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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001686 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: NAR SOCI KCRM ELAB FARC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: DRUG TRAFFICKING UP, DRUG FLIGHTS DOWN 
PART 2: A REPORT FROM PARA AND MARANHAO 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 588 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 56 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Brazil's Air Bridge Denial ("shootdown") 
program has diminished drug flights in Brazil, and as a 
result, traffickers are increasingly using riverine routes to 
transport drugs out of the country.  The state of Para sees 
much of this riverine trafficking.  The combination of 
tributaries, estuaries, and hundreds of islands that dot the 
landscape on the mouth of the Amazon river in Para state 
create thousands of hideaways that traffickers of illicit 
goods use to avoid scrutiny.  Monitoring of the riverways on 
the part of the state and federal authorities is effectively 
nonexistent, as law enforcement forces in the state face 
daunting resource and personnel challenges.  Assignments to 
Para are not the path to career advancement in the Federal 
Police, and positions there are often filled by the least 
experienced of officers, who serve a few years and move on to 
better assignments.  Maranhao, on the other hand, does not 
suffer from international drug trafficking, but a critical 
shortage of resources, stemming from its status as the second 
poorest state in Brazil, leaves it ill equipped to deal with 
myriad public security problems.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
A Safe Route Through the Amazon River for Traffickers 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Emboff traveled to Para and Maranhao in late 
September to discuss drug trafficking and public security 
(septel will report on trafficking in persons, forced labor, 
and exploitation of women and children in those states). 
According to Cleomenes de Alencar, a police officer in the 
intelligence division of the Federal Police (DPF) office in 
the state of Para, since the establishment of the "shootdown" 
program they have seen a decrease in the number of drug 
flights and a consequent increase in the use of riverine 
routes to transport drugs out of Brazil.  Federal Prosecutor 
Ubiratan Cazetta, who specializes in international drugs and 
crime, noted that the geography of the state is particularly 
favorable to traffickers who use riverine routes.  The island 
of Marajo in particular, he noted, is filled with hideouts 
and favorable spots for transshipment of goods.  One method 
often used by traffickers is to hide drugs in wood exports, 
such as doors, with hollowed out areas for drugs, mostly 
cocaine. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Regional Superintendent of the Federal Police in the 
State of Para, Manuel Fernando Abbadi, noted that the 
police's ability to monitor drug trafficking through the 
Amazon is negligible; their operations are all intelligence 
based, since there is no patrolling going on in the rivers. 
The State military police does no patrolling in the rivers 
and the Federal Police only has four boats to monitor the 
riverways in Para, all of which were out of commission on 
repairs at the time. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Asked about the Federal Police's presence in Para, 
he noted that in addition to the office in Belem, there were 
federal police stations in Maraba, Redencao, Santarem, 
Altamira and a small forward post in Obido.  Most of these, 
however, consist of only a few police officers.  Alencar 
noted that despite the decrease in drug flights, there is 
still a considerable amount of trafficking taking place 
through air routes, and there remain clandestine air strips 
throughout the states.  Furthermore, he noted, the Federal 
Police essentially stopped its efforts to take out the strips 
with explosives, a futile effort since new strips can crop up 
overnight.  He drew a horizontal line starting in Maraba and 
noted that below that line (an area roughly the size of 
Germany) and in some parts above it, there was a general 
problem of governance, as there is no state presence, adding 
that "there are many clandestine landing strips in those 
 
BRASILIA 00001686  002 OF 003 
 
 
areas still in use". 
 
------------------------------------- 
Federal Police Has Seen Better Days 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Lack of experienced personnel is hampering efforts 
to stem the rising riverine drug trade.  Asked for his 
assessment of the efforts of federal and local authorities, 
Prosecutor Cazetta observed that the local authorities were 
not competent to deal with international drug trafficking, 
and that even the Federal Police had its own set of problems. 
 "There has been a generational shift in DPF officers serving 
in Para," noted Cazetta.  "While the new officers are smart 
and enthusiastic, for many their stint in Para is their first 
tour," he observed and added that there is now more of a rush 
to move on to "career enhancing assignments" outside the 
region after paying their dues in the less glamorous 
assignments such as Para.  According to Cazetta, this higher 
rate of turnover has had a negative impact in the depth of 
knowledge and expertise of local realities and caused a 
weakening of relationships within the law enforcement 
entities in the state. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Wilson Jose Barp, a professor of public security at 
the Federal University of Para, agreed that quality of 
personnel was an issue, particularly at the level of the 
state police forces.  As professor within the university's 
RENAESP program--essentially a graduate degree in public 
security certified by the Ministry of Justice's National 
Secretariat for Public Security that is part of the Brazilian 
government's anti-crime plan PRONASCI (ref B)--he teaches 
courses for public security professionals, mostly state civil 
and military police officers.  According to Barp, the 
students often show a rudimentary level of understanding of 
police tactics, technology, and investigative techniques. 
The impact from the creation of the RENAESP program up to 
this point has been limited, but should improve the quality 
of state police forces over time. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Maranhao: "We need more money for everything" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (SBU) The drug trafficking situation in the state of 
Maranhao, according to Telmo Macedo Fontoura, is not as much 
of a problem as in Para.  Fontoura, a retired Federal Police 
officer and now special assistant to the State Secretary for 
Public Security, notes that a bigger issue than international 
trafficking is drug use among youths in the State, 
particularly 'merla,' a popular drug in Brazil made from the 
byproducts left over during production of cocaine. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Reflecting on the larger problems Maranhao faces, 
Fontoura noted that back when he was active in the federal 
police he mostly worked in the south and south eastern 
regions of the country and that as a result he never seen 
anything like the poverty and social conditions that exist in 
Maranhao. (Note: From 2003-2005, Maranhao ranked next to last 
in the human development index among Brazilian states; at 
.683 for 2005, Maranhao's figure is lower than Bolivia and 
Guatemala, the least developed countries in Latin America. 
End note.)  "We need more money for everything," Fontoura 
observed, and as a result, the state government successfully 
appealed to the Federal government for Federal funds through 
the PRONASCI program (Note: Maranhao was not included in the 
PRONASCI program; it was originally designed to go towards 
the 11 cities with the highest crime rates in Brazil. 
Although Maranhao ranks low in homicide rates within Brazil 
ranked 23rd out of 27 jurisdictions in homicide rates, it 
ranks among the middle third of states in most other crime 
statistics, according to the 2007 Annual Index of the Forum 
Brasileiro de Seguranca Publica.  Only two other states, 
 
BRASILIA 00001686  003 OF 003 
 
 
however, spend less per capita on public security than 
Maranhao.  End note.). 
 
¶9. (SBU) Fontoura observed that prison overcrowding was a 
significant problem for the state, noting that there are only 
a few prisons in Maranhao, and prison riots frequently break 
out as a result, including one that was taking place at the 
moment of the meeting. (Note: according to Ministry's of 
Justice's National Department of Prisons, there are five 
prisons in Maranhao, and six  holding facilities in a state 
with a population of about six million; as of June 2008, 
there were about 5,300 persons in prison or held in custody 
and space for only 2,500.  End note.).  According to 
Fontoura, the state recently came out with a public security 
plan that will use PRONASCI funds to build several prisons 
and to establish a state presence, through community 
councils, in every slum, starting in the capital city of Sao 
Luis.  These councils, according to Fontoura, should help in 
establishing a government presence in neighborhoods by 
establishing a mechanism for dialogue between communities and 
public security forces, helping administer social programs, 
and monitoring at-risk youth.  He added, however, that it was 
an extremely uphill climb and they were just getting started 
setting up these councils. 
 
------------- 
Comment: 
------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) As noted in ref a, there is mounting evidence that 
traffickers adjusted to the "shootdown" program by shifting 
their trafficking activities to more secure routes, 
particularly the unpoliced Amazon river.  Traffickers shifted 
their patterns but the Brazilian government has been slow to 
adjust to the new tactics, mainly due to the considerable 
challenges in personnel and resources the Federal Police 
faces. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment, cont.  As one of poorest states in Brazil, 
Maranhao has an extremely limited ability to provide public 
security.  Public Security officials are making the best of a 
tough situation and have put in place an approach that has 
garnered attention from the national government, who found 
their proposed plan worthy enough to be included as part of 
PRONASCI, and could begin to pay dividends in the long-term 
if executed on a sustained basis. 
KUBISKE