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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3410
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RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T MANAGUA 001405 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, INL/LP, INR/IAA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2013 
TAGS: SNAR ASEC PGOV PREL NU
SUBJECT: THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL POLICE AND ELECTORAL FRAUD 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1195 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 1343 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 1384 
     ¶D. MANAGUA 1393 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Callahan, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In the period before, during, and after 
the November 9 municipal elections in Nicaragua, the 
Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) conspicuously failed to 
carry out its duties to uphold the Electoral Law and 
generally failed to carry out its duties to maintain public 
order in a non-partisan, professional manner.  Embassy and 
other third-party observers noted worrisome lapses in 
provision of security for the opposition Vamos con Eduardo - 
Constitutional Liberal Party (VcE-PLC) candidates as well as 
selective inaction in the face of blatant election fraud and 
violent actions on the part of the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) and its supporters.  Post is planning 
to meet with NNP Chief Aminta Granera to present USG concerns 
on the overall posture of the NNP during the entire election 
period and the difficulty of continuing assistance programs 
to the NNP considering their recent actions.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Before the Election: Harbingers of Trouble 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (C)  As early as September 2008, the NNP was beginning to 
exhibit troubling patterns of partisan bias in favor of the 
FSLN.  On September 20, NNP officials stood idly by as FSLN 
sympathizers violently disrupted a civil society march in 
Leon organized by pro-democracy civil society groups.  The 
civil society protest organizers had previously filed for, 
and received, permission from the Leon government to stage 
their march, whereas the FSLN groups who violently disrupted 
the march were clearly acting without a formal permit and 
outside the boundaries of the law.  FSLN supporters taking to 
the streets of Leon boldly declared that the "streets are for 
the people - only FSLN people."  In the face of these illegal 
actions, the NNP failed to warn or otherwise deter the FSLN 
marchers and did not arrest or detain any agitators, even 
when police themselves were directly threatened by FSLN 
sympathizers with machetes, mortars and baseball bats. 
Representatives from the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights 
(CENIDH) believe that President Ortega ordered the NNP to 
allow the FSLN supporters to conduct their attacks against 
the civil society groups without impediment. 
 
¶3. (C) A close contact and former NNP division chief, who was 
also primarily responsible for re-organizing the anti-riot 
police unit in the early '90s, told us that the anti-riot 
police in Leon were clearly acting "under instructions."  He 
explained that standard procedures for anti-riot units in 
Nicaragua was to form a "triangle-wedge" formation to enter a 
disturbance, after which the wedge must identify, surround, 
and detain major "instigators" of violence.  In the case of 
disturbance in Leon, however, our contact pointed out that 
video footage of the riot police clearly showed a "triangle" 
unit moving towards, then deliberately avoiding FSLN mayoral 
candidate Manuel Calderon, who had brought a baseball bat to 
the scene and was one of the main instigators of the mob. 
See Ref A for the full account of pre-election clashes in 
Leon. 
 
¶4. (C) The NNP also clearly demonstrated preferential 
treatment for FSLN forces in the pre-election period in its 
tolerance of the illegal occupation of major Managua 
intersections and traffic circles by FSLN supporters (Ref B). 
 PLC Deputy and National Assembly Justice Committee 
Chairperson Jose Pallais explained to PolOff that not only 
did the FSLN activists, who were clearly organized and funded 
by the Ortega administration, fail to secure any permits from 
the NNP for their activity, but that their very presence in 
the period leading up to the election was a clear violation 
of the Nicaraguan Electoral Law.  Nicaragua's Electoral Law 
(Law 331)  expressly prohibits any political gatherings in 
the 72-hour period preceding any elections.  As reported in 
Ref B, even Managua's Sandinista mayor, Jose Dionisio "Nicho" 
Marenco (who has clashed with Ortega on various occasions) 
declared the occupation of the intersections and circles an 
illegal act.  Despite the clear legal prerogative to act, 
however, the NNP remained silent and inactive.  To date, the 
FSLN has continued to maintain its illegal presence at major 
intersections in the city as a clear deterrent to political 
opposition and a none-too subtle threat of violence against 
those who would stand in their way - all under the watchful 
and passive eyes of the NNP. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
During The Election: NNP Complicit in Electoral Fraud? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (C) Nicaraguan municipal elections were held on November 
9, 2008.  Throughout the day, Embassy and third party 
organizations noted multiple instances of intimidation and 
improper, if not outright illegal, behavior towards VcE-PLC 
affiliated personnel (Ref C).  In multiple voting centers 
around the country, NNP uniformed police stood by and watched 
as FSLN supporters forcibly and illegally ejected VcE-PLC 
fiscales (poll-watchers) from the sites.  According to PLC 
Deputy Jose Pallais, there was at least one instance of 
uniformed police officers actively involved in the expulsion 
of opposition poll-watchers from a voting center - in the 
FSLN dominated municipality of Telica.  Post is attempting to 
gather more information on the events in Telica, particularly 
the alleged personal involvement of the Telica Chief of 
Police in what transpired there. 
 
¶6. (C) In addition, there were widespread reports of 
"electoral police" involved in electoral irregularities 
throughout the country.  Embassy monitors, media outlets, and 
other third party organizations reported that the electoral 
police (who are not affiliated with the NNP) assisted in the 
ejection of VcE-PLC officials from voting centers, the early 
closure of key voting centers, and were likely involved in 
actual physical tampering with a large volume of ballots. 
(Another close contact and former NNP chief explained to 
PolOff that although these groups are called "police" in 
actuality they have no ties to the NNP.)  The Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) traditionally has the role of 
gathering civilian volunteers and provide training to these 
individuals as electoral police.  This year, however, this 
role was relegated to the Ministry of Government, which in 
turn charged regional Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) with the 
task.  We know that the electoral police were FSLN members 
hand-picked by the Ministry of Government.  (Note:  In a 
formal briefing on electoral security, the Nicaraguan Army 
stated that the electoral police were indeed directly trained 
by the NNP.)  Of course, contact concluded, these purely 
partisan Sandinista organizations lost no time in gathering 
groups of FSLN radicals who entered into service with one aim 
- to steal the elections. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
After The Election:  All Dressed Up With Nowhere To Go 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C) The trend of police inaction in face of clearly 
illegal acts of violence and intimidation continued in the 
days following the election (Ref D).  On November 11, an FSLN 
mob attacked the VcE headquarters building in Managua, 
causing extensive property damage and injuring some VcE 
staff.  On the same day, the NNP failed to prevent FSLN 
forces from burning down the VcE campaign headquarters in 
Nagarote.  Despite receiving intelligence regarding the 
potential for such attacks, the NNP failed to prevent the 
attack or apprehend those responsible.  It took police over 
15 minutes to arrive on the scene in Managua.  On November 
16, FSLN supporters created an illegal barricade against 
VcE-PLC supporters attempting to travel to Leon to protest 
the fraudulent results of the mayoral race there.  In a 
situation reminiscent of the clashes in Leon in September, 
the NNP again failed to protect the rights of the protesters, 
who once again had obtained legitimate permits from the NNP 
itself, to gather safely in Leon.  The opposition group was 
forced to turn away from Leon in defeat. 
 
¶8. (C) During the week of November 17, FSLN forces gathered 
in large, armed groups (machetes, home-made mortars, and some 
guns) to continue their illegal occupation of major 
intersections and roundabouts in Managua.  In many instances, 
units of anti-riot police - dressed in full anti-riot gear - 
could be observed loitering safe distances away from the 
armed FSLN mobs blocking traffic, laying down nail-strips and 
other traps for vehicles, and shooting their home-made 
mortars into the air.  As a result of this intimidation, 
opposition leaders were forced to abort a large march they 
had scheduled on November 18 to protest the electoral fraud. 
Participants in the opposition told us that police radios 
were used to position FSLN supporters over the three-hour 
standoff.  Police also physically prevented opposition 
supporters from accessing the march location.  However, 
opposition leaders were able to take advantage of the FSLN 
focus on Managua to hold a successful protest march in Leon. 
In an apparent act of retaliation, on the same night 
Sandinista sympathizers led by an FSLN National Assembly 
deputy, broke in and destroyed the radio transmitters of 
three radio stations widely seen as sympathetic to the 
opposition.  When asked by Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa why 
they stood aside and let the crime occur, one of the two NNP 
officers who had been on the scene frankly replied, "we had 
orders not to act." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Granera Embattled, Surrounded - But Still Struggling 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (S/NF) The consensus that is emerging after all of these 
events is that NNP Chief Aminta Granera has almost completely 
ceded control over the institution to Ortega loyalists 
ostensibly serving under her.  A Former NNP Chief blamed the 
inaction and seeming indifference of anti-riot units in 
Managua on Managua Chief of Police Roger Ramirez, who he 
claimed is receiving orders directly from FSLN security 
organs.  Our contact also accused newly promoted NNP 
Sub-Director Francisco Diaz, who shares an illegitimate 
grandson with Ortega, of being heavily involved in electoral 
machinations involving the NNP.  The Nicaraguan private 
sector is also evidently aware of Granera's loss of control 
in the NNP.  Owner of Nicaragua Brewing Company Javier Solis 
informed EmbOffs that NNP units on the street are actually 
directly controlled by Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo. 
 (Note: He also informed us that he has offered Granera a job 
at the Brewing Company.) 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Despite her lack of influence, Granera appears to 
be attempting to help VcE-PLC figures in a limited fashion. 
According to various sources inside both the NNP and the 
VcE-PLC organization, on November 10 Granera personally 
warned VcE leader and Managua mayoral candidate Eduardo 
Montealegre of a squad organized by FSLN security chief Lenin 
Cerna to attack him as he approached CSE headquarters to 
protest the fraudulent election results.  Granera also seems 
to be looking out for opposition figures who have personal or 
geographic connections to her.  PLC Deputy Jose Pallais, who 
like Granera is a Leon native, said that when his team 
discovered ballots marked in favor of VcE-PLC candidates 
discarded in Leon's municipal dump, Granera acted quickly on 
his tip to protect the ballots - thus preserving important 
evidence of electoral tampering by the FSLN.  Finally, 
perhaps in response to widespread criticism over the 
lethargic response of the NNP to election-related 
disturbances to this point, the NNP now appears to be taking 
more assertive actions to protect opposition politicians from 
Sandinista mobs.  Post will continue to closely monitor the 
NNP posture as the likelihood of violent conflict between 
FSLN and opposition supporters rises before the CSE's 
official December 5 announcement of the results of the 
election. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶11. (S/NF) Comment:  Granera has publicly characterized the 
actions of the NNP as "balanced and cautious," with a focus 
on "preventing a bloodbath" as opposed to being concerned 
about "social conflicts."  We remain, however, gravely 
concerned both by the actions (and inaction) of the NNP 
during these municipal elections and the systematic attack by 
the Ortega Administration against the professionalism and 
independence of the police organization.  We are actively 
seeking a formal meeting with Aminta Granera to present USG 
concerns about the conduct of the NNP and warn of the effect 
this might have on assistance programs for the police, but we 
anticipate that the presence of Ortega loyalists and NNP Sub 
Directors Carlos Palacios and Francisco Diaz will have a 
chilling effect on the dialogue in the meeting.  In short, at 
this late stage of the game it is difficult to expect that 
Aminta Granera will have the power, influence or even, 
perhaps, the will to change the course of events both within 
and without the NNP.  The validity of our concerns was 
brought into sharp focus on November 18, when an Embassy 
officer waved down an NNP patrol for assistance with a FSLN 
mob that was actively threatening him.  The hapless officer 
was succinctly told: "We are not here to help you." 
CALLAHAN