R 101128Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1162
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
INFO AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
FBI WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000257 
 
NOFORN 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR DNSA FOR HS AND CT BRENNAN 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019 
TAGS: PTER KDRG KISL YM
SUBJECT: REVIEWING YEMEN'S PREVIOUS EXTREMIST 
REHABILITATION PROGRAM AND EXAMINING ITS PLANS FOR A NEW ONE 
 
REF: SANAA 168 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U) From 2002 through 2005, Yemen conducted an extremist 
rehabilitation program that is believed to have had some 
success.  This report outlines what is known about that 
program and how it worked, and compares what is known about 
the ROYG's current plans for a rehabilitation center to it. 
While recent movement on the rehabilitation center is 
welcome, there is still a long way to go before Yemen is 
ready to accept the return of its GTMO detainees.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
The Old Program 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In 2002, Judge Hamoud al-Hitar undertook a program to 
reform extremists through dialog.  The program was simple and 
relied primarily on conducting a dialog with imprisoned 
extremists to convince them that terrorism and violence were 
not consistent with the teachings of Islam.  420 individuals 
passed through the program many of whom were returnees from 
foreign jihad, including some returning from Afghanistan. 
Initial startup costs were negligible.  The dialogs were held 
in an empty room at the prison and the prisoners were housed 
with the rest of the prison population.  The primary expense 
was providing the participants pencils, paper, and research 
materials to support their participation.  The participants 
were given ample time to research and establish their 
positions and then would sit with Hitar, who would discuss 
their positions and present his point of view.  This process 
would be repeated as needed until the participant was 
convinced to disavow terrorism. 
 
¶3.  (C) Hitar emphasized to POL/E Chief on February 4 that 
the key to the program was not necessarily the content of the 
dialog but how it was conducted.  "It is important to respect 
the ethics of the dialog," he said.  "Each side should be 
given adequate time and the humanity of the participants must 
be respected."  He added that each case was different and 
each participant had different needs.  "You have to be like a 
doctor," he said, "except a doctor diagnoses the body and you 
must diagnose the thinking." 
 
¶4.  (C) As an example, Hitar offered the story of one young 
extremist.  When Hitar first met with him the young man 
refused to "Salaam" him.  (Note:  Hitar explained to POL/E 
Chief that exchanging the traditional greeting "Salaam 
Alaikum" means more than simply saying hello.  It also 
constitutes a promise not to attack.  Therefore, a refusal to 
exchange the greeting can be seen as tantamount to a threat. 
End Note.)  Hitar commenced the dialog by asking the young 
man about himself.  After ascertaining that the man had been 
married shortly before his arrest, he asked if the man had 
been afforded the chance to be with his wife.  When the man 
said he had not, Hitar summoned the warden and asked if the 
prison had a place where prisoners could visit with their 
wives.  The warden said there was no such place and Hitar 
directed him to find a place for the young man to be with his 
wife even if that place was the warden's office. 
 
¶5.  (C) Hitar then asked the young man if he had been given 
access to the books he needed to prepare his arguments.  The 
young man answered no and Hitar asked him to list the books 
he needed.  Then Hitar summoned the warden again and directed 
him to provide the young man with the books on the list.  The 
warden replied that some of the books were banned and Hitar 
responded that books may be banned outside of the dialog but 
no books were banned within the dialog.  Having secured for 
the young man the right to see his new wife and access to the 
books he requested, Hitar did not return to see him for four 
months.  After four months when Hitar entered the dialog room 
the young man not only greeted him, but the two embraced and 
cried together.  By respecting the man's human needs and 
showing him compassion, Hitar asserted that he had broken 
down the wall of his resistance. 
 
¶6. (C) Hitar added that the program was designed to continue 
after the extremists were returned to society. As conceived, 
someone would visit the participant at regular intervals to 
a) ensure that he had not returned to extremism and b) to 
help him cope with the pressures of reintegration.  If the 
participant did not have a trade, Hitar specified that he 
should be given training.  If he needed money to set up a 
business, he should be given financial assistance.  Hitar, 
however, put primary importance on the counseling aspect of 
the follow-on program.  If the participant said he was having 
trouble getting along with his boss at work the visitor 
should offer to go to his work site and help mediate. If the 
participant was found to be having marital problems, the 
visitor should offer to help him reconcile with his partner. 
(Note:  Post has no information as to whether or not the 
follow-on program, as Hitar envisioned it, was ever carried 
out, and does not believe that Hitar himself performed any 
follow-on visits.  End Note.) 
 
¶7.  (C) With Hitar's appointment as Minister of Awqaf and 
Religious Guidance in 2005, he no longer had time to 
implement the dialog program.  It was passed to individuals 
he had trained to take over.  These replacements do not 
appear to have had the same success Hitar is believed to have 
had and the program has been essentially moribund since 2005. 
 Hitar claims substantial success for the program, asserting 
to POL/E Chief that no more than 5 percent of participants 
have returned to extremism.  Hitar blamed these recidivists 
on a failure of the ROYG to provide adequate post-release 
counseling (as described in para 6). 
 
The New Program 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (C/NF) After months of foot-dragging, the ROYG now 
appears to be taking steps toward implementing an extremist 
rehabilitation that would enable the USG to return Guantanamo 
detainees.  After his December resignation, Former Deputy 
Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi has been tasked by the ROYG to 
oversee construction of the rehabilitation center.  Documents 
provided to the Ambassador by Alimi on January 31 (reftel) 
indicate that the ROYG has taken into account at least some 
of the lessons learned by Hitar about respecting the humanity 
of the extremists and reintegrating them into society. 
Provision is made for housing that would allow detainees to 
live, at least on a temporary basis, with their wives and 
children.  Provision has also been made for vocational 
training for detainees to prepare them for reintegration into 
society.  These documents, however, focus entirely on 
infrastructure and construction costs and shed little light 
on the proposed program itself. 
 
¶9.  (C) A separate document prepared by the Sheba Center for 
Strategic Studies (SCSS) in April 2008 provides some 
additional general information about the program.  It 
specifies the formation of four subcommittees to take care of 
various phases of the operation.  The largest of the four, 
the religious subcommittee, will be responsible for the 
dialog portion of the program.  The psychological and social 
subcommittee would be responsible for evaluating the 
participants' social condition, diagnosing any psychological 
problems, and assessing the participant's compliance with the 
process and the needs of his family.  The security 
subcommittee would evaluate the security risk posed by the 
participants, make release recommendations and be responsible 
for post-release monitoring.  The media committee would be 
responsible for preparing educational materials for the 
program and conducting outreach to young people outside of 
the program. 
 
¶10.  (C) The SCSS plan seems to fall short of Hitar's vision 
in two significant ways.  It does not specify that 
participants are to be provided with whatever research 
material they need to formulate their positions.  In Hitar's 
view, a lack of these resources would reduce the credibility 
of the dialog.  While the SCSS plan specifies how the ROYG 
should reintegrate the detainees into society, it does not 
require continued discussions between those who have 
completed the program and their mentors.  This would appear 
to leave the program vulnerable to exactly the point of 
failure the Hitar noted for the old program.  When asked, 
Hitar said that he had not been contacted about helping 
prepare the dialog portion of the new program. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C/NF) In spite of President Saleh's optimism that the 
rehabilitation program can be put in place in a short time, 
there is still a very long way to go.  (Note:  In a recent 
speech Saleh asserted that the GTMO detainees would be 
returned to Yemen within three months.  End Note.)  Leaving 
Hitar, the Yemeni with the most experience in this area, out 
of the loop, either by omission or by design, seems to be a 
failure in judgment on the part of the ROYG.  While Alimi 
appears to have reinvigorated the process of constructing the 
facility, there is simply no evidence of serious efforts to 
lay out a solid rehabilitation and re-orientation program, 
including post-release monitoring.  The absence of these 
program elements, coupled with the ROYG's poor track record 
when it comes to keeping extremists in custody, fails to 
inspire confidence.  The day when Yemen can receive its GTMO 
detainees and place them in a secure, credible program, seems 
a long way off.  End Comment. 
 
 
SECHE