O 030652Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8629
INFO VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000583 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018 
TAGS: KNNP IAEA AORC IR SY KN
 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES ELBARADEI ON EARLY REPORT ON 
SYRIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S) In an October 31 meeting with IAEA Director General 
Mohammed ElBaradei, Ambassador Schulte reiterated the U.S. 
request for a written report to the IAEA Board of Governors, 
under a Syria-specific verification agenda item, detailing 
the Agency's ongoing investigation into Syrian clandestine 
nuclear activities.  ElBaradei would not commit to a written 
report or an agenda item, saying it depended on the substance 
of a report.  He pressed the USG to provide more information, 
including imagery.  On Iran, ElBaradei confirmed the Agency 
will report again to the Board, noting the continuing lack of 
Iranian cooperation, but stated that the report will contain 
nothing new. 
 
¶2. (S) On DPRK, ElBaradei expressed his appreciation for U.S. 
efforts to maintain a significant IAEA role in verification 
activities despite considerable DPRK reluctance, but 
complained the Agency cannot "play second fiddle" to the six 
parties in a pure consultancy role.  He appreciated the 
recent phone call from A/S Hill, and the Ambassador told him 
that A A/S McNerney would be coming to Vienna to discuss the 
IAEA's role in more detail.  The Ambassador also emphasized 
our goal for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and discussed, 
based on his recent visit, how to encourage Brazil and 
Argentina to adopt the Additional Protocol.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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SYRIA 
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¶3. (S) Ambassador opened the meeting by saying that the case 
of Syria was different than the case of Iran, and we want to 
avoid driving Syria to adopt Iran's noncompliance policies. 
This means that the IAEA must pursue its investigation and 
make clear to Syria that it cannot avoid Board scrutiny by 
continued delay.  We want Syria to choose the path of Libya, 
not Iran. 
 
¶4. (S) Unfortunately, however, Syria seems to be adopting the 
techniques of Iran, whether in the Board room or on the 
ground with inspectors in order to prolong the investigation 
and avoid the potential consequences of its actions. 
Ambassador noted that Syria has followed Iran's lead in 
challenging the mandate, authority, and integrity of the 
Agency, and predicted that Syria --if it continues to adopt 
Iranian techniques-- will likely agree at the last minute to 
further (but limited) cooperation with the IAEA's 
investigation in order to avoid a tough report.  Ambassador 
strongly urged the Director General to continue with the 
Agency's investigation into clandestine Syrian activities, 
and to provide a written report to the Board of Governors for 
discussion under a Syria-specific agenda item at the Board's 
November meeting. 
 
¶5. (S) ElBaradei responded that the Agency is "doing what 
we're supposed to do" regarding Syria, but once again 
conveyed his serious displeasure that the IAEA was not 
alerted to Syria's alleged activities earlier, and his severe 
disapproval that force was relied on instead of the Agency's 
verification process.  ElBaradei conveyed that the Agency is 
now in the process of blindly "picking up the pieces" after 
the fact, and is still waiting for the lab results of the 
environmental samples it obtained from Al Kibar.  ElBaradei 
stated the IAEA does not yet have a clear picture of the 
nature of activity at Al Kibar and is not in a position to 
make any determinations.  The DG noted the further 
complications arising from the assassination of the Agency's 
main Syrian interlocutor, and complained that the IAEA lacks 
the authority to request more information and access from 
Syria.  Noting that "I can only work with the tools I have," 
ElBaradei reiterated the Safeguard Department's request for 
imagery of the Al Kibar site after the bombing. 
 
¶6. (S) Ambassador noted our understanding that while no 
commercial imagery of the site after the bombing was 
available, the U.S. has provided a significant amount of 
information to the Agency regarding activities at the 
facility, including imagery of the exposed reactor vessel, as 
well as information on the clean-up and remediation efforts 
pursued by Syria following the bombing.  Given the 
information available to the Agency, Ambassador argued that 
the onus should be on Syria to explain the nature of the 
facility, to which ElBaradei responded that to the contrary 
the obligation is on the "accusers" to make the case, and 
that Syria is not "guilty until proven innocent."  ElBaradei 
again complained about a lack of information including 
satellite imagery, to which Ambassador responded that when 
information is provided it must be acted upon appropriately, 
noting that in the past information on Syrian sites passed to 
the Agency was provided back to Syria, allowing Syria to 
remediate those facilities while still denying access. 
 
¶7. (S) Returning to the matter of the Board, ElBaradei stated 
that only once he had substance would he provide a report to 
the Board.  Ambassador argued that we considered this to be a 
very substantive verification issue, as did the EU and other 
countries that had requested a report to the November Board. 
Our goal was to work with the IAEA Secretariat in conducting 
this investigation in a professional manner.  However, if the 
DG did not respect Member State requests for a report and 
agenda item, we could have on of two situations: either 
Governors could put in writing their requests for a report 
and agenda item, or there could be a repeat of the debate of 
the last Board meeting on the agenda.  Either would 
politicize the discussion, when our common goal was a 
thorough IAEA investigation. 
 
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IRAN 
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¶8. (S) ElBaradei said that he would have little new to report 
to the Board on Iran.  He said that he did not expect any 
movement from Iran at least until next June, after the 
presidential elections in Iran. 
 
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DPRK 
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¶9. (S) On DPRK, ElBaradei expressed his appreciation for his 
recent telephone conversation with A/S Hill and acknowledged 
the DPRK's resistance to an IAEA verification role.  He noted 
the recent negative statements about the IAEA by the DPRK at 
UNGA.  He cautioned that it would not be good for the 
nonproliferation regime if the Agency served only as a 
consultant to the Six-Party process, noting that the IAEA can 
only work under the authority of the Board of Governors, not 
at the discretion of certain Member States.  He suggested 
that the Six-Parties report to the Secretariat so that it in 
turn could report to the Board. 
 
¶10. (S) Ambassador said that we appreciated his advice and 
that of his team on the IAEA's role.  As suggested by his 
staff, perhaps the Six-Parties could agree to a monitoring 
role that would allow the Agency to be prepared to take the 
DPRK back under IAEA safeguards.  Ambassador informed 
ElBaradei that Acting A/S McNerney is coming to Vienna on 
November 10 to discuss the IAEA role in detail with Mr. 
Heinonen.  DG ElBaradei expressed appreciation and said that 
we seemed to be on the same track. 
 
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Additional Protocol 
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¶11. (S) The Ambassador briefed ElBaradei on our goal for the 
upcoming meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.  ElBaradei 
said that our shift from an outright ban to a criteria based 
approach for restricting sensitive technology transfer should 
help in our quest for multilateral assurances of fuel supply. 
 Ambassador described our effort to secure the support of 
Argentina and Brazil for the Additional Protocol as a 
criterion for sensitive technology transfer in the short term 
and, in the long term, the adoption of the AP.  Based on his 
recent trip to Argentina and Brazil, the Ambassador told 
ElBaradei that Argentina was politically ready to conclude 
the AP, but was not yet prepared to take on the technical 
reporting requirements, while in Brazil the opposite was the 
case.  ElBaradei noted that the technical requirements should 
not be a real hindrance for Argentina, and that he has 
repeatedly heard from both countries in the past several 
years that they are "very close" to concluding an AP. 
ElBaradei noted that he has tried to reassure Brazil that the 
IAEA will not "snoop" into activities conducted before the 
conclusion of an AP, stating that "we all know they were 
pursuing nukes."  ElBaradei undertook to press Brazil to 
adopt the AP, suggesting he would do so through Sergio Duarte 
but also asking our advice on which government officials to 
press. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶12. (S) ElBaradei did not commit to a written report or 
agenda item for the November Board meeting, though this may 
have reflected his unwillingness to be seen as succumbing to 
pressure from the U.S. and EU.  We hope, however, that he 
will understand our argument that his putting it on the 
agenda will be less politically charged than Member States 
forcing it on. 
 
¶13. (S) ElBaradei was much more relaxed on the DPRK.  We 
thank A/S Hill for his phone call and Acting A/S McNerney for 
scheduling a visit here next month. 
SCHULTE 
 
 
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