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Viewing cable 08PHNOMPENH883, SOK AN ON THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PHNOMPENH883 2008-11-03 12:37 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO1660
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0883/01 3081237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031237Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0050
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0456
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0654
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3233
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2330
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000883 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, D, P, DRL, IO, S/WCI 
USUN FOR M. SIMONOFF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS EAID PHUM CB
SUBJECT: SOK AN ON THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 
 
REF: A. PHNOM PENH 775 
     B. PHNOM PENH 653 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. PIPER CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B 
, D) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  As a follow-up to a coordinated donor 
strategy to engage Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) 
officials on corruption allegations in the Cambodian 
administrative side of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and in the context of ongoing 
discussions with other officials, Charge October 31 called on 
Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Council of 
Ministers, to relay the USG's shared concerns about the 
unresolved report from the UN Office of Internal Oversight 
Services (Ref B).  Sok An chose to meet on a Cambodian 
holiday in advance of extended official travel and indicated 
that he understood implicitly the primary concern was for the 
removal of ECCC Director Sean Visoth.  Although hinting that 
the removal of Visoth remained on the table, Sok An made a 
legalistic case for adhering to due process before removing 
one of only two Cambodians who have been with the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal (KRT) since the inception of UN negotiations in 
1997.  He made several pointed criticisms of the UN, all but 
asserting that UN meddling was intended to mar Cambodia's 
significant contributions to the KRT and to assert UN 
dominance over it.  Sok An also criticized the absence of 
communication between the UN and Cambodian sides of the 
court.  In the wake of a planned UN/OLA visit in late 
November, the Japanese embassy has called for a meeting of 
core donors on November 6.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Concern about Corruption 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C)  Noting the U.S. had joined the donor community to 
support the KRT, and citing the good work of the court's 
judicial process, Charge raised a concern of the donor group 
about allegations of corruption on the administrative side of 
the court.  Sok An reviewed the KRT's "five  achievements" 
saying that this was a laudable record of accomplishment and 
that nothing should be done to undermine this "package" of 
success.  Some of the concerns being raised by donors did not 
reflect the progress being made; we need to keep our focus on 
the trials and bring the court's work to a conclusion, he 
said. 
 
3. (C)  Sok An reviewed the four main goals of the court. 
First the ECCC was supposed to provide justice to Cambodians 
who suffered under the Khmer Rouge.  Second, the KRT would 
serve to preserve the memory of the Khmer Rouge atrocities 
and avoid future repetition.  Third, the court could serve as 
a model for other countries contemplating a hybrid court and 
seeking to try war crimes or genocide on their own soil. 
Fourth, the KRT was a means to help ensure peace, security 
and stability for the Cambodian people. 
 
4. (C)  The concerns being raised were a distraction from the 
goals of the court, said Sok An.  Besides, a number of 
internal audits had been carried out and did not find any 
evidence of wrongdoing.  The administrative machinery was 
doing its job to allow the court to achieve justice and we 
should not let these distractions delay the work.  (NOTE: 
None of the audits to date have examined allegations of 
providing jobs for kickbacks. END NOTE.)  Sok An similarly 
implied that the international community was attempting the 
undermine Cambodia's successful contribution to the peaceful 
and secure handling of a trial that proved to be "difficult 
and risky." 
 
Allegations Against One Man 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  In response to reference to the OIOS report, Sok An 
acknowledged that allegations had been made against one man 
but asked if there were evidence to prove the allegations. 
He noted an exchange of letters with the UN raising the 
allegations and other points, but there was not yet a 
response to his latest letter to the UN.  Cambodians involved 
in the process continued to suggest points for an additional 
RGC letter to the UN, he said (although he later acknowledged 
that tit-for-tat letters were not productive).  Sok An noted 
that the RGC had never claimed there was no corruption in 
Cambodia.  No country is perfect, he averred.  But the court 
was doing good work and should not have obstacles raised in 
front of it. 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000883  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
6. (C)  Sok An continued that he once told UNAKRT Special 
Expert and UN Assistant Secretary General David Tolbert that 
he understood the request to remove one man from the ECCC 
administration.  "I never said 'no' to David Tolbert 
regarding that suggestion," he noted.  He mentioned that he 
had been willing to consider the proposition.  (COMMENT:  In 
this meeting, he again did not outright reject the potential 
dismissal of Sean Visoth, whom he alluded to directly but 
never mentioned by name.  END COMMENT.).  But the work of the 
court must go on, Sok An continued.  At this time there are 
only two people at the court who have been there since the 
beginning, he noted.  It would be difficult to operate 
without them. Sok An mentioned the need for strong 
administration at the court.  The judicial side was going 
well and the administrative side was also performing well, so 
why should we change it, Sok An asked rhetorically. 
 
Questions About UN Motivations 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (C)  In response to Charge's query about a "political 
solution," Sok An went into a long discourse about the 
Cambodia-UN negotiation on the ECCC that began in 1997, 
implying the UN was not always a trustworthy negotiating 
partner.  At one point, UN/OLA's Hans Corell sought to change 
a feature of the hybrid ECCC arrangement that had already 
been agreed.  "He tried to throw out his own baby in front of 
everybody," said Sok An. 
 
8. (C)  Sok An seemed hesitant to accept that any real change 
in UN attitudes had occurred, asserting that some in the UN 
wanted to raise obstacles, although he acknowledged that 
UNAKRT Special Expert David Tolbert had a reasonable approach 
and said that he had had a good exchange with Tolbert.  (This 
was when he repeated to Charge his line to Tolbert that the 
idea of moving one man was not off the table.) 
 
More Evidence of Mistrust 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C)  Sieng Vandeth, Chief of Cabinet in the Council of 
Ministers, noted that he spoke to ECCC Deputy Director Knut 
Rosandhaug on October 30 and when he asked if Rosandhaug had 
ever spoken to any of the witnesses in the case, Rosandhaug 
responded in the negative.  When asked how many direct 
witnesses there were in the case, Rosandhaug had noted there 
were five individuals.  Implying this was a weak case, 
Vandeth suggested that the UN wanted to get rid of Sean 
Visoth because Visoth was a strong and effective 
administrator. 
 
10. (C)  Sok An said that the RGC was continuing its own 
investigation, but in the meantime the administrative 
machinery had to keep functioning to support the court.  Now 
the UN and the Cambodian sides are not even talking, he said. 
 (NOTE:  Few on the UN side have interacted with Visoth since 
the OIOS report.  END NOTE.)  A court cannot function like 
that, Sok An said.  The Charge noted that when credible 
allegations are brought against an individual, the 
allegations cannot be ignored and must have an impact on 
administrative functions.  Sok An noted that the allegations 
were not being ignored.  However, without evidence a person 
could not be fired. 
 
Past and Present Interactions with the UN 
----------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C)  In an exchange on former S/WCI Ambassador David 
Scheffer, Sok An fondly recalled a private meeting he had 
with Scheffer down at Sok An's Takeo province farm, during 
which Scheffer helped break through an RGC-UN impasse at that 
time.  He noted that Scheffer had come straight from Phnom 
Penh's Pochentong airport and had flown out the same day, so 
as to avoid attracting notice or having to answer pressing 
questions from journalists. 
 
12. (C)  In response to a question about a possible UN/OLA 
visit, Sok An said that he had to attend a meeting of the 
Centrist Democrat International in Mexico in early November. 
Cambodia would be host to the CDI world conference in 2009, 
so it was important to attend, he noted.  It was not possible 
to meet the OLA at this time, he said, but he expressed 
willingness to meet with them if their dates can be changed. 
(NOTE:  According to UNAKRT's Giovanni Bassu, UN/OLA will 
propose a trip in late November that matches Sok An's 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000883  003 OF 003 
 
 
availability.  We understand that this will be no earlier 
than Nov. 21.  END NOTE.) 
 
13. (C)  COMMENT:  This meeting follows on a stiffer, less 
open exchange with MFA Secretary of State Ouch Borith in 
mid-October in which Ouch Borith adhered to the more 
legalistic arguments in defense of Sean Visoth.  Sok An 
appeared relaxed, sure of his position and willing to be 
frank.  He again alluded to the notion that at an appropriate 
time Sean Visoth would move from the ECCC.  However, absent a 
serious effort by the UN to present and back up evidence, it 
does not appear that the RGC will feel compelled to 
investigate.  If Sok An has indeed thought through a lateral 
move for Visoth, the DPM's biggest worry may be finding a 
suitable replacement who will assert Cambodian sovereignty in 
the process and thus keep ownership of Cambodia's "success 
story" at the KRT.  While Sok An never suggested a quid pro 
quo whereby Knut Rosandhaug and Sean Visoth are both moved, 
his criticisms of the UN administration were pointed. 
CAMPBELL