and NAVCENT commander, 
U.S. Vice Admiral William Gortney.  Our contacts also 
described the integration of the EU,s liaison officer in 
Bahrain into important meetings and briefings.  The EU is 
participating in shared awareness and deconfliction meetings 
and may host the next such meeting at the Northwood 
headquarters. 
¶7.  (C//NF)  Our interlocutors, however, also mentioned the 
limits on information sharing, specifically the lack of a REL 
EU designation that would allow for the sharing of U.S. 
information with all EU Member States.   (Note: The Council 
Secretariat expressed a similar concern when PolOff delivered 
REF B letter on information sharing on January 22.)  USEU 
understands that NAVCENT and the EU are working through this 
issue, and that the EU has dispatched a liaison officer to 
the Combined Maritime Forces J2. 
¶8.  (C//NF)  The OHQ has also established communication with 
the collocated NATO headquarters and with JFC Naples, and 
informal NATO-EU information sharing is taking place, but our 
interlocutors suggested that this should remain below the 
political radar.  When asked directly, they said the OHQ had 
no concerns about operating alongside Standing NATO Maritime 
Group 1, should it be tasked with counter-piracy, as long as 
NATO operations were fully coordinated with the EU. 
What Next? 
¶9.  (C)  The OHQ acknowledged that, for now, the EU has 
adopted an &end date8 rather than an &end state8  for 
Operation Atalanta, which is scheduled to end in December 
¶2009.  However, the OHQ,s plans and policy shop is 
contemplating options for counter-piracy engagement ashore ) 
options which could theoretically encourage the Member States 
to extend the EU,s engagement in the region, albeit with a 
different focus.  The OHQ is preparing a paper for the EU 
Military Staff, entitled &Over and Above,8 that outlines 
options for engagement on shore.  There is currently no 
political will to pursue kinetic military operations against 
pirates ashore and no discussion at the political level of 
extending the Atalanta mission, but planners suggest that the 
EU may agree to pursue regional capacity building.  Key 
questions include how to work with all the players in the 
region, what the role of the African Union should be, and 
what kind of support the EU could bring to bear. 
¶10.  (C) Comment:  We can capitalize on the OHQ's work being 
done by encouraging the EU to use the OHQ as the foundation 
for the CPCC under the Contact Group.  This would deepen the 
EU's involvement and provide the Contact Group with an 
already-established capability, but would require that we 
resolve the UK,s concerns about security and bandwidth. 
Should we ask this of the EU, we should also emphasize our 
commitment to a robust, informal U.S.-EU information 
exchange, per REF B.  We can also encourage the EU to 
consider a longer-term capacity building role, which would 
get the EU engaged in addressing the root causes of piracy 
and may keep them involved after the mandate for Atalanta 
expires in December 2009.  In addition, as NATO contemplates 
similar capacity building with the African Union, this would 
be a good test case for NATO-EU cooperation.  End Comment. 
MURRAY 
.