VZCZCXRO5895
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #0889/01 2751028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011028Z OCT 08
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4970
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 3331
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 5198
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/1/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CMGT VM
SUBJECT: TIGHTENED RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BY OFFICERS AT CONGEN HCMC 
 
REF: (A)  2007 HCMC 1064  (B) HANOI 1122 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000889  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth J. Fairfax, Consul General, U.S. 
Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, Department of 
State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a series of highly unusual moves that 
directly violate the "rules of the road" for travel by Consulate 
employees established by the GVN, External Relations Office 
(ERO) in HCMC informed the CG that the MFA had forbidden the 
Consulate's PolOff from completing a planned trip to Danang on 
September 24 - 25 and that the ERO cannot even accept a DipNote 
concerning plans by the Consulate's Humanitarian Resettlement 
Section (HRS) chief to travel to the Central Highlands.  These 
steps come on top of the MFA decision to deny the Consulate's 
HRS chief permission to travel to the Central Highlands in July. 
 When DCM raised these issues with the Office of Government and 
MFA, she was told the issue is sensitive, and that there was 
pressure from other parts of the GVN to hold firmly to the 
policy that travel by Consulate officers outside of their 
consular district was to be done on an exceptional basis.  MFA 
Director General for Consular Affairs Doung Chi Dung noted that 
the recent scrutiny was related to the "negotiating environment" 
for the consulate in Houston, but agreed to DCMs request to look 
in to the practical effect of the increased (and unclear) 
restrictions and continue active discussions on consulates in 
both countries.  While these added restrictions are unwelcome, 
their application is still clearly the exception rather than the 
rule, impacting only a tiny percentage of travel by Consulate 
officers. END SUMMARY. 
 
CONFUSING CANCELLATIONS 
----------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) On September 22, the ERO in HCMC called the Consulate 
to inform us that travel by PolOff to Danang that week could not 
take place as planned.  The decision was made after MFA in Hanoi 
informed ERO HCMC that ConGen PolOff would not be allowed to 
meet with government officials or religious leaders during the 
trip.  ERO noted that PolOff could meet with two humanitarian 
NGOs as planned.  When asked if this prohibition also applied to 
the Embassy Hanoi officer who was scheduled to make the trip 
with ConGen PolOff, the ERO replied that the ban applied to 
ConGen PolOff only.  On Tuesday morning, September 23, the ERO 
contacted the Consulate to announce that HCMC PolOff could not 
travel to Danang at all.  When asked that this information be 
conveyed in formal, written format, ERO staff refused. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On September 24, the ERO called the Consulate 
concerning planned travel to the Central Highlands by the 
Consulate's Humanitarian Resettlement Section (HRS) chief.  The 
October 5 - 6 trip was planned in conjunction with the upcoming 
visit of PRM officer Tran Hoa.  In this case, the ERO notified 
the Consulate that because the trip involves a visitor from 
Washington, the Embassy must send the Diplomatic Note requesting 
permission for both the visitor and the Consulate's HRS officer 
to travel.  The Consulate has already protested that this new 
policy contradicts the clearly written travel policy conveyed in 
MFA Diplomatic Note 035/NG-LS, which states "Consular missions 
located from Danang City south should send diplomatic notes to 
the Office of External Relations in Ho Chi Minh City."  There is 
no mention in that note of any exceptions based upon visitors. 
(Note: This is the second time in recent months that travel by 
the Consulate's HRS chief has been denied.  In the previous 
incident, which occurred in June, the ERO read to CG 
instructions from Hanoi that specifically linked the 
cancellation of travel by the HRS chief to GVN unhappiness over 
the inability to open ConGen Houston during PM Dung's visit to 
the USA.  End Note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) CG HCMC, who was in Danang himself on Sept 22 - 23, 
returned to HCMC and met with ERO Director Tran Quang Dung.  CG 
expressed his confusion and grave concern over the unexplained 
actions by ERO and MFA.  In addition, CG reminded ERO Director 
Dung that the Consulate had scrupulously followed GVN rules that 
the Consulate must provide at least five days advanced notice 
along with complete details on the trip.  CG went on to remind 
the ERO that the instructions in MFA Dip Note 035/NG-LS also 
stipulate that the ERO will reply in writing within five days. 
CG protested the fact that ERO was clearly violating the rules 
it established in two ways -- it waited 10 days to object to the 
travel and refused to provide a formal written notice.  ERO 
Director Dung acknowledged the irregularity and apologized for 
the tardy communication and refusal to provide written notice. 
He explained that the notice from Hanoi instructing him to deny 
the travel only arrived on September 22.  He promised that ERO 
would send a formal DipNote and would strive to respond in a 
more timely fashion in the future. 
 
¶5. (SBU) When asked the reasons for the denial, Dung said that 
the reasons were not clear to him but that the fact that a 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000889  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Consular officer was accompanying an Embassy officer "greatly 
complicated clearance procedures."  When the CG asked why this 
would complicate the approval, Dung replied that for the past 
several months the MFA has consistently been asking ERO to 
clarify why it is necessary for a Consulate officer to take part 
in "an Embassy trip."  He added that the request to meet with 
Mr. Nguyen Chi Huong, whom authorities in Danang stated is not 
an official minister and who "is a law breaker" was a second 
complicating factor.  CG disputed this characterization of 
Pastor Huong and the DCM later raised his case directly with the 
CRA Director in Hanoi (ref B). 
 
¶6. (C) Sensing that ERO Director Dung had a bit more to say, CG 
contacted him privately outside the office for a "not for 
attribution conversation."   Dung stated that for the past 
several months the MFA in Hanoi has been "severely questioning" 
all requests for travel submitted by the Consulate.  His staff, 
he added, has to "work hard" to gain approval for each trip. 
(Note: Dung's comments precisely echoed comments that ERO Deputy 
Director Nguyen Van Tu made to CG at a reception the previous 
week.  End Note.)  Dung said the now-routine question from Hanoi 
in response to DipNote notifying ERO of the Consulate's intent 
to travel outside of HCMC is "why is it necessary for a 
Consulate officer to travel outside the Consular District" (i.e. 
-- outside HCMC).  While the HCMC ERO has generally been able to 
answer this question based upon information contained in the 
Consulate's DipNote providing notification of the trip, the 
situation is more complex when an Embassy officer or Washington 
visitor travels with a Consulate officer.  In those cases, the 
MFA interprets the trip as "an Embassy trip on which a Consulate 
officer wishes to accompany," making it harder for ERO to argue 
that it is "necessary" for a Consulate officer to travel outside 
HCMC. 
 
THE VIEW FROM HANOI 
------------------- 
¶7. (C) On September 25, DCM met with Office of the Government 
Director for External Relations Bui Huy Hong and discussed the 
recent travel denials.  The DCM noted that the denials seemed 
inexplicable given that all of the proposed meetings took place. 
 The issue of which U.S. official should conduct a meeting is 
one for the USG to decide.  The DCM concluded that it was 
important that we take constructive steps to improve the 
situation while the two sides work to broaden and deepen our 
consular relations.  Hong replied that after Deputy Secretary 
Negroponte's raising of the consular district issue during his 
recent visit to Hanoi, the GVN had carefully reviewed the issue 
and had issued instructions to the relevant authorities.  Hong 
refused to comment on the nature of these instructions, citing 
the sensitivity of the issue.  At the same time, Hong seemed 
surprised to learn of the denial of the Danang trip and told the 
DCM he would discuss this with MFA. 
 
¶8. (C) The following day, the DCM met with MFA Consular Director 
Doung Chi Dung for a frank discussion of the travel policy and 
the way forward on the consular district issue.  The DCM 
stressed that these travel denials would make it more difficult 
for us to find a solution to the consular district issue and to 
agree to the opening of a Vietnamese consulate in Houston.  She 
also added that since Embassy officers could travel throughout 
Vietnam, the decisions of ERO did not affect with whom Mission 
personnel would meet with or how often officers would travel. 
Dung responded that the issue of consular travel was very 
sensitive right now, and that there was pressure from other 
parts of the GVN to hold firmly to the policy that travel by 
Consulate officers outside of their consular district was to be 
done on an exceptional basis.  (Note: This is in strict 
conformance with Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR). End Note.)  Dung added that under the VCCR 
consular relations should promote development and good will 
between the two sides.  This is why it is difficult to approve 
travel for an officer who intends to meet with people who 
"oppose stability and the Government of Vietnam."  He added that 
in the GVN's view managing visitors to Vietnam was the Embassy's 
responsibility and this is why support for such visitors, 
including diplomatic notes, must come from the Embassy.  At the 
same time, Dung indicated that he was continuing to work on the 
issue of expanding HCMC's Consular District and that there might 
be positive developments in the future. 
 
KEEPING IT IN PERSPECTIVE 
------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) The decision by the GVN to restrict travel by Consulate 
officers is an unfortunate escalation in our long-running 
disagreement over the definition of ConGen HCMC's Consular 
District.  While unwelcome, this escalation does not mean that 
Consulate officers are unable to travel.  In fact, Consulate 
officers traveled more in FY-2008 than ever before.  During 
FY-08, State Department officers at ConGen HCMC undertook 159 
domestic trips outside HCMC, accounting for a total of 477 
officer-days spent "on the road" outside what the GVN considers 
to be our Consular District.  Even the majority of "sensitive" 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000889  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
trips are still being approved.  In July, for example, the GVN 
approved the CG's emergency request (made without the required 5 
days advanced notice) to travel to the funeral of former UBCV 
leader Tich Huyen Quang.  Another major traveler was the 
Consular Section's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU), which logged 174 
officer-days outside HCMC, a record made possible partly by the 
greatly eased travel restrictions applying to FPU travel only 
that CG negotiated with ERO following an October 2007 incident 
in An Giang (reftel).  Against this background, the total number 
of instances in which travel was canceled or denied is quite 
small. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶10. (C) Events in HCMC and the conversations with ERO make it 
clear that policy on consular travel is being set in Hanoi with 
only limited input from HCMC officials.  Our conversations with 
MFA and OOG also highlight that, while the GVN has not formally 
changed its policies for out of district consular travel, they 
are choosing to take a stricter approach in enforcing those 
rules until a solution is found that allows them to open a 
consulate in Houston.  At the same time, it is clear that the 
GVN is practicing selective enforcement of these rules.  Trips 
that involve economic or development assistance are regularly 
approved, while those that touch on politically sensitive 
subjects face increased scrutiny and possible -- but not 
consistent -- denial.  It also appears that joint 
Embassy/Consulate trips or trips with visitors from the 
Department are also receiving increased scrutiny, with the GVN 
feeling that this is a way to show they are strictly enforcing 
Article 6 and preventing the Consulate from assuming too large a 
role.  It appears there is division within the GVN on the way 
forward, with our interlocutors sending conflicting signals by 
simultaneously suggesting tougher enforcement while indicating 
that the GVN is working on an offer that goes beyond the 
9-province expansion of the consular district proposed in May. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment Continued: Mission will continue to push for a 
resolution using a two-pronged approach: First, we intend to 
expand travel by officers from both Hanoi and HCMC to illustrate 
that the GVN policy will not decrease our ability to meet with 
the people we feel we need to see.  To the extent possible, we 
will continue to arrange trips to address a variety of issues to 
demonstrate the breadth of our relations and decrease the 
likelihood of purely "political" trips being cancelled.  Second, 
we need to urge the GVN to find a way to move ahead on resolving 
the consular district problem.  This is not something that can 
be accomplished quickly, as it is clear that there are many 
players with conflicting agendas.  Post believes that the best 
approach is to carefully work with the responsible ministries 
and provinces to build support for expansion. 
 
¶12. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. 
FAIRFAX