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Viewing cable 09DAKAR25, GUINEA-BISSAU: 2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DAKAR25 2009-01-08 11:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO2148
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0025/01 0081155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081155Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1668
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1174
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000025 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL, PARIS FOR DEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PU SNAR XY
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: 2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR), PART I, DRUGS AND CHEMICAL 
CONTROL 
 
REF: STATE 100970 
 
 I.  SUMMARY 
----------- 
1.  Below is Part I, Drugs and Chemical Control, of the 2008 
INSCR for Guinea-Bissau.  The text is keyed to the format 
provided in reftel. 
 
2.  Guinea-Bissau, a tiny impoverished country in West 
Africa, has evolved into a major transit hub for narcotics 
trafficking from South America to Europe.  The country, a 
party to the 1988 United Nations (UN) Drug Convention, 
provides an opportune environment for traffickers because of 
its location in relation to Europe, South America and 
neighboring West African transit points, its lack of 
enforcement capabilities, its susceptibility to corruption, 
its porous borders and its linguistic connections to Brazil, 
Portugal and Cape Verde.  The un-policed islands off the 
coast of Bissau are alleged hubs for the associated problems 
of arms trafficking and illegal immigration. Corruption, 
specifically the complicity of government officials at all 
levels, inhibits both a complete assessment and resolution of 
the problem.  Degeneration of Guinea-Bissau into a narco 
state is a possibility.  END SUMMARY. 
 
II. STATUS OF COUNTRY 
---------------------- 
3.  Approximately three times the size of Connecticut, 
Guinea-Bissau has a population of fewer than 1.8 million 
persons.  The country is also one of the poorest in the 
world, placing 175th out of 177 countries on the United 
Nation,s Human Development Index.  Security forces lack the 
most basic resources.  The country possesses no adequate 
detention facilities, and civil servants are often not paid 
for months at a time. Guinea-Bissau's history since 
independence from Portugal in 1974 has been plagued by 
political instability and civil unrest.  The U.S. embassy in 
Bissau closed in June 1998 due to civil unrest; however, U.S. 
engagement with the Government of Guinea-Bissau (GOGB) has 
increased since parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2008 and 
presidential elections in 2005 were deemed free and fair by 
the international community.  Guinea-Bissau,s fragility was 
underscored, however, by two apparent coup attempts, the 
first in August and the second in November, 2008. 
 
4.  In January, 2008, the United Nations Office for West 
Africa stated that Guinea-Bissau was on the brink of becoming 
Africa,s first narco state. In his September 29 report to 
the Security Council, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon warned that the country was evolving from a narcotics 
transit hub into a &major marketplace in the drug trade.8 
The Secretary General proposed the formation of a panel of 
experts that would investigate narcotics trafficking in 
Guinea-Bissau with the possible outcome of the imposition of 
targeted UN sanctions. 
 
5. In July, 2008, authorities attempted to seize a grounded 
plane, originating from Venezuela and believed to have been 
transporting 500 kilograms of cocaine.  The plane,s cargo, 
however, was unloaded before military personnel allowed 
judicial police officers to investigate the scene. 
Authorities successfully interdicted four smaller quantities 
of cocaine throughout the year.  The traffickers were 
arrested. In general, GOGB drug enforcement efforts remain 
under-funded and undermanned, allowing international 
trafficking and the illegal cannabis trade to continue 
unabated. 
 
6.  The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) views Guinea 
Bissau and Cape Verde -- a former Portuguese colony off the 
coast of Senegal -- as part of a Lusophone Atlantic network 
with links to Brazil and Portugal.  Due to cultural links and 
existing air and sea connections, Guinea-Bissau and Cape 
Verde are serving as transshipment and possibly processing 
points for drugs originating in Brazil that are destined for 
the European market.  UNODC,s October 2008 report suggests 
that traffickers continue to use Guinea-Bissau as a hub for 
narcotics from South America.  Once large shipments of 
cocaine are off-loaded from planes and boats in 
Guinea-Bissau, the drugs are disbursed in smaller quantities 
throughout the region before being shipped out on commercial 
air flights and other means to Europe. 
 
III.COUNTRY ACTIONS AGAINST DRUGS IN 2008 
------------------------------------------- 
7.  Policy Initiatives.  The GOGB continues to adhere to its 
2007 Anti-Narcotics Emergency Plan.  The GOGB further has 
 
DAKAR 00000025  002 OF 003 
 
 
welcomed the European Union,s Security Sector Reform 
Mission, launched in March, 2008.  In collaboration with GB 
officials, the EU mission seeks to restructure and reform the 
armed forces, the police and the judiciary.  The objective is 
to make the security forces more efficient and accountable. 
In 2008, representatives from Guinea-Bissau participated in 
the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) 
counter-narcotics conference in Praia, Cape Verde, and was a 
signatory to the political declaration that came out of the 
conference. 
 
8.  Accomplishments.  During 2008, a number of seizures were 
made. On August 13, three Nigerian nationals were arrested in 
the Militar neighborhood of Bissau in possession of 160 
capsules of cocaine sealed in latex.  On September 23, at 
Osvaldo Vieira International Airport in Bissau, officials 
seized two belts containing two kilograms of cocaine and 
arrested a Bissau-Guinean national.  On September 25, again 
at Bissau,s airport, officials seized 180 capsules of 
cocaine, sealed in latex, and arrested a Bissau-Guinean 
national.  In October, autopsy officials removed 58 capsules 
of cocaine, sealed in latex, from the interior of a 
Bissau-Guinean national.  The courier died when one or more 
of the capsules burst open inside of him. 
 
9.  With support from UNODC, a new headquarters is nearly 
complete for the judicial police.  UNODC, with support from 
Portugal, also supported the training of 50 new judicial 
police officers specialized in counter-narcotics.  The 
officers are currently being trained in Brazil. 
 
10.  In August, authorities reported that they had uncovered 
an attempted coup d,etat, allegedly organized by the Navy 
Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto.  Na 
Tchuto, long suspected of being a major facilitator of 
narcotics trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, eventually fled to 
the Gambia where officials arrested him then later released 
him.  He remained in exile in the Gambia at year,s end. 
 
 
11.  Law Enforcement Efforts. On July 12, a plane from 
Venezuela landed at the Bissau airport without the requisite 
permission.  Upon landing, it immediately was cordoned off by 
Bissau-Guinean military officials and its cargo unloaded. 
Due to mechanical difficulties, the plane could not again 
take off.  On July 17, the Minister of Justice reportedly 
learned of the unauthorized plane and ordered the arrest of 
the crew, who were taken into custody on July 19.  Military 
officials refused to allow the judicial police and 
international investigators to remove the black box and 
Global Positioning System apparatus from the plane.  On 
August 19, a judge set bail and released the crew of the 
plane from custody, despite the issuance of an international 
arrest warrant against one member and protests by the 
Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General.  The pilot 
subsequently disappeared, and the judge was later suspended 
pending an investigation into possible corruption. 
 
12.  Given limitations on funding, training, and policy, 
there is only limited ability to guard against the transit of 
drugs through Guinea-Bissau.  Due to weak enforcement efforts 
and inadequate record keeping, it is difficult to assess 
accurately the scope of the drug problem.  Police lack the 
training and equipment to detect drug smuggling.  Once 
arrests are made, there are no adequate detention facilities 
to hold suspects.  There are furthermore no secured vehicles 
with which to transport suspects. 
 
13.  Corruption.  Corruption is a problem for narcotics law 
enforcement all over Africa, and Guinea-Bissau is 
particularly susceptible.  The Government does not, as a 
matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit production 
or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other 
controlled substances, nor the laundering of proceeds from 
illegal drug transactions.  However, anecdotal stories of 
corruption at the highest levels are common. Observers noted 
the apparent complicity of military personnel in the July 
plane incident, and the judge,s release of the suspects 
despite the existence of an international warrant. As of 
December 31, 2008, the government was four months in arrears 
in paying civil servant salaries, making law enforcement and 
security officials further susceptible to bribery. 
 
14.  Agreements and Treaties.  Guinea-Bissau is a party to 
the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and has signed but not ratified 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
the UN Convention against Corruption.  The status of the 1999 
 
DAKAR 00000025  003 OF 003 
 
 
UN International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism and the African Union Convention on 
Terrorism Finance is not known. 
 
15.  Cultivation/Production.  The extent of cannabis 
cultivation in the country is unknown.  Cannabis cultivation 
is quite common in the Senegal's southern Casamance region 
and linked to a more that 20-year-old separatist movement, 
the Movement of Democratic Forces 
in the Casamance (MFDC).  As elements of the MFDC frequently 
find sanctuary on the Guinea-Bissau side of the border with 
Senegal, it can be assumed that cannabis is cultivated to 
some degree.  There are no/no known efforts to determine the 
scope of the cultivation or eradicate it. 
 
16.  Drug Flow/Transit.  The U.S. is not believed to be a 
destination point for these drugs. 
 
17.  Domestic Programs.  There is no comprehensive GOGB 
policy for systematic destruction of seized drugs or domestic 
cannabis nor for the prevention of the transshipment of 
harder drugs.  Enforcement efforts are sporadic and 
uncoordinated.  According to the UN, local drug abuse is a 
growing problem in Guinea-Bissau, as traffickers occasionally 
pay their local accomplices with drugs in kind.  There are no 
GOGB efforts targeted specifically to reduce local drug 
consumption.  There are also no GOGB drug treatment programs, 
although private organizations have established drug 
rehabilitation centers. 
 
IV.  U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
-------------------------------------------- 
18.  The U.S. Embassy in Bissau closed in June 1998.  The 
U.S. Ambassador to Senegal is accredited there and one U.S. 
officer assigned to the Embassy in Dakar monitors events 
there.  The U.S. Embassy liaison office opened in Bissau in 
2008 and is staffed by two foreign service nationals.  During 
2008, DEA and FBI representatives visited Bissau to assist in 
the investigation surrounding the July seizure of the plane 
from Venezuela.  Representatives from AFRICOM and the FBI 
made frequent visits to Bissau in 2008 to provide technical 
assistance and to conduct needs assessments. 
 
19.  The Road Ahead.  The USG will continue to work closely 
with the GOGB to improve the capacity of its narcotics law 
enforcement officers to investigate and prosecute narcotics 
crimes.  The USG also will seek to identify credible partners 
within the Bissau-Guinean security forces and will seek to 
build their capacity to respond to the threat of narcotics 
trafficking.  In recognition of the importance of 
strengthening broader institutional capacity, the USG will 
support the EU,s efforts to reform the judiciary, and will 
seek to strengthen the legislative and oversight capacity of 
the National Assembly.  Furthermore, in recognition of the 
broad role that socio-economic factors play in narcotics 
trafficking, the USG will seek to promote economic 
development and political stability. 
 
V.  STATISTICAL TABLES 
---------------------- 
20.  No statistics available 
 
VI. CHEMICAL CONTROL 
--------------------- 
21.  There are no grounds for adding Guinea-Bissau to the 
list of chemical control countries at this time. 
 
BERNICAT