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DE RUEHUP #1213/01 3540606
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P 190606Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3712
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001213 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE AND INR; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM 
STERLING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2013 
TAGS: PGOV KBIO HU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SOLYOM'S INJUDICIOUS ACTIVISM 
 
BUDAPEST 00001213  001.9 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The chorus of complaints regarding Prime 
Minister Gyurcsany has largely but not completely obscured 
the mixed reviews received by President Laszlo Solyom.  Seen 
as principled by his supporters and pedantic by his critics, 
Solyom has tested the boundaries of his largely ceremonial 
position.  His minimal experience in economics and 
international affairs, combined with his personal animus 
toward the Prime Minister, has limited his ability to promote 
political compromises.  Moreover, his legalistic approach and 
seeming ambivalence toward the U.S. will likely remain 
complicating factors in our efforts to work with Hungary on 
key initiatives.  End Summary. 
 
SOLYOM'S APPEAL ... 
 
¶2.  (C) A former President of the Constitutional Court, 
Solyom emerged as a dark horse for the Presidency in 2005. 
Originally proposed to Parliament by an NGO and no longer a 
member of any political party (though formerly in the 
center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum), he has been an 
often divisive force in a position envisioned as a ceremonial 
figure and a unifying force in national politics.  Former 
SzDSz Faction Leader Gabor Kuncze, who regards his party's 
support of Solyom as "among our worst mistakes," notes 
sardonically that "Solyom helped define the Presidency when 
he was a judge ... and now he's trying to break out of the 
box he built."  Hailed by supporters as an apolitical figure 
who is "not like all the others," Solyom often leads 
Hungary's popularity polls ) albeit with approval ratings of 
only 50 percent.  His critics, by contrast, regard him as 
"just another politician ) only a very inept one."  (Note: 
These deep differences of opinion regarding Solyom extend to 
our local staff, as our informal survey revealed.  End Note.) 
 
 
AND CRITICS' OBJECTIONS 
 
¶3.  (C) Variously described as a liberal and a conservative, 
Solyom is first and foremost a legalist, often both myopic 
and politically tone-deaf.  He has argued, for example, for 
an expansive definition of the social "guarantees" extended 
by Communist-era provisions of Hungary's Constitution without 
regard to current economic realities.  He's also drawn fire 
for his objections to proposed legislation on hate speech, 
and for his decision not to attend the National Summit 
designed to build a national consensus in response to 
economic crisis. 
 
¶4.  (C) Although we sense no particular anti-Americanism on 
his part, he could not be described as particularly 
pro-American.  Early in his term, Solyom infamously remarked 
that he would not visit the United States due to 
fingerprinting requirements, and his pet issues of privacy 
and environmental protection have put him publicly at odds 
with us on high-profile issues including the sharing of 
personal data to the construction of the NATO radar facility 
at Tubes.  The former issue, for example, led him to refer 
the enabling legislation behind the Visa Waiver agreement 
back to Parliament, forcing the government ) and the embassy 
) to scramble to contain the fall-out with Secretary 
Chertoff en route to Budapest. 
 
HOLDING THE GOVERNMENT IN CONTEMPT 
 
¶5.  (C) He is far more often a thorn in the side of the 
Gyurcsany government, however.  Though steadfast in his 
support for the rule of law - and indeed privately shaken by 
the extent of the violence during the demonstrations of 2006 
and 2007, he has remained an outspoken critic of the police 
and of the Prime Minister.  Solyom has had pointedly little 
personal contact with the PM in the past year.  His trips 
overseas, for example, are often timed to avoid ceremonial 
events where he and Gyurcsany would otherwise be together, 
and he makes no (secret) of his low personal regard for the PM. 
 "He's certainly not alone in his feelings about Gyurcsany," 
observed one contact, "but the President is supposed to be 
above the partisan fray." 
 
¶6.  (C) This friction often extends to the distant 
relationship between the President's Office and the 
bureaucracy.  Sources throughout the Ministries note that 
their efforts to brief the President and his staff are often 
rebuffed, even on economic and foreign policy issues where 
Solyom lacks deep experience ... if not strong opinions.  As 
one MFA official jokingly observed after Solyom's staff 
declined our offer of a briefing on Kosovo before his 2006 
trip to Serbia, "don't feel bad - they're not interested in 
hearing about Hungarian policy either."  This makes Solyom's 
 
BUDAPEST 00001213  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
frequent travel to ethnic Hungarian communities abroad - 
complete with references to "autonomy" - a particular source 
of tension for the Gyurcsany government. 
 
¶7.  (C) GoH officials also complain bitterly that Solyom 
needlessly uses his prerogative to return legislation to 
Parliament or to refer it to the Constitutional Court.  One 
irate MP fumed that "as a President he's a hell of a judge." 
Although government contacts believe they can work around 
Solyom, who they sometimes point out is "only the President," 
MSzP contacts fear that he will use what powers he does have 
- such as scheduling elections - to their detriment. 
"Solyom's criticism is always principled," concludes one 
Socialist MP archly, "but I notice that his principles seem 
to tilt to the right." 
 
RESPECT AND RESERVATIONS FROM THE RIGHT 
 
¶8.  (C) But frustration with Solyom is not limited to the 
left.  While generally careful to refer to Solyom as "our 
President" (rather than the Socialists' preferred epithet 
"that man"), some opposition figures are disappointed that 
Solyom has not used his moral authority to call more 
explicitly for Gyurcsany's resignation.  Though they 
generally feel that he is philosophically sympathetic, many 
FIDESZ officials regard him as politically unpredictable. 
 
¶9.  (C) Indeed, Solyom has been sharp in his comments 
regarding the opposition following their votes against his 
nominations to serve as Hungary's various omsbudsmen.  This 
has been a particular point of contention during Solyom's 
tenure, and he has resolutely refused to consult with 
Parliament regarding his personnel selections.  Following the 
Parliament's recent rejection of his nominee to head the 
Constitutional Court, Solyom let fly with a bitter televised 
diatribe in which he denounced MPs' votes as "shameful and 
unconstitutional."  The result of this war of wills has been 
a government that has gone for protracted periods without key 
officials, reinforcing the perception of many that "Hungary 
is not being governed." 
 
I, THE JURY 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment: In a country that respects expertise, 
Solyom is universally recognized as the preeminent expert on 
the Hungarian Constitution.  As one former Justice Minister 
observes, "Solyom wrote so much of the Constitution he feels 
that he's the only one who can interpret it."  But most 
Hungarians agree that the Constitution is broken, and Solyom 
has been no repairman.  Indeed, his expertise seemingly leads 
him to ordain but not to accept alternate views.  Even his 
supporters find him to be an aloof activist, and he has been 
reluctant to move beyond the minutiae of the law to use the 
bully pulpit of the Presidency to speak out on broader social 
problems such as intolerance.  Though seemingly frustrated by 
the strictures of his role as Head of State, Solyom often 
appears uninterested in using his office to broker the 
political compromises Hungary so desperately needs. 
Moreover, Solyom's animosity toward the Prime Minister and 
impermeability to outside engagement may leave our 
initiatives at odds with his opinions.  Even if he does not 
consciously obstruct decisions merely because they involve 
us, to date he has been unhelpful in practice if not in 
intent.  He will remain a wild card in the deck as we 
continue our efforts to work with a distracted government and 
a divided Parliament.  End Comment. 
 
 
Foley