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Viewing cable 09ADANA11, TURKEY: KURDISH PROTESTS ERUPT TO MARK DATE OF OCALAN'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ADANA11 2009-02-17 12:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Adana
VZCZCXRO4179
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDA #0011 0481245
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171245Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL ADANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4709
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1252
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1052
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0019
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0014
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0145
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1314
UNCLAS ADANA 000011 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER ASEC IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: KURDISH PROTESTS ERUPT TO MARK DATE OF OCALAN'S 
ARREST; MORE TO FOLLOW? 
 
Summary 
------------ 
 
1.  (SBU) PKK supporters came out in the thousands to mark the 
10th anniversary of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's capture. 
Defying a ban on pro-Ocalan demonstrations, protesters gathered 
at the headquarters of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party 
(DTP) in several southeastern cities.  In the ensuing clashes, 
over 70 (including 20 policemen) were injured and approximately 
180 people were arrested.  The active participation by DTP 
officials in the protests shows the enduring grip of Ocalan on 
Kurdish politics.  The violence is probably a precursor to 
several weeks of tension preceding the Turkish local elections 
March 29.  While DTP's uneducated base may get fired up by 
confrontations with the police, middle-class residents of cities 
such as Diyarbakir and Van are increasingly turned off by such 
destructive theatrics.  End summary. 
 
Ocalan Still a Magnet for Protest 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) PKK supporters staged several illegal demonstrations 
throughout southeastern Turkey February 14-15 to mark the 
anniversary of Abdullah Ocalan's 1999 arrest in Kenya by Turkish 
authorities.  Pro-PKK Kurds still regard the imprisoned Ocalan 
as their leader; the DTP leader in Siirt province told reporters 
that the date of his capture is a "dark day for the Middle 
Eastern peoples." 
 
3.  (SBU) The largest protest took place in Diyarbakir, where a 
crowd of 5,000 gathered at DTP headquarters.  Violence erupted 
after the police refused to allow DTP mayor Osman Baydemir to 
make a statement on the grounds that those gathered had not been 
granted permission to do so.  In the ensuing clashes, police 
used water cannons and tear gas to break up the gathering.  A 
local journalist told us that Baydemir made good-faith efforts 
to reach an accommodation with the authorities to allow the 
demonstration to proceed with minimal disruption on traffic or 
the surrounding community.  The authorities, however, insisted 
that the demonstration be cancelled completely.  The DTP is 
calling for "silent marches" on February 18 to protest the 
"disproportionate force" used by police over the weekend. 
 
4.  (SBU) On a smaller scale, similar incidents took place in 
Batman, Siirt, Hakari, Urfa, Mardin, and Van as well as in 
migrant-heavy cities farther west, including Mersin and Adana. 
Nationwide, approximately 180 people have been arrested so far. 
Throughout the Southeast, merchants kept their shops shuttered 
on the 15th to avoid damage.  (PKK supporters typically call for 
shop closures in "solidarity" with their cause; those who stay 
open risk retaliation.) 
 
5.  (SBU) According to the liberal daily, Taraf, police in 
Diyarbakir are also detaining children with scarred hands on the 
assumption that they were involved in stone-throwing.  In recent 
months prosecutors have been unusually harsh in punishing 
youngsters accused of pro-PKK rioting.  In Adana, 19 teenagers 
are facing prison sentences averaging 25 years for throwing 
stones at police during pro-Ocalan protests last year. 
According to Taraf, a total of 737 children faced charges for 
participation in illegal protests and similar crimes in 2006-07. 
 
 
Harbinger of Stormy March? 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The February 15 protests are likely the first 
installment in a game of street politics that will continue in 
the Southeast through the Nevruz celebrations and the local 
elections, on March 21 and 29, respectively.  According to 
contacts in the region, the DTP will try to generate situations 
which provoke the police to overreact, creating the perception 
that the state (and by extension the ruling AKP) is harming 
innocent Kurds who merely want their voices heard and their 
human rights respected.  The DTP calculates that such scenes 
will reinforce Turkish-Kurdish fault lines and persuade more 
Kurds to support their party.  The risk, however, is that 
pro-PKK militants overstep the line and are seen as responsible 
for causing disorder, as happened during PM Erdogan's visit to 
Van in January.  If the PKK and DTP are blamed, then the AKP 
benefits, particularly in cities such as Diyarbakir, which have 
a growing middle class interested in stability and impatient 
with the PKK's radicalism. 
 
GREEN