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Viewing cable 09KABUL10, AFGHAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL10 2009-01-04 09:15 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1928
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0010/01 0040915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040915Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6592
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000010 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A; STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, DRL, PMA, 
INL 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MCGRAW 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL PHUM
SUBJECT: AFGHAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ISSUES 
REPORTS CONDEMNING INSURGENT TERROR TACTICS; CHIDING 
COALITION FORCES ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 
 
KABUL 00000010  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In two simultaneously released reports, the 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) strongly 
condemned Taliban and other insurgents' intimidation and 
killing of civilians and presented a relatively balanced 
analysis of civilian deaths due to coalition and Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) military operations.  In the 
report concerning coalition forces, the AIHRC claimed the 
coalition over-relied on airstrikes and failed to investigate 
thoroughly and report back to affected communities on 
civilian casualty incidents, but also clearly stated that it 
found no systematic attempts by pro-government forces to 
violate their international obligations of care to civilians. 
 Afghan media reported widely on the reports' publication, 
but civil society groups have been slow to react to the 
findings. 
 
---------- 
Report on Insurgent Abuses: Deliberate and Systematic Attacks 
on Civilians and Government Institutions 
---------- 
 
2. (U) On December 23 AIHRC rolled out the two reports with a 
press conference attended by most Afghan television stations 
and major print publications.  The reports are available in 
English, Dari, and Pashto on AIHRC's website at 
www.aihrc.org.af. 
 
3. (SBU) "Insurgent Abuses against Afghan Civilians" is 
hard-hitting in its criticism of insurgent actions, 
describing how Taliban and other insurgents deliberately 
attack civilians in order to weaken support for the Afghan 
government.  The AIHRC characterizes these actions as a 
campaign of "intimidation and murder."  The report gives 
specific examples of Taliban atrocities and details general 
patterns of abuses and their resulting effect on Afghan 
society. Taliban and other anti-government actors 
"systematically terrorize the civilian population with 'night 
letters,' kidnappings, executions (often by beheading) and 
other crimes." Taliban often start by leaving a threatening 
letter during the night warning an individual or community to 
desist from a certain action, such as working for the 
government. If the subject of this "night letter" does not 
heed the warning, the Taliban will often kidnap or kill the 
person. The report notes, "The simple act of being a civil 
servant or being friendly with government officials is 
frequently seen as enough to justify an attack." One man in 
Zabul told AIHRC, "in Zabul province almost everybody who 
works for, or maintains links in any way with the government 
has been issued night letters or phone call threats.8 
4. (SBU) The AIHRC argues that insurgent attacks affect not 
only the immediate victim but the entire civilian population. 
 Insurgents target and kill government officials, decreasing 
the government's ability to provide services and eroding 
public confidence in government officials and agencies. 
Murdering aid workers prevents whole communities from 
receiving much needed humanitarian assistance. Similarly 
Taliban regularly attack hospitals and schools, depriving the 
population of education and medical care. 
 
5. (SBU) The report concludes with the following 
recommendations to Taliban and other insurgent leadership, 
the Afghan government, Afghan and international military 
forces, religious organizations and leaders, and other 
influential figures: 
 
Taliban/Other Insurgent Leadership 
-Cease all attacks that spread terror and intentionally 
target civilians 
-Instruct members to cease distributing night letters and 
abducting, shooting, beheading, hanging, and mutilating 
civilians 
-Cease taking refuge in residential areas 
-Cease spreading interpretations of religious law that 
inaccurately justify and call for intimidation and killing of 
civilians 
 
Afghan Government 
-Hold accountable those who order and carry out serious 
violations of international humanitarian law 
 
Afghan and International Military Forces 
-Provide the highest degree of civilian protection possible 
-Train Afghan Army and Police officers in international human 
rights standards and international humanitarian law 
 
KABUL 00000010  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
-Ensure all counter-insurgency activities are conducted in 
such a way as to minimize civilian harm 
 
Islamic Associations, Clergy, Scholars, and other Influential 
Figures 
-Publicly condemn Taliban and other insurgent action that 
harms civilians and is contrary to religious and 
international humanitarian law 
-Publicly declare that causing collateral harm to civilians 
is not compatible with Sharia law 
-Express concern to the Taliban and other insurgents about 
the detrimental effects of intentionally targeting civilian 
resources, such as schools, medical clinics, humanitarian aid 
projects, supply lines, and development projects 
 
---------- 
Report on Pro-government Forces: Lack of Coordination 
and Inadequate Response 
---------- 
 
6. (SBU) The AIHRC's report "From Hope to Fear: An Afghan 
Perspective on Operations of Pro-Government Forces in 
Afghanistan," focuses on two issues: civilian deaths and 
injuries from air strikes and residents' anger due to house 
searches.  According to UNAMA, airstrikes accounted for 25 
percent of all civilian casualties in 2008. The report 
questions coalition forces' heavy reliance on airstrikes 
instead of ground operations and expresses concern that lack 
of coordination among different pro-government forces and 
between pro-government forces and local government officials 
leads to preventable civilian casualties. 
 
7. (SBU) The AIHRC criticizes the conduct of pro-government 
forces in the aftermath of civilian casualty incidents. The 
report specifically cites slow or inadequate 
investigations, failure to make public the results of 
investigations and/or translate public announcements into 
local languages, and the absence of timely acknowledgment of 
any misconduct or civilian losses. 
 
8. (SBU) The report highlights and criticizes a pattern of 
search operations conducted by unidentified pro-government 
forces, as affected families have no way to protest the 
action of unknown operatives.  The report details allegations 
that pro-government forces in some incidents stole property 
such as cash or jewelry.  The AIHRC also expressed concern 
over the lack of female military personnel to conduct 
searches of women. 
 
9. (SBU) Despite the number of criticisms leveled against the 
conduct of pro-government forces, the report's language is 
neutral and objective in describing the subject of many 
emotional and non-objective public commentaries, including 
the August 22 Shindand civilian casualty incident.  For 
example, AIHRC investigations confirmed at least some armed 
opposition in the village, supporting the claim made by 
international military authorities that airstrikes were 
called in to support ground troops under attack.  The report 
mentioned that only 13 fighters were found dead at the scene, 
but acknowledged that other combatants may have fled by the 
time investigators arrived.  The report, rather than directly 
criticizing the mission's objective, questioned whether 
alternative tactics could have achieved the mission goal with 
fewer civilian casualties. The report's strongest criticism 
was focused on the international military forces, 
after-incident actions, specifically unexplained revisions of 
civilian death estimates and not releasing investigation 
details to the public. 
 
10. (SBU) On a related front, AIHRC reports that it has 
received an increasing number of complaints about ANSF 
misconduct and civilian casualties resulting from ANSF-only 
operations.  Statistics on casualties caused by ANSF are 
unavailable because most operations are conducted jointly 
with international military forces. 
 
11. (SBU) In order to minimize future civilian casualties the 
AIHRC recommends coalition forces: 
-Improve coordination among pro-government forces in planning 
and conducting operations in order to reduce errors due to 
faulty or misunderstood intelligence 
-Engage local officials as much as possible in order to 
better authenticate intelligence and assessments about the 
local situation 
 
KABUL 00000010  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
-Initiate prompt and thorough investigations of any incident 
of alleged civilian casualties and publicly release details 
of findings and evidence 
-Offer a public apology to families or communities suffering 
civilian casualties due to pro-government military operations 
-Clarify chains of command of those conducting night raids in 
order to allow residents to complain of misconduct to the 
appropriate authorities 
-Avoid night raids whenever possible in favor of regular law 
enforcement-led search and arrest procedures 
 
---------- 
AIHRC: Poised to Follow up 
---------- 
 
12. (SBU) The AIHRC meets monthly with US military leadership 
at Bagram and will schedule additional meetings with US and 
NATO officials to discuss the reports' specific findings and 
recommendations.  AIHRC Commissioner Nader Naderi said a NATO 
official contacted AIHRC with a positive response to the 
reports, emphasizing the differentiation made between the 
"systematic" abuses of the Taliban and the deeply regrettable 
but unintentional civilian casualties caused by 
pro-government forces. 
 
13. (SBU) Naderi was encouraged by a recent NATO directive 
calling for increased coordination between ANSF and 
international military forces.  In addition, he sees the 
projected increase in US troops as a positive development. 
More troops will mean less need for airstrikes, leading to 
fewer civilian casualties.  Naderi re-emphasized the 
importance of translating the results of civilian casualty 
investigations into Dari and Pashto as a key step to 
improving public understanding of these incidents.  He asked 
for Embassy support for this goal. 
 
14. (SBU) Naderi noted the preparation of the insurgent 
report was the more difficult of the two as the public was 
much more hesitant to give AIHRC investigators information 
regarding Taliban abuses.  As AIHRC investigators examined 
Taliban incidents, they also needed to take more extensive 
security precautions, such as using public transportation and 
traveling without identifying documents. 
 
---------- 
Reaction Muted but Positive from Civil Society Actors 
---------- 
 
15. (SBU) Nilofar Sakhi, human rights activist and country 
director for the Open Society Institute (OSI) had reviewed 
the reports, thought they were extremely well done and 
important, but had not heard much discussion of them among 
civil society actors.  OSI will host several meetings over 
the next month with human rights stakeholders including 
donors and Afghan civil society groups.  Sakhi added 
discussion of the two reports to the meetings' agendas and 
will distribute the reports in advance to attendees.  During 
the upcoming meetings she plans to ask Afghan civil society 
stakeholders to pressure the government, religious leaders, 
and other influential leaders to comply with the reports' 
recommendations. 
 
16. (SBU) Mahbooba Seraj, Equal Access NGO program manager, 
also had not heard specific discussion of the reports. 
Civilian casualties, however, are of great importance to the 
Afghan public, and people are very angry about the increasing 
numbers of civilian casualties.  It is often difficult to 
assess what really happened in each situation: for example, 
if bad intelligence information was deliberately passed or if 
casualties were the result of a friendly fire accident, she 
noted.  For this reason the reports' suggestions of more 
detailed, prompt, and local language publicizing of 
investigation results is of utmost importance, Seraj said. 
 
 
 
WOOD