VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0565/01 2951444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211444Z OCT 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8577
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0353

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000565 
 
STATE FOR IO/T, ISN, 
ISN/MNSA - RAGSDALE, COCKERHAM, DAVIS 
-  ISN/NESS - STRATFORD, BURKART 
-  ISN/RA - NEPHEW, GROMOLL 
DOE FOR S-1, S-2 
-  NE - MCGINNIS, CLAPPER, HERCZEG, HAN 
-  NA 2O - BAKER, WITTROCK 
-  NA24 - LERSTEN, SCHEINMAN, GOOREVICH, BRUNS 
NRC FOR OIP - MDOANE, JSCHWARZMAN 
ROME FOR USMISSION TO FAO 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY IR KN SY LY IN
 
SUBJ: IAEA/GC: GENERAL DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 554  B) UNVIE 546 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Director General ElBaradei opened the IAEA General Conference 
on September 29 with a warning that "all is not well with the IAEA," 
given a lack of resources to meet nuclear energy, safeguards, safety 
and security challenges.  He called for implementation of the 
Additional Protocol (AP), including by Iran, and cited upgrades of 
the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and the Incident and Emergency 
Center as immediate priorities.  The Director General highlighted 
the Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) report's recommendations, 
and urged member states to take a long-term view of the Agency's 
future.  The Scientific Forum, a two-day event parallel to the 
General Conference, also addressed the future role of the IAEA, as 
informed by the CEP report. 
 
¶2. (U) The General Debate in the GC Plenary spanned four days, 
including national statements from 130 member states and 
intergovernmental organizations. Speaking first in the General 
Debate, Secretary of Energy Bodman delivered the U.S. statement and 
a Presidential message in support of the IAEA.  A number of 
countries offered general assessments of the CEP report on the 
Agency's future as timely but in need of member state input and 
further refinement.  Among other key issues were nuclear 
verification in Iran, DPRK, Syria and Libya; Indian nuclear 
cooperation; and the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. 
Several interventions noted the passage of UNSCR 1835 on Iran. 
Iran, having downgraded its participation in the GC to protest the 
IAEA's toughening stance, charged that the Agency was threatening 
its national security.  Iran also raised "non-discrimination" in 
multilateral fuel assurances.  In a similar vein, Syria claimed that 
its cooperation with the IAEA would not be at the expense of 
military or national security. 
 
¶3. (U) In addition to these specific issues, member state 
interventions in the General Debate addressed broad themes and IAEA 
programmatic areas: strengthening safeguards with emphasis on the 
Additional Protocol and nuclear disarmament; funding and support to 
nuclear security; the Agency's role in the expansion of nuclear 
power; the importance of technical cooperation and nuclear safety. 
Japan and South Africa used their interventions to promote 
respective candidates for IAEA Director General.  Notably, on the 
issue of upgrading the Agency's laboratories, the Czech Republic 
announced that it had offered the IAEA "premises and capacities" for 
safeguards analysis.  Several member states, including some 
potential recipients, also expressed support for Reliable Access to 
Nuclear Fuel (RANF).  End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
DG's Introductory Remarks 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Opening the GC on a cautionary note, DG ElBaradei warned in 
address entitled "The IAEA at a Crossroads," that "all is not well 
with the IAEA" and cited a lack of resources and legal authority to 
meet member state expectations.  IAEA-FAO cooperation was the first 
programmatic area he mentioned, urging continued member state 
support.  Among growing demands was the significant expansion of 
nuclear power, projected to double by 2030, and safeguards 
challenges with respect to undeclared activities by state and 
non-state actors.  Regarding the latter, ElBaradei regretted that 
only about half of NPT states have Additional Protocols (AP) in 
force and 30 states lack required comprehensive safeguards 
agreements (CSA).  The DG also highlighted Agency contributions to 
nuclear safety standards and nuclear security.  The aging 
infrastructure at the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory merited 
particular mention, as did the need for an overhaul of the Incident 
and Emergency Center so that it may respond to large-scale 
emergencies. 
 
¶5. (U) ElBaradei commented on the DPRK's intention, at that 
juncture, to restrict inspector access, and noted "substantial 
progress" in Iran's nuclear program.  However, he stressed that the 
Agency could not verify the absence of undeclared activities, and 
urged Iran to implement the AP and transparency measures to build 
confidence as "this would be good for Iran and good for the world." 
The DG welcomed the resumption of routine verification in Libya but 
reiterated concerns that electronic information on enrichment and 
weapon design exists on the black market.  He also reported the lack 
of any progress on a Middle East NWFZ. 
 
¶6. (U) Turning to the future, the DG noted that years of zero real 
growth left the Agency overly reliant on voluntary contributions, 
particularly for nuclear security and safety as well as safeguards. 
He highlighted the Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) report's most 
important recommendations, including multilateral nuclear fuel 
supply arrangements; substantial increase for the Technical 
Cooperation Fund, which should not be a "political bargaining chip"; 
binding nuclear security standards and a global safety network; 
strengthening safeguards, and progress on nuclear disarmament, which 
has been on the "back burner for too long."  The cost of these 
proposals, with a gradual doubling of the IAEA budget by 2020, was 
modest, he claimed, weighed against the cost of a nuclear accident 
or terrorist attack.  ElBaradei concluded by encouraging member 
states to "think big and think long-term." 
 
-------------- 
U.S. Statement 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The first speaker in the General Debate, Secretary of Energy 
Bodman delivered the U.S. statement and a message from President 
Bush.  The Presidential message pledged that the U.S. would do its 
part to support the Agency's goals, including those outlined in the 
CEP report, of strengthening safeguards, and promoting nuclear 
safety, security and peaceful nuclear energy.  Secretary Bodman 
noted three challenges facing the expansion of nuclear power that 
need to be addressed in quick order: cost, waste and proliferation. 
He also highlighted the Convention on Supplemental Compensation 
(CSC), the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and the Next 
Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI); and he supported the 
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank, noting the U.S. 
contribution of nearly 50 million USD to that effort.  Secretary 
Bodman advised that the U.S. hoped to ratify the AP by year's end 
and reported significant progress in nuclear disarmament, with the 
U.S. strategic stockpile at levels equivalent to that of the 
Eisenhower Administration.  Full text of the U.S. statement 
available at www.doe.gov and www.iaea.org. 
 
------ 
20/20 
------ 
 
¶8. (U) Several countries commented on the CEP report and future 
direction of the Agency with some expressing reservations about 
outsourcing the 20/20 process.  The EU advised it is willing to 
enter a dialogue on CEP recommendations within the Statutory mandate 
of the Agency, but also noted that the CEP does not replace the 
Agency's policy bodies.  Slovenia and the Netherlands observed that 
member states should steer the 20/20 process.  Slovenia also 
recommended that the IAEA focus on its statutory role while Poland 
cautioned against the trend toward politicization of the Agency's 
work.  Poland supported more emphasis on nuclear energy development 
and reliance on the regular budget.  The Netherlands attached great 
importance to the Agency's future, and was ready to discuss 
budgetary implications.  The UK, Brazil, Chile, Philippines, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Azerbaijan and others welcomed the CEP report as 
timely, positive and a good basis for discussion.  Norway urged that 
we seize this opportunity to strengthen the Agency. 
 
¶9. (U) Among the G-77, India was critical of the report as needing 
"balance" and more of a focus on nuclear energy and practical ideas. 
 Indonesia also observed that the CEP report did not sufficiently 
address issues of concern to developing countries, especially 
Technical Cooperation (Note: The report calls for a substantial 
increase in TC funding. End note.) Syria underlined that the CEP 
report was a non-binding guidance document and that member states 
and policy organs would determine the future direction of the 
Agency. 
 
------------- 
DG Candidates 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (U) Japan and South Africa used the General Debate to 
enthusiastically support their respective candidates for the next 
IAEA Director General, Governor Amano of Japan and Governor Minty of 
South Africa.  Mozambique also publicly endorsed Minty's candidacy; 
the DG race was not otherwise raised in the General Debate. 
 
---------------------  ----- 
Nuclear Verification:  Iran 
------------------------    ----- 
 
¶11. (U) Iranian Vice President and Atomic Energy Agency of Iran 
(AEOI) Director Agazadeh cancelled his participation in the General 
Conference, reportedly to protest the IAEA's toughening stance on 
Iran's nuclear program.  Iran's statement, delivered by Iranian 
Ambassador Soltanieh, charged the IAEA with threatening Iran's 
national security on the pretext of verification and at the behest 
of a few Western nations.  Soltanieh described Iran's nuclear energy 
plan and encouraged potential suppliers to participate.  He noted 
that the fuel enrichment facility at Natanz was almost at the final 
stage of construction.  In statements widely quoted in the press, 
Soltanieh claimed that multilateral fuel assurances failed to 
address concerns of developing countries and include 
non-discriminatory criteria.  Soltanieh insisted that Iran acts in 
accordance with its safeguards agreement, and cited negative 
developments in the Board of Governors.  He urgently called for UNSC 
reform and concluded by affirming that sanctions do not deter Iran's 
nuclear program and put constraints on negotiations. 
 
¶12. (U) More than two dozen IAEA members referred to Iran in their 
General Debate statements; most were critical with the exceptions of 
Cuba and Venezuela.  The EU, UK, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, 
Greece, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Norway, Ireland, 
Malta, the Philippines and Singapore variously urged Iran to 
cooperate with the IAEA (or noted Iran's defiance), implement the 
AP/transparency measures, comply with UNSCRs and change course. 
Several countries also encouraged Iran to respond to the EU3+3 
offer. (Note: Like the U.S., Russia and China did not focus on 
verification issues in their GC statements. End note.)  The EU 
"could not accept Iran with nuclear weapons" and cited the adoption 
of UNSCR 1835 that week, as did the UK, Denmark and Australia.  The 
EU affirmed that as the guarantor of international security the UNSC 
was an important partner of the IAEA.  Denmark's statement was 
particularly strident with respect to the credibility of the UNSC. 
The EU also called on Iran to accede to the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety before Bushehr goes online.  Several interventions supported 
the IAEA investigation of weaponization.  Germany noted remaining 
questions on the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear 
program, while Greece called on Iran to make full disclosure of 
weapons development.  Australia urged Iran to follow Libya's lead, 
and Belgium contrasted Libya's case with those of Iran and DPRK. 
Notably, Peru distanced itself from the Tehran NAM Ministerial 
statement and supported UNSCRs on nonproliferation. 
 
¶13. (U) Other national statements, including by some current or 
incoming UNSC members, were carefully balanced.  Mexico welcomed 
positive progress on the Iran work plan and urged Iran to intensify 
cooperation and clarify outstanding issues.  Thailand also urged 
Iranian cooperation but defended NPT rights to peaceful use.  Turkey 
noted the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran while 
sharing the DG's concern that the Agency is not able to verify the 
full scope of Iran's program.  Ukraine supported constructive 
dialogue between Iran and the Agency.  Sudan welcomed IAEA 
activities in Iran and encouraged a peaceful conclusion.  Libya 
warned that "threats and confrontation" would not facilitate a 
solution and argued against sanctions or use of force.  Libya 
stressed Iran's right to peaceful use, while calling for increased 
cooperation.  Indonesia hoped that Iran's program would remain 
peaceful and cautioned that sanctions alone would not lead to a 
solution.  As would be expected, Cuba and Venezuela came to Iran's 
defense.  Venezuela rejected the UNSC "usurping" the IAEA's role and 
argued that Iran should not be singled out, using pretexts to deny 
NPT rights.  Cuba also cited the IAEA as the only competent 
authority to verify compliance without external interference. 
 
---------------------  ------------------ 
Nuclear Verification:  Syria, Libya, DPRK 
------------------------    --------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) In a statement delivered by Atomic Energy Commission 
Director Othman, Syria regretted calls by others for more 
transparency with the Agency on the investigation. Othman recalled 
statements made by the DG and DDG for Safeguards at the September 
2008 Board of Governors meeting that Syria was "cooperative and 
complied with the procedures agreed upon with the Agency."  Othman 
noted that Syria will continue to cooperate but not at the expense 
of disclosing military positions or threatening national security. 
The remainder of Syria's statement was devoted to the issues of a 
Middle East NWFZ and "double standard" for Israel. 
 
¶15. (U) A number of statements raised Syria's cooperation with the 
IAEA.  The EU urged Syria to answer the IAEA's questions and provide 
access, asking that the Secretariat pursue the investigation "until 
such time" that it can send a full report to the Board of Governors. 
 Denmark, Germany, Italy and Australia also called for Syrian 
cooperation with the investigation.  Australia and Canada expressed 
concern about DPRK cooperation with Syria.  By contrast, Switzerland 
was pleased to see cooperation with Syria and awaited the 
conclusions of the IAEA.  Malaysia noted that there was no 
indication of nuclear material at Al Kibar.   Rallying to Syria's 
defense, Venezuela described the attack on Al Kibar as a flagrant 
violation of international law. 
 
¶16. (U) Several statements took note of positive developments in 
Libya.  The EU applauded the "courageous steps" taken by Libya and 
Italy expressed satisfaction with Libya's decision to renounce WMD. 
Belgium, Italy and others noted Libyan-IAEA cooperation and 
transparency and Greece hoped that other member states would follow 
Libya's example.  Libya expressed support for IAEA safeguards and 
focused its statement on peaceful use, nuclear energy and technical 
cooperation.  Libya also thanked the U.S. and U.K. for the fruitful 
work carried out in the days prior, i.e. on the Board of Governors 
resolution on Libya's return to routine safeguards, and cited 
U.S.-Libya cooperation on a nuclear medicine center. 
 
¶17. (U) At least 20 General Debate statements, including those of 
Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, 
Turkey, Malta, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, sounded 
concern about the DPRK's announced halt to disablement activities at 
Yongbyon and removal of IAEA seals and inspectors in late September. 
 The ROK, New Zealand, Singapore and several others called for the 
DPRK's return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.  Denmark, Italy, 
Ukraine, Thailand and Chile also supported the IAEA's role in DPRK. 
The EU called on the DPRK to implement UNSCRs and dismantle nuclear 
facilities in a verifiable manner so that the IAEA could be in a 
position to assume its full role. 
 
------------------------- 
India Nuclear Cooperation 
------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (U) India highlighted the Board of Governors' approval of its 
safeguards agreement and subsequent NSG exception, which would allow 
it to contribute to international civil nuclear cooperation, and 
focused on the importance of nuclear energy for sustainable 
development and climate change.  Israel also welcomed the U.S.-India 
civilian nuclear agreement.  Germany expected that the India-IAEA 
safeguards agreement would bring India closer to nonproliferation 
efforts and that India would refrain from nuclear testing.  Germany 
clarified that its support of the NSG decision was predicated on the 
safeguards agreement. The ROK specified that India should implement 
its safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol at the earliest 
possible date; Belgium also hoped India would move forward on the 
AP.  Japan called on India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state. 
Others expressed continued reservations about the India safeguards 
agreement and NSG exemption.  Switzerland noted that this still 
represented a challenge for universality and comprehensive 
safeguards.  Ireland had "reluctantly" agreed to India's exemption 
from full safeguards only after India committed to a moratorium on 
testing.  Indonesia was the most critical in "deeply regretting" the 
NSG decision, which would bring more harm than good to the global 
nonproliferation regime. 
 
------------------------------- 
Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel 
------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) The General Debate further reflected considerable momentum 
and support for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF), which was 
also the subject of side events by the Nuclear Threat Initiative 
(NTI) and others.  The EU confirmed that it was examining the 
possibility of making a contribution to the International Nuclear 
Fuel Bank (INFB).  Russia expected to have all the mechanisms in 
place for the international fuel enrichment center at Angarsk by 
year's end. However, Russia cautioned that making fuel supply 
arrangements subject to political considerations would undermine 
support.  China also called for multilateral approaches to the 
nuclear fuel cycle.  The UK noted that it would host a major 
conference by March 2009 on assurance of supply.  Germany shared the 
DG's view that any multilateral mechanism should be 
non-discriminatory and in compliance with IAEA safeguards.  Other EU 
members, including Austria, Denmark and Greece, expressed strong 
support for multilateralization of nuclear fuel supply, and Denmark 
advocated a crucial role for the IAEA in such a mechanism. 
 
¶20. (U) Among potential recipient countries, the Philippines viewed 
"with interest" proposals on multilateral fuel centers with IAEA 
involvement.  Ecuador welcomed the rich debate about options for 
guaranteeing supply of nuclear fuel, and was prepared to support 
viable initiatives allowing countries to benefit from nuclear 
energy.  Indonesia was also forward leaning in viewing multilateral 
mechanisms on fuel supply as a positive step so long as this does 
not restrict the right of countries to develop nuclear technology. 
Malaysia noted that the establishment of a RANF mechanism should be 
based on consultation with all member states and by consensus.  Only 
 
Venezuela obliquely rejected "commercial" arrangements that limit 
states' options with regard to nuclear power, while Iran portrayed 
fuel supply mechanisms as discriminatory toward developing 
countries. 
 
----------------- 
Middle East NWFZ 
----------------- 
 
¶21. (U) Once again the subject of a Middle East NWFZ would come to 
dominate the General Conference.  The former GC President (Lebanon) 
opened the GC with a call for universal adherence to the NPT in the 
Middle East and the establishment of a zone free of WMD.  Upon 
taking office, the 2008 GC President (Italy) expressed the hope that 
a Middle East Forum on the establishment of a WMD-free zone could be 
convened during the coming year.  For its part, Israel noted that it 
had supported establishment of a NWFZ since 1993 and had not lost 
hope, but regretted the breakdown of consensus in the GC.  This had 
led Israel to wonder if the Middle East NWFZ was really the issue. 
 
¶22. (U) The establishment of a Middle East NWFZ and the "double 
standard" with respect to Israel's accession to the NPT/the 
application of IAEA safeguards was the focus of interventions by 
most Arab states in the General Debate (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon and Sudan) and that of 
Iran.  Syria portrayed this as the "highest priority" on the agendas 
of all international organizations, and Iran blamed the U.S., U.K 
and France for Israel's possession of nuclear weapons.  Libya also 
pointedly warned that Israel's nuclear possibilities could trigger 
an arms race in the region.  NAM countries led by Cuba, Venezuela, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Ecuador voiced support for a Middle East 
NWFZ and the Arab League position.  Cuba condemned U.S. technology 
transfer to Israel.  The Palestinian Observer Mission spoke of 
living in the shadow of the unsafeguarded Israeli reactor.  Others 
such as Afghanistan and Nigeria lent moral support to the concept of 
NWFZs, including in the Middle East. 
 
---------------------- 
Safeguards / AP/ SAL 
---------------------- 
 
¶23. (U) The majority of countries underlined their commitment to 
strengthening safeguards with particular emphasis on 
universalization of the Additional Protocol.  EU members, Russia, 
China, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Kazakhstan, 
Uganda, Albania and Croatia cited the importance of the AP.  Spain 
regretted that 11 years after the adoption of the Model AP, 104 
states have yet to implement it.  The UK, Austria and others cited 
the failure of 30 countries to conclude safeguards agreements. 
Several interventions (Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, ROK, 
Latvia, Israel and others) stressed safeguards compliance, noting 
that breaches of safeguards obligations/clandestine activities 
necessitated strengthened safeguards.  Australia saw safeguards as 
the core mission of the IAEA, including with respect to 
investigation of weaponization, and cited transparency measures 
beyond the AP. 
 
¶24. (U) In a concrete contribution to Agency safeguards, the Czech 
Republic announced during the General Debate that it had officially 
offered the Agency premises and capacities for performing analysis 
of safeguards samples.  The Czech Republic advised that use of or 
investment in adequate capacities of countries in the vicinity could 
be a cost effective solution for the IAEA in its efforts to upgrade 
the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory. 
 
¶25. (U) In other noteworthy interventions, Saudi Arabia cited 
safeguards as one of the main pillars of the Agency but argued that 
they be applied without exception (i.e. including Israel).  Saudi 
Arabia reported that it has met all the legal and constitutional 
requirements for implementation of a safeguards agreement, and 
Tunisia advised that it would soon ratify an AP.  Pakistan also 
noted that it would place a uranium conversion facility under Agency 
safeguards. 
 
¶26. (U) Only Egypt cast the AP as a voluntary measure that should 
not be generalized and complained instead of the diminishing role of 
the IAEA in disarmament.  Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Indonesia 
characterized nonproliferation and disarmament as mutually 
reinforcing or inseparable, and the Philippines called for 
substantial progress toward both.  Nigeria also linked the 
transparent and nondiscriminatory application of Agency safeguards 
with commitment to disarmament on the part of nuclear weapons 
states.  Switzerland observed that the NPT Prepcom had demonstrated 
this conflict between verification and disarmament.  In an apt 
rejoinder, Norway argued that concerns about the lack of progress on 
disarmament should not be an excuse for or detract from 
strengthening safeguards.  Kazakhstan also advocated universal 
disarmament and Venezuela rejected the existence of nuclear weapons. 
 In addition, Norway, Ireland, Italy, Armenia and others called for 
the CTBT to enter into force. 
 
----------------- 
Nuclear Security 
---------------- 
 
¶27. (U) Nuclear security was also high on the agenda of the majority 
of member states.  The EU noted support for the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and encouraged participation in the IAEA's 
illicit trafficking data base and nuclear security fund (NSF). 
Russia announced that it would make a considerable contribution to 
the NSF.  The Netherlands saw the NSF as a "pivotal" function that 
should be funded out of the regular budget, while Denmark, New 
Zealand and others also noted contributions to the NSF. 
 
¶28. (U) Countries from every region (Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Croatia, Macedonia, Armenia, Poland, Italy, Colombia, Kenya 
among others) highlighted nuclear terrorism and trafficking as a 
grave threat, and strongly supported the IAEA's efforts in 
coordination with other bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. 
Pakistan saw verification of safety and security as the primary 
objective of the Agency.  Morocco called upon the IAEA to use all 
the resources at its disposal against the acquisition of nuclear 
technology by international terrorist networks.  In a direct affront 
to Pakistan, Afghanistan observed that AQ Khan and his government 
must be accountable for their implication in nuclear proliferation, 
and held nuclear states responsible if a terrorist attack should 
occur.  Libya noted its historic decision to dismantle nuclear 
technology that could lead to nuclear terrorism. 
 
¶29. (U) Denmark cited UNSCR 1540 as a fundamental step forward, and 
Saudi Arabia and Ukraine commended the IAEA's role in UNSCR 1540 and 
1763 implementation.  Italy cited cooperation through the G-8 
against nuclear terrorism and supported a ban on fissile material 
production, as did Finland.  A number of countries focused on 
strengthening export controls and regional cooperation.  Denmark 
cited the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Latvia noted 
its work with DOE on control of dual use technology.  Ukraine 
highlighted cooperation through GUUAM, as did Azerbaijan, and with 
the U.S. and others in the Global Initiative to Prevent the 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  In addition, Russia noted removal 
of HEU from Vietnam, Poland and the Czech Republic, while the Czech 
Republic noted it would fund the transfer of spent fuel from Serbia 
to Russia. 
 
-------------- 
Nuclear Safety 
-------------- 
 
¶30. (U) Many interventions strongly supported the IAEA's role in 
nuclear safety, in addition to nuclear security. China called upon 
the Agency to strengthen the global nuclear safety culture and 
advised against complacency in view of several incidents at nuclear 
facilities.  The EU congratulated the IAEA's work on nuclear safety 
standards.  Austria expressed concern at efforts to "downgrade" IAEA 
safety standards from "highest" to just "standard."  Italy observed 
that safety and security standards should be global legal 
obligations.  On the other hand, Finland and others opined that the 
Agency's advisory role cannot be a substitute for national 
regulatory infrastructure for those developing nuclear power.  Many 
countries underlined safety as a prerequisite for expansion of 
nuclear power, including in the context of the 3Ss (safety, 
security, safeguards).  India also announced that it is hosting an 
IAEA conference on nuclear installation safety in November 2008. 
 
¶31. (U) A number of countries, including Lithuania, Belgium, the UK, 
Finland, Spain and China, drew attention to waste management.  The 
UK supported deep geological disposal of nuclear waste, and Finland 
noted that it is constr]I[:Q-QQ 
QYp> power and the 
promotion of innovative approaches.   The EU announced that it has 
developed a global plan on energy and is producing a strategic 
report by November 2008.  The EU also supported IAEA activities on 
INPRO.  Russia expected to double its nuclear capacity by 2060 with 
the addition of 36 power plants.  The UK, Canada and many others 
noted the vital and expanding role of nuclear energy.  Germany 
believed the IAEA's mandate was sufficiently broad and flexible to 
support this demand.  Only traditional nuclear power opponents such 
as New Zealand and Ireland raised reservations about the risks of 
nuclear power and the role of the Agency in its promotion. 
 
¶34. (U) Developing countries such as India and Morocco saw nuclear 
energy as integral to meet growing energy needs and for sustainable 
development.  Countries ranging from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and 
Bangladesh to Romania advocated increased Agency support for nuclear 
power development.  Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Libya 
stressed unconditional and transparent support and 
non-discrimination in furtherance of NPT rights to nuclear energy. 
Several of 50 or so states considering nuclear power addressed their 
plans.  Kuwait referred to a Gulf Summit declaration on a joint 
program among GCC countries for peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
noted satisfaction with preliminary feasibility studies, and looked 
forward to further IAEA-GCC cooperation.  Libya had invited a number 
of companies to offer expertise on nuclear reactor technology and 
had signed agreements with France, Russia and South Korea.  Morocco 
noted that it had launched its first reactor in 2007 and supported 
technical cooperation with brotherly countries.  Turkey planned for 
nuclear power to become a major component of its energy mix.  Jordan 
would like to use nuclear power and is developing a nuclear energy 
infrastructure.  Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda and Mongolia were 
exploring or considering nuclear power; Namibia saw it as a prospect 
and Ghana as a long term option (Ghana is holding its first workshop 
in early 2009.) The Dominican Republic sought IAEA assistance on 
nuclear power and noted an agreement with Cuba on training staff. 
 
¶35. (U) Bulgaria, Armenia and Kazakhstan noted their participation 
in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). OECD countries were 
also more vigorously pursuing nuclear power. Italy noted the 
adoption of legislation to allow the production of nuclear energy. 
Lithuania noted it is expanding nuclear power with a new plant 
expected by 2016, and supported TC for nuclear power development. 
Finland is building a new plant and considering others. Canada 
expressed renewed interest in a thorium-fueled reactor.  Spain was 
completing a study on its nuclear power needs through 2030. 
 
¶36. (U) States were cognizant of the proliferation risks associated 
with nuclear energy expansion. In addition to Japan, Nigeria 
advocated adherence to international legal and regulatory 
requirements for 3s (safety, security and safeguards).  Saudi 
Arabia, Romania, Brazil and several others underlined the role of 
Agency safeguards in this expansion.  Russia noted that it was 
important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology, and 
China supported the right to nuclear power for those in compliance 
with nonproliferation obligations. 
 
---------------------- 
Technical Cooperation 
---------------------- 
 
¶37. (U) Noting that it was the leading contributor to technical 
cooperation (TC), the EU called for a substantial debate to ensure 
its effectiveness and efficiency of TC and equitable geographic 
distribution, including to LDCs.  Other donor nations such as Canada 
also voiced strong support for TC.  Many national statements 
(Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bosnia, Croatia, Ghana, 
Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Mongolia, Vietnam 
and others) focused on the importance of TC in general or TC 
projects in respective countries.  The Program of Action for Cancer 
Therapy (PACT) drew universal praise, and the African Regional 
Cooperative Agreement for Research (AFRA), cooperation with the 
African Union on tsetse fly eradication (AU-PATTEC), and the Sterile 
Insect Technique (SIT) received accolades from African countries. 
Ethiopia gave the highest priority to the SIT program, which was at 
a decisive stage, and thanked the U.S., China and Japan for their 
support.  Continuation of IAEA-FAO cooperation in the Joint Division 
also drew support from Poland, Norway and Ethiopia, among others. 
 
¶38. (U) Egypt, Indonesia and Guatemala made traditional calls for 
"balance" between safeguards and TC and among the Agency's three 
pillars. Others such as Malaysia called for predictable and assured 
funding for TC, incorporation of TC in the regular budget, and the 
establishment of criteria for TC fund targets.  Cuba once again 
lambasted the U.S. blockade, which it blamed for difficulties in 
implementing TC projects. 
 
---------------- 
Scientific Forum 
---------------- 
 
¶39. (U) The two-day Scientific Forum on the margins of the General 
Conference was devoted this year to the "Future Role of the IAEA and 
chaired by former Dutch PM Ruud Lubbers.  Four panels considered the 
IAEA's role in nuclear energy; development; safety and security; and 
non-proliferation.  Among the 21 panelists, including government 
officials, NGOs and academics, was U/S of Energy and NNSA Deputy 
Administer William Tobey, who addressed the Next Generation 
Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).  Opening the Forum, DG ElBaradei 
related these topics to the 20/20 exercise and the Commission of 
Eminent Persons report, reiterating many of the points from his 
introductory remarks to the GC.  The first session on nuclear energy 
included calls for increased IAEA budget and legal authority and 
focused on the Agency's support role in nuclear power development. 
Thailand presented an excellent case study on infrastructure and 
capacity building, and other participants addressed fuel cycle 
approaches and waste management.  The only distraction was an 
intervention from an Iran during the Q&A in defense of its nuclear 
program, which was finally cut off.  The second panel on development 
and technical assistance was the most "scientific" of the four, 
including talks on cancer treatment and water resources.  During the 
panel on safety and security, some participants proposed that the 
IAEA play the role of an international regulator; most however, 
favored harmonization of safety and security standards.  In the 
final panel on safeguards, Chairman Lubbers pushed for international 
acceptance of the AP and criticized U.S.-India nuclear cooperation 
as a possible failure of the NPT. Other speakers also suggested the 
expansion of the IAEA role to include verification of disarmament. 
 
¶40. (U) Taking on the DG's challenge to "think big and think 
long-term," the Scientific Forum Chairman's report to the GC sought 
to inform and enrich the views of member states with inputs from a 
variety of stake-holders on the Agency's future.  The Director 
General's 20/20 report and the Commission of Eminent Persons report 
provided a starting point for the discussion.  The Forum report 
focused on the Agency's role as the global leading actor on 
non-proliferation; its important role on nuclear energy, safety and 
security; and the IAEA's strategic but more modest contribution to 
development assistance.  The Forum took note of greater demands on 
the safeguards system with the expansion of nuclear energy and fuel 
cycle activities, and nuclear security challenges.  This 
necessitated greater efficiency and effectiveness of Agency 
safeguards and other innovations, including multilateral approaches 
to the fuel cycle.  Although the Forum report recognizes that the 
IAEA is not the lead forum on disarmament, it recommends that the 
Agency be prepared to respond to the technical needs of verification 
in this domain.  The second part of the report on meeting energy 
needs in a safe and secure manner focuses on the challenges 
accompanying the nuclear renaissance, including Agency support for 
"newcomer" countries as well as solutions for waste management, the 
back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle and innovation.  The report 
recommends a stringent approach to safety and security to enable 
this renaissance, and sees the Agency as playing a leading, expanded 
role in harmonization of standards.  The final section on 
development assistance highlights the Program of Action for Cancer 
Therapy (PACT), the contribution of the FAO-IAEA Joint Division to 
food security, and Agency research on isotope hydrology.  The report 
recommends enhanced technical cooperation in partnership with other 
organizations. 
 
¶41. (SBU) In conclusion, the Chairman's report recommends 
consideration of greater resources to meet the Agency's dual mission 
for development and security so that it may remain "ahead of the 
curve."  The "vital messages" from the Forum focus the need for more 
technical assistance to member states and enhancement of nuclear 
technology for development, and the Agency's role in ensuring that 
all nuclear facilities meet the 3S (safety, security and safeguards) 
requirements.  (Comment:  As has become increasingly the case, the 
Scientific Forum was less "scientific" and more "political"; this 
year's focus on the future of the Agency only reinforced the trend. 
The DG used the Forum as yet another platform for the 20/20 process 
in the hopes of advancing his agenda.  We expect to see some of the 
Scientific Forum's recommendations creep into discussions of the way 
forward in the 20/20 process.  End Comment.) 
 
PYATT