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PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0380/01 0441023
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P 131023Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8132
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0498
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000380 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2024 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS TU SY KPWG IS
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER OLMERT DISCUSSES HAMAS, PALESTINIAN 
AUTHORITY, AND SYRIA WITH CODEL SMITH 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador James B. Cunningham for reasons 
 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY.  Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met with 
Ambassador Cunningham and members and staff of the House 
Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence on January 29 to discuss Israel's recent 
military operation in Gaza, peace talks with the 
Palestinians, and the possibility of conducting negotiations 
with Syria.  Olmert assessed that Operation Cast Lead's 
results had some promise but confided that some challenges 
remained.  He defended Israel's conduct, stressing that 
Israel worked hard to avoid harming civilians.  He credited 
the 2006 war in Lebanon with discouraging Hizballah to 
intercede during the operation in Gaza, claiming that 
Hizballah knew it lost the war.  Olmert explained that it was 
important that any rebuilding done in Gaza be seen as 
benefiting the moderate Palestinian Authority (PA) 
leadership.  More importantly, he said, it was necessary to 
reach a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians.  He then 
outlined what he said he proposed to PA President Mahmud 
Abbas and said he has been waiting more than four months for 
a response from the Palestinian leader.  Turning to Syria, 
Olmert told his interlocutors that Israeli officials were in 
Ankara, Turkey in January to finalize the agenda for formal 
Israeli-Syrian negotiations, but he averred that Syrian 
President Bashar al-Asad scuttled the process.  Nevertheless, 
he explained that he still favored pursuing talks with Syria 
and encouraged the U.S. to lead international efforts while 
requiring Syrian actions before providing Damascus with any 
tangible benefits.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Attending the meeting on the Israeli side were 
Olmert, foreign policy adviser Shalom Turgeman, Israel's 
ambassador to the U.S. Sallai Meridor, government spokesman 
Mark Regev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Yaron 
Siderman, and Yael Apter.  The U.S. delegation consisted of 
the Ambassador; Reps. Adam Smith (D-WA), Susan Davis (D-CA), 
Ted Poe (R-TX), Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD), Gabrielle 
Giffords (D-AZ), Frank Kratovil (D-MD), and Glenn Nye (D-VA); 
staff members Bill Natter, Alex Kugajevsky, John Bohanon, and 
Robert Minehart; military escorts David Colberg and David 
Silverman; and Poloff. 
 
GAZA 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Olmert began the meeting with an assessment of the 
recent conflict in the Gaza Strip.  He said that the 
operation there could help change the reality, but that 
Israeli leaders knew the hostilities ended at a fragile point 
and it did not take long for rocket fire to resume.  Olmert 
defended Israeli actions, stressing that most countries had 
forgotten that dozens of rockets fell on Israeli cities in 
the days leading up to the Israeli incursion.  He contrasted 
Israeli tactics he said were designed to minimize civilian 
casualties with HAMAS's attacks that target civilians. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Olmert assessed Hizballah's response to Israel's 
military operation in Gaza, suggesting that Hizballah 
refrained from targeting Israel during Operation Cast Lead 
because the terror group remained chastened from its conflict 
with Israel in 2006.  He cited as evidence of Hizballah's 
fears that Hizballah's leader Hassan Nasrallah "has been in a 
bunker for the last two years - with good reason."  He 
continued:  "Israeli newspapers told Hizballah that they won, 
but their leaders know they lost the war in 2006." 
 
¶5.  (C) Olmert told the delegation that it was important that 
the moderate Palestinian leadership get credit for the 
rebuilding that would take place in Gaza.  He added, however, 
that he was "not optimistic" that all countries - 
specifically Arab nations - would make good on their pledges 
to aid Palestinians in Gaza, pointing out that much of the 
money pledged as part of the Annapolis process had failed to 
be delivered. 
 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS 
 
¶6.  (S) More important than the conflict in Gaza, he 
continued, was the need to reach a lasting agreement with the 
Palestinians.  Olmert then sketched out for the delegation 
the outlines of the proposal he offered to PA  President 
Abbas, specifying that an agreement reached based on these 
proposals would not be implemented while HAMAS controlled 
Gaza.   The plan, which he said would give the Palestinians a 
realistic vision of what a state would look like, included a 
contiguous Palestinian state "based on" the 1967 lines, with 
Israel keeping a small portion beyond the Green Line and 
compensating the Palestinians with land in Israel and 
providing for safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank. 
 
TEL AVIV 00000380  002 OF 002 
 
 
Olmert said he also offered to divide Jerusalem into Arab and 
Jewish sectors with universal access to the Holy Basin, which 
would be administered jointly by the U.S., Israel, Palestine, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.  He rejected a right of return for 
Palestinian refugees (though he allowed for the possibility 
of "some" humanitarian cases over the course of five years), 
and said a fund would compensate both Palestinians for their 
"suffering" and Jews who left Arab countries for Israel. 
Olmert told the delegation that he has been waiting more than 
four months for a response from Abbas and wondered whether 
the worst scenario for Palestinian leaders would be for 
Israel to accept their demands, forcing them to decide 
whether they really want peace.  "I made my choice," he 
concluded. 
 
THE SYRIA TRACK 
 
¶7.  (S) When asked about negotiations with Syria, Olmert 
informed the delegation that he had gone to Ankara in 
December hoping to finalize an agenda for formal negotiations 
with Syria.  However, the talks fizzled after Turkish premier 
Tayyip Erdogan spoke with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, 
according to Olmert, and Asad established new conditions for 
going forward.  He added that he was disappointed by Syria's 
cooperation with Iran and HAMAS during Operation Cast Lead, 
but that he was in favor of pursuing peace with Damascus if 
it showed it can deliver on its pledges.  He encouraged the 
U.S., rather than Europe, to lead international efforts to 
moderate Syria, but he stressed that Damascus "should not be 
given anything until they act first." 
 
¶8.  (U) CODEL Smith did not review or clear this message. 
 
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CUNNINGHAM