VZCZCXRO6127
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1533 2751417
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011417Z OCT 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001533 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR EUN PTER
SUBJECT: ITALIAN PSC AMBASSADOR REVIEWS GEORGIA DEPLOYMENT, 
THE BALKANS, AND PIRACY 
 
REF: BRUSSELS USEU 1494 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Christopher Davis for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C)   Summary:   Italian PSC Ambassador Andrea Meloni and 
his counselors covered a range of high priority topics at a 
lunch hosted for Charge, Political Minister-Counselor and 
Deputy Minister-Counselor.  Meloni described the start-up of 
the deployment to Georgia of the approximately 265 EU 
monitors, representing 22 of the 27 EU countries.  Meloni 
predicted that a range of Balkans issues would feature 
prominently in the EU calendar in coming months, with 
potential progress on Serbia and deployment of EULEX in 
Kosovo.  Meloni also described concerns over piracy, but 
noted Italy would not be able, for the moment, to contribute 
to EU patrolling efforts.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On Georgia, Meloni and his staff noted that 22 out of 
27 EU countries were sending monitors, with the remaining 
five countries looking at contributing to a second wave.  The 
first contingents are expecting to stay four months.  The 
Italian monitors (reportedly some 30 in number) have arrived 
and will assist the arrival of other monitors.  They will be 
posted with German, Lithuanian and Czech monitors in the same 
location.  While many are military or police, they will shed 
military garb and weapons, and  paint vehicles white to 
maintain the civilian character of the mission.  There will 
be some 265 monitors to accommodate all countries which 
wanted to be part of the Mission.  Meloni, like others, 
emphasized that quick deployment of all the observers would 
help give the Russians no excuses to comply with their 
commitment to withdraw into South Ossetia and Abkhazia  prior 
to October 10. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Meloni predicted that Balkans issues would continue 
to be high profile in coming months as several Balkan states 
sought membership in the EU and NATO.  On Serbia, the 
Italians thought the Dutch would eventually ease up on their 
isolated "hard line" position on insisting on Serbia's fuller 
cooperation with the ICTY, so as to allow an Interim 
Agreement with Belgrade  (with emphasis on trade) to go 
forward.  As for the ICJ referral on Kosovo, the Italians let 
on that the EU vote in UNGA had been discussed in terms of 
Serbia's future stance regarding EULEX,s deployment in 
northern Kosovo.  The EU French presidency, they said, is 
trying to find consensus on an EU position on the UNGA vote, 
describing one exchange wherein the UK delegate threatened to 
vote no to counter another member state wanting to vote yes. 
 
¶4.  (C) Our interlocutors suggested  that the Serb government 
 may be pursuing the ICJ referral so that it can tell its 
public that it tried.  It would be hard for the Serbs should 
Croatia be able to move forward with EU accession.  On 
Kosovo, and, indirectly, Macedonia, he said that the Greeks 
had won points for not being difficult on Kosovo, with an 
unspoken shift within the EU toward Greece on the name issue, 
and the return of the term "FYROM" in EU discussions. 
Greece's positive role vis a vis Kosovo, along with unhelpful 
developments within Macedonia, had hurt Skopje,s cause. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Meloni said the meeting of EU defense ministers on 
October 1 in Deauville would consider the problem of piracy 
near the Somali coast, but repeated several times that Italy 
would not have resources available for the effort.  He noted 
that the EU coordination cell had been established and 
responded to our inquiry into the possibility of NATO and the 
EU working together in combating piracy by reviewing the 
barriers to cooperation, primarily the difficulties created 
by Turkey whenever NATO-EU cooperation is raised.  One of 
Meloni,s counselors, who had regional experience, raised the 
question of what the pirates were doing with the money 
gained, noting the informal financial networks that operate 
in the Horn of Africa and with Yemen.  He discounted the 
notion of formal Al Qaeda connections, but not of extended 
links to a variety of criminal networks, commenting that it 
is the custom in that part of the world to "keep all doors 
open." 
.