VZCZCXRO3448
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0487/01 2981359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241359Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2033
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR -- STUART JONES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL LO KVIR
SUBJECT: MOVING SLOVAKIA CLOSER TO "YES" ON KOSOVO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C) Although the Government of Slovakia shows no signs of 
softening its opposition to Kosovo's independence, per my 
recent consultations with you and Assistant Secretary Fried, 
I plan to use recent key recognitions, i.e., by Montenegro, 
Portugal and Macedonia, to press the Slovaks toward a more 
flexible stance.  Prime Minister Fico frequently 
characterizes Kosovo's declaration of independence as a 
violation of international law. All Slovak political parties, 
except the Hungarian Coalition Party, have rejected Kosovo's 
independence and made clear their opposition to Slovak 
recognition. Numerous factors inform the Slovak position: 
close ties to Serbia (and Russia); concern about the 
aspirations of Slovakia's large Hungarian minority; and, in 
some cases, barely disguised antipathy toward Albanian 
Muslims.  Finally, there remains resentment toward the U.S. 
for its role in the 1999 NATO intervention and an abiding 
belief that it was the U.S., not the Serbians, who created 
the circumstances which led to the final break-up of 
Yugoslavia. 
 
¶2. (C) I have concluded that Slovakia will move on Kosovo 
only when Serbia, Russia, or key EU partners, e.g., Spain, 
do.  Clearly, EU states that have already recognized will 
have the greatest leverage on their fellow EU members and on 
Serbia.  In the meantime, I ask for Washington's support for 
a concerted effort to help shift Slovak official and public 
opinion.  The two key pillars of the argument would be that 
Kosovo's independence is consistent with international law 
and that acceptance of Kosovo's independence by all EU 
members will help Serbia move forward and closer to the 
European Union.  We will also seek to knock down flawed 
comparisons between Slovakia's ethnic Hungarians and Kosovo 
Albanians. 
 
What We Will Do 
--------------- 
 
3.(C) One of the key challenges we face in Slovakia is that 
both the public and elite are woefully ill-informed (and 
sometimes misinformed) about the history of the Serbia-Kosovo 
conflict and about the progress the Kosovars have made toward 
the development of a multi-ethnic society that respects 
minorities.  Also, many Slovaks (including senior GOS 
officials and politicians) appear to be genuinely concerned 
that Kosovo could serve as a precedent for the Hungarian 
minority illustrates the extent of the problem. 
 
¶4. (C) Using the resources and contacts we have, Embassy 
Bratislava will intensify our outreach on Kosovo, making the 
case that moving forward on the basis of an independent 
Kosovo is best not only for Kosovo, but also for Serbia. 
Given a lack of regular personal contact with PM Fico, I will 
utilize other levers of influence, e.g., close colleagues of 
Fico such as Culture Minister Madaric and key "influentials," 
such as former Ambassador Kacer, to convey our messages. I 
will also use the goodwill gained from President Gasparovic's 
recent visit to the U.S. to press him to take a more 
pragmatic stance. I hope to initiate a mini "contact group" 
of diplomats in Bratislava to strategize about how to 
encourage constructive Slovak policy.  We will press 
Hungarian politicians and intellectuals to repeat/amplify the 
message that Kosovo is not a precedent for ethnic Hungarians 
in Kosovo, and will host roundtables and events aimed at 
strengthening Slovak-Hungarian relations.  In an effort to 
build broader and more accurate public understanding of the 
Balkans, particularly the Serbian-Kosovo conflict, post is 
considering a multi-city "film festival," which could foster 
greater objectivity and understanding of the Balkan 
conflicts.  We would then seek to place films in schools, 
libraries and offer them to Slovak TV stations. 
 
 
What We Seek 
------------ 
 
¶5. (U) To support Post's efforts, I ask that you consider: 
 
-- Sending respected USG and non-USG lawyers, e.g., Legal 
Advisor John Bellinger, to Slovakia to speak with a range of 
Slovak interlocutors on the legality of Kosovo's 
independence.  These discussions could also take place via 
DVC, a  format that could also be used for dialogue between 
Balkan experts and Slovak officials, journalists and 
think-tank representatives. 
 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000487  002 OF 002 
 
 
-- Providing more compelling written argumentation on the 
legality of Kosovo for Post's use with interlocutors. I have 
been impressed with the argumentation contained in an article 
published by the American Society of International Law (text 
emailed to EUR/CE). 
 
-- Visits by key USG officials such as yourself to discuss 
Balkan policy with GOS officials;. 
 
-- An IV-type program for Slovaks and Kosovar Albanians, 
e.g., Department would sponsor a select group of Slovaks to 
travel to Kosovo, and vice versa. Such a program could be 
carried out with participants from other non-recognizing EU 
states. 
 
-- Providing regular updates on positive developments in 
Kosovo; 
 
 
Working With the EU 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  I and my staff consult with our U.S. Embassy 
colleagues in other EU non-recognizing states and we 
understand that different issues underpin the firm resistance 
to Kosovo recognition.  That said, perhaps some of the 
tactics/programs/visits we are considering could be relevant 
elsewhere, too.  I believe that more consultation with the EU 
and activism by Brussels could help move the ball forward. 
Perhaps Washington and key European capitals, e.g., Paris and 
Berlin, could craft a more closely-coordinated effort aimed 
at securing recognition by all EU members by a date certain, 
e.g., the anniversary of Kosovo's independence. I know such 
results would be very tough to achieve, but I often have the 
sense that the Slovaks are hearing about Kosovo from this 
Embassy, but not very much from their EU colleagues either 
here or in Brussels.  Based on my discussions with a wide 
range of Slovaks during the past 10 months, I believe that it 
is essential that we intensify our efforts precisely now, 
because of positive developments in Kosovo and Serbia and 
because this is the period in which we, the U.S. and the EU 
have maximum leverage on Serbian and Kosovar Albanian 
leaders.  Delays or setbacks in progress in either Belgrade 
or Pristina will only harden Slovak attitudes. 
 
¶7. (U) Stu, it was a pleasure to meet you and I look forward 
to hearing from you.  Best, Vince 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OBSITNIK