VZCZCXRO6135
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #4778/01 2751447
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011443Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4871
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 8785

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 104778 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2018 
TAGS: PREL UNGA UNSC RS GG
SUBJECT: QUINT POLITICAL DIRECTORS SEPTEMBER 26 MEETING 
WITH EU SPECIAL ENVOY PIERRE MOREL 
 
Classified By: EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Quint Political Directors (U.S., France, 
Germany, UK, and Italy) met on September 26 with EU Special 
Envoy for Georgia Pierre Morel to discuss the October 15 
Geneva talks on Georgia.  Morel presented his vision of the 
talks proceeding along two tracks: a plenary session that is 
convened bi-monthly at the Political Director level; and 
expert-level working groups convened on an ad hoc basis 
dealing with security/stability issues, human rights, and 
IDP/refugee returns.  Morel planned to invite de facto Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian leaders to Geneva for the inauguration of 
the working groups on October 22, but did not foresee their 
attendance at the opening session of the talks on October 15. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried, 
French Political Director Gerard Araud, German Political 
Director Volker Stanzel, UK Political Director Mark Lyall 
Grant, Italian Political Director Sandro de Bernadin, 
EUR/CARC Conflicts Advisor Mike Carpenter (notetaker). 
 
----------------- 
The Geneva Talks 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Morel began by telling the Quint that he intends to 
meet with the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 
September 29 in Brussels, fly to Tbilisi on September 30, 
visit Gori on October 1, and then fly to Yerevan to see 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov on October 2 (due to Lavrov's 
longstanding commitment to be in Yerevan on that date). 
Morel said it was essential to consult with Russia in the 
lead-up to the Geneva talks or Russia will not play a 
cooperative role.  In Georgia, he argued there is an urgent 
need to establish an "incident prevention mechanism" that 
would immediately investigate and de-escalate tensions in the 
zones of conflict.  There would be one mechanism for Abkhazia 
and one for South Ossetia.  This sort of mechanism is 
urgently needed since recent incidents of violence could 
spiral out of control and give Russia a pretext to slow its 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement. 
 
¶4. (C) French Political Director Gerard Araud noted Russia is 
interested in having a real dialogue in Geneva, and that the 
EU Foreign Ministers had agreed with Secretary Rice to start 
this dialogue at the Political Directors' level.  Araud told 
the Quint that on the eve of the talks (i.e. October 14), 
French Foreign Minister Kouchner would host a dinner for the 
three international organizations active in post-conflict 
Georgia: the UN, OSCE, and EU.  The guests would include UN 
Secretary general Ban Ki Moon and UN Undersecretary for 
Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe, Finnish Foreign Minister and 
OSCE Chairman-in-Office Alexander Stubb and OSCE Secretary 
General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, and EU High 
Representative Javier Solana (in addition to Kouchner).  The 
October 15 talks themselves would include the representatives 
of the EU (Morel), OSCE, and UN (Special Representative of 
the Secretary General Johan Verbeke), in addition to the MFA 
Political Directors of Georgia, Russia, and the U.S.  This 
would constitute the "Group of Six" who participate in the 
plenary session in Geneva. 
 
¶5. (C) Morel responded that he envisioned two "launching 
sessions" of the Geneva talks. The first "launching session" 
would be the plenary session held on October 15 at the 
Political Director level.  The Abkhaz and South Ossetians 
would not/not be invited to this session.  A second 
"launching session" would occur a week later (approximately 
October 22) at the expert level, and would include the de 
facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders.  The Political 
Directors would meet every two weeks and the experts would 
meet as often as needed, reporting to the Political Directors 
at the bi-monthly "plenary sessions."  The expert-level 
meetings would be broken down into two Working Groups: one on 
the return of refugees and IDPs (and human rights), and the 
other on security and stability.  When needed, the talks 
could be elevated to the ministerial level.  A good 
opportunity for a ministerial meeting would be in conjunction 
with the OSCE ministerial conference in Helsinki on December 
4-5. 
 
¶6. (C) UK Political Director Lyall Grant supported Morel's 
decision not to invite the de facto leaders to the plenary 
session on October 15.  Araud and German Political Director 
Stanzel were more skeptical about delaying de facto 
 
STATE 00104778  002 OF 002 
 
 
participation until October 22.  Lyall Grant noted that the 
working groups could also include relevant organizations such 
as UNHCR and ICRC.  Morel agreed, and noted that the talks 
will take place at the EU Mission to the UN in Geneva, and 
invitations will be sent to the appropriate missions in 
Geneva.  The presence of the OSCE, UN, and EU in Georgia will 
together constitute the "international mechanism" in point 5 
of the six-point French-mediated ceasefire agreement of 
August 12.  A/S Fried told the group that having the de facto 
leaders participate only in the second meeting will be a 
tough sell with Russia. Georgia will probably accept it if 
pro-Georgian South Ossetian leader Dmitri Sanakoyev is also 
invited. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Arria-style meeting with separatist leaders in New York 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶7. (C) Araud raised the issue of an Arria-style (informal) 
meeting at the UN in New York with the separatist leaders of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.   Referring to a Russian proposal 
to allow for an Arria-style meeting to take place in New York 
in return for a technical rollover of UNOMIG's mandate and 
the exclusion of Georgian representatives from the Security 
Council session on the renewal, Araud asked the Quint whether 
they believed an Arria-style meeting was an acceptable price 
to pay for technical rollover of UNOMIG's mandate? 
Furthermore, was it necessary to rename UNOMIG, as the Abkhaz 
were demanding?  Morel noted that the Quint had a collective 
interest in keeping the "international mechanism" (UN, EU, 
OSCE) in Georgia intact, with UNOMIG playing the lead role in 
Abkhazia.  A/S Fried noted that Secretary Rice had told 
Lavrov that renaming UNOMIG is a deal-breaker.  Fried said he 
would go back to Washington and see where we stand on the 
Arria-style meeting.  If we were to theoretically agree to an 
Arria-style meeting in return for a rollover of UNOMIG's 
mandate, we should host a separate Arria-style meeting with 
Sanakoyev and representatives of the IDP population in 
Georgia. 
RICE