VZCZCXRO6243
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0818/01 2751606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011606Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8513
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000818 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report September 30:  North 
            Kivu Commander Sees Weakened CNDP 
 
¶1.  (SVB) Summary:  General Rawat told facilitation team September 
30 that after a month of fighting, CNDP appeared to have weakened, 
but there was still no likely military solution.  Chief of army 
staff Kayembe told him he was amenable to direct military talks 
between CNDP and Etumba.   EU rep Dumont said Etumba also did not 
foresee a military solution but many hardliners were pushing for 
one.  EU Special Envoy van de Geer arrives Goma Saturday October 4, 
without assurances Nkunda will receive him.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SVB) As of late afternoon September 30 there had been no 
renewed fighting during the day in North Kivu, according to North 
Kivu brigade briefing.  However, on the evening of September 29, 
CNDP made an attack south of Tongo against FARDC forces now holding 
that strategic town, which was captured by FARDC in recent days 
after CNDP had withdrawn.  FARDC warded off the CNDP probe, with two 
CNDP and two FARDC killed.  FARDC now has a battalion's strength in 
Tongo (500-600 men, with two companies brought in from the east and 
four from the north, but commanded by Col. Delphin Kahimibi, in 
charge of the Rutshuru sector).   In Ituri, the rebel group FPRI 
(only sporadically active over the past year) attacked a FARDC 
position at Tcheyi with a force of 500 men.  These were driven back 
by MONUC, which used two attack helicopters and fired 34 rockets, 
but FPRI retook the FARDC position afterward.  Meanwhile, MONUC 
headquarters had to shut down for much of the day following a road 
accident outside the headquarters, in which a MONUC military vehicle 
hit a motorcycle taxi with resultant fatality.  A large 
stone-throwing crowd quickly gathered, led by angry motorcycle taxi 
drivers. 
 
¶3.  (SVB) North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier General Bipin Rawat 
met the facilitation team in the late afternoon September 30 for an 
in-depth assessment of the military situation after a month of 
fighting.  He said that CNDP appeared to have "weakened quite a bit, 
and they know it."  He judged that the FARDC's use of heavy weapons 
at Sake and Rugari might have discouraged the CNDP, and a very 
important factor was that FARDC had not consistently run away (for 
example at Tongo), as had typically been the case in previous 
military encounters.  It was possible, he speculated, that CNDP was 
suffering leadership difficulties.  However, he did not believe that 
FARDC would be able to defeat CNDP militarily.  If FARDC knew how to 
use its attack helicopters efficiently the story might be different, 
he noted. 
 
¶4.  (SVB) Rawat said that he had earlier met FARDC Chief of Army 
Staff General Kayembe, who was in a "bullish" mood (consistent with 
his statements to the press that "CNDP is demoralized and 
weakened").  He told Kayembe, on the basis of the meeting September 
29 between deputy commander Col. Negi and CNDP officers near 
Bunagana, that CNDP appeared willing to negotiate directly with the 
government through the international facilitation, and he urged 
Kayembe to seek such a meeting.  (Note:  The CNDP officers in fact 
said that CNDP rejected military-to-military talks, but Rawat chose 
to see CNDP's position in a more positive light.)  Kayembe objected 
to the CNDP demand that both sides withdraw to positions pre-August 
28, saying that the focus should be on MONUC's proposed zones of 
separation. 
 
¶5.  (SVB) Rawat said he emphasized to Kayembe that FARDC's numerous 
ceasefire violations over the past two weeks (much more numerous and 
severe than CNDP's) had greatly complicated the effort to promote 
dialogue over the disengagement plan.  FARDC's capture of Tongo was 
a particularly serious breach and would be difficult to overcome. 
Kayembe gave assurances that FARDC would withdraw from Tongo, but 
only after CNDP fully withdrew from Kanombe within the Rutshuru 
corridor.  Rawat told him that CNDP appeared not only to have 
re-withdrawn from Kanombe but also to have withdrawn from the 
sensitive position of Himbi Heights above Rugari.  Kayembe said that 
he had given direct orders to all his commanders in North Kivu to 
cease all attacks.  (Note:  Rawat stated that he had heard this 
promise repeatedly from Kivus commander General Lukama, and it was 
not clear how effective Kayembe's order would be, as the colonels in 
charge of the concerned sectors appeared to have direct channels to 
hard-line elements in Kinshasa.  End note.) 
 
¶6.  (SVB) Rawat said that Kayembe, in the end, agreed that there 
could be military-to-military talks with CNDP.  He said that General 
Didier Etumba (co-chairman of the Joint Technical Commission) would 
be the appropriate person to conduct such talks.  Etumba was now in 
Kinshasa but would return to Goma in two days. 
 
¶7.  (SVB) Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Cunliffe remarked that, if such 
talks went forward, Etumba could be the wrong person, as he tended 
to harp on the Amani model, which was now anathema to CNDP.  He 
suggested that such talks would proceed more positively under either 
General Mayala or General Lukama, both of whom had a better grasp of 
 
KINSHASA 00000818  002 OF 002 
 
 
military realities on the ground. 
 
¶8.  (SVB) EU representative Jean-Michel Dumont revealed that he had 
had a conversation with Etumba the previous day, in which Etumba 
stated that he did not believe a military solution was possible 
against CNDP.  Etumba regretted that there were many hard-liners, 
both in North Kivu and Kinshasa, who believed now was the moment to 
go after CNDP militarily.  Etumba said that, as for himself, he 
understood the need to continue to seek dialogue with CNDP and make 
some concessions.  Dumont concluded that Etumba might, indeed, be 
the best person to conduct such talks. 
 
¶9.  (SVB) Dumont said that European Union Special Envoy Roeland van 
de Geer would return to Goma on Saturday October 4.  He would seek 
an early opportunity to speak to Rawat and to Etumba, and he would 
hope to see Nkunda.  Dumont saw Nkunda's letter of September 23 to 
SRSG Doss as possibly less rigid than most of the recent CNDP 
pronouncements, although it was by no means clear that Nkunda would 
receive van de Geer.  Rawat welcomed van de Geer's arrival as 
excellently timed. 
 
¶10.  (SVB) Rawat noted that the following day, October 1, MONUC 
would be accompanying a FARDC "strong patrol," with MONUC/DDRRR 
presence, into northern North Kivu to apprehend FDLR elements.  The 
FARDC unit, he said, would come from Sake.  He hoped this effort 
would be useful in sending a signal to CNDP that MONUC and FARDC 
continued to be serious intheir anti-FDLR campaign. 
 
BROCK