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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MOPS PREF GG RU
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL VISIT TO TBILISI 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 1602 
     ¶B. USNATO 334 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The North Atlantic Council (NAC) visited 
Georgia September 15-16 to take stock following Russia's 
invasion of Georgia, to reaffirm support for Georgia's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to strengthen 
NATO-Georgia relations (including by inaugurating the 
NATO-Georgia Commission).  The NAC held separate formal 
meetings with President Saakashvili, Prime Minister 
Gurgenidze, and members of the Georgian Parliament. 
Representatives of the UN, EU, and OSCE also briefed PermReps 
in a special session. The NAC also conducted a number of 
outreach activities, as well as visiting a damaged military 
base and a refugee camp in Gori. This was not a 
paradigm-changing visit. Georgia reaffirmed its commitment to 
Euro-Atlantic integration and NAC Ambassadors reaffirmed 
their only slightly evolving national positions. End summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Saakashvili Says Same Plans 
for Euro-Atlantic integration 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) President Saakashvili greeted the SYG and PermReps by 
professing deep gratitude for this visit. He saw the NAC trip 
as a symbol that Georgia does not stand alone, and that NATO 
and Georgia share common principles. Saakashvili observed 
that the bonds between NATO and Georgia stem from a common 
interest in greater security in the South Caucasus, bonds 
that should be seen as a threat to no one. The President said 
this war was not of Georgia's choosing, nor of Georgia's 
initiative. He enthusiastically referred to new evidence 
entering the public domain that Russia had initiated a 
conflict in an attempt to redraw the map of Europe, and 
overthrow a democratic government. Saakashvili thought that 
the international community had responded loudly and clearly 
to Russia's challenge to international law. He expressed 
thanks for NATO's strong statements during the conflict, 
saying that Georgia's ability to withstand the Russian 
onslaught had been linked to its friends and partners in the 
West, including NATO. Saakashvili underlined the Georgian 
people had suffered too long under authoritarian regimes to 
relinquish the gains of recent years and promised to announce 
a new and deeper series of reforms in a speech to parliament 
on September 16 (Ref A). The president also said he had 
expressed his condolences to all those who had lost 
loved-ones in the conflict regardless of which side they were 
on. 
 
¶3. (C) Saakashvili did not hesitate when responding to a 
pointed German question on the origins of the war. He 
countered the German implication that Georgia was looking for 
a fight by saying Georgia had expected aggression for a long 
time and had merely been preparing to defend itself. He 
claimed to have been trying to downplay tensions and said he 
would welcome a fully transparent investigation into the 
causes of the war, including plans for the creation of a 
parliamentary investigation into the causes of the war. 
Saakashvili related a conversation he had with Putin in 
November 2006, in which Putin had threatened to damage the 
Georgian economy. Saakashvili said Putin had commented that 
if economic measures failed then he would turn Georgia into 
Cyprus. Saakashvili was deeply grateful to France for 
obtaining a ceasefire from Russia when Moscow did not want to 
talk, and hoped that the French would stay engaged after the 
end of their EU presidency. 
 
¶4. (C) Saakashvili acknowledged that Russia must be part of 
the solution to ongoing tensions.  He laid out his priorities 
for the October Geneva talks. 
-- compliance with the 6-point plan 
-- an absolute right of dignified return of IDPs to both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
-- access for any monitors to all of the disputed areas 
He said that under no circumstances would Georgia give up any 
territory, but guaranteed that Georgia would pursue its aims 
by exclusively peaceful means. 
 
¶5. (C) Saakashvili asserted that one of the worries for the 
other side had been Georgian soft power successes won by 
providing ethnically mixed villages with schools and 
healthcare.  The President said that the Russian interest in 
this conflict was control of energy routes and regime change 
in Tbilisi. He was grateful to donors for the measures 
announced to bolster the Georgian economy, and promised to 
continue economic reforms. The President also promised deeper 
political reforms and asked PermReps to remember that Georgia 
is playing its part in a merit-based process with NATO that 
is leading to a decision on the provision of MAP in December. 
This, he said, would be a moral decision on the part of the 
Alliance. 
 
----------------------------------- 
PM to NAC - It's the Economy Stupid 
----------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) After signing the protocols for the establishment of 
the new NATO Georgia Commission (Ref B) Prime Minister Lado 
Gurgenidze characterized Georgia as a young liberal democracy 
with a vibrant economy which is suffering from a Russian 
effort to erode liberty and set a different political 
direction for the country. He said the level of international 
support for Georgia would determine the direction of 
developments for months and years to come. Gurgenidze said 
the damage to Georgian economy had been significant, 
including damage to private property, deliberate 
environmental damage by Russia, and loss of fiscal revenue 
for the rest of the year. The PM highlighted the greatest 
threat to the Georgian economy would be loss of confidence, 
which would have to be restored within weeks or there would 
be a risk of severe economic decline. Such decline, he said, 
would risk social unrest, and possible regime change, as 
Russia desired. Gurgenidze briefed on U.S., IMF, and other 
international efforts to bolster the economy and expressed 
his deepest thanks. He looked forward to the Georgia donor 
conference in October, and underlined his view that possible 
free trade agreements with the EU and U.S. would be crucial. 
 
¶7. (C) The PM promised that Georgia was ready to play its 
role in regional energy security. After displaying an 
impressive knowledge of the details of Georgia's energy 
supplies, Gurgenidze warned of the strategic importance for 
Georgia of the Enguri Dam (Note: He indicated that Georgia 
plans to diversify supply through the construction of 
multiple smaller hydroelectric plants. End note).  The Prime 
Minister echoed Saakashvili's view that one of the causes of 
the conflict had been the success of Georgian soft power in 
South Ossetia. He said the population had begun to notice the 
real progress in Georgian controlled areas, and this 
development had been a real threat to the "kleptocracy of the 
separatist regime."  Gurgenidze said he was certain Georgia 
could win again through soft power. Gurgenidze looked forward 
to deepening reforms in Georgia, mentioning that President 
Saakashvili would soon announce a new package of reforms to 
parliament. He pledged Georgia's commitment to continue its 
work towards integration with NATO which, he said, would be 
the ultimate guarantor of Georgia's stability and security. 
 
¶8. (C) Defense Minister Kezerashvili, in a very short 
intervention, said Georgia is currently conducting a damage 
assessment. He said a strategic defense review would be 
accompanied by new defense planning that would encompass the 
new realities of a self-defense mission. Kezerashvili said 
Georgia's priority remains NATO membership, and NATO 
interoperability would remain a core defense priority 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Parliament: Even the Opposition stands 
with us (for now) 
-------------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) Speaker Davit Bakradze told the NAC that there was a 
danger of losing one of the great achievements of the end of 
the cold war:  the end of spheres of influence. He warned 
that issues such as access for monitors involve the changing 
of the borders of Europe, and suggested that the 
international community had a key role to play in its 
response to ethnic cleansing. He also highlighted the need 
for a new conflict resolution mechanism, as all that is in 
place is the 6-point plan. The Speaker also emphasized  that 
whoever controls Georgia would have the power to cut off 
energy supply routes. 
 
¶10. (C)Bakradze referenced James Madison's conclusion that 
problems with democracy can only be solved with more 
democracy. Reforms would be intensified. He viewed the 
conflict as the price for "living outside of the environment 
that defends democracies." In response to PermReps questions 
on MAP, Bakradze said he would view MAP as a framework for 
more robust reforms, rather than a privilege for Georgia. He 
indicated his willingness to work with members of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly to build more support for Georgia. 
 
¶11. (C) Bakradze pledged his continued willingness to work 
with all members of the opposition, including those that had 
chosen not to take their seats in parliament. He underlined 
that election timetables would not be postponed as a result 
of the crisis. 
 
¶12. (C) Assembled Georgian Parliamentarians from the 
opposition expressed similar sentiments to Bakradze in 
relation to Euro-Atlantic Integration and MAP. Some 
underlined that this was a time for national unity and 
several referred to a three point charter adopted by the 
Parliament that reaffirmed Georgia's NATO aspirations, the 
territorial integrity of Georgia, and a national commitment 
to act only within the constitutional framework. Opposition 
members expressed enthusiasm for election reform, but a 
central message to the NAC was that MAP would be a way to 
avoid further bloodshed. Several contended a failure by NATO 
to grant MAP in December would be a signal to Moscow that 
Russia will retain freedom of action in Georgia, and the 
region. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NAC PermReps play familiar tunes 
-------------------------------- 
¶13. (C) PermReps' comments during the series of meetings 
conveyed a sense that national positions were relatively 
unchanged, despite the August conflict. The only perceptible 
shift was an air of greater caution when MAP was mentioned, 
with even strong supporters of Georgia urging them to also 
focus on reform. 
 
¶14. (C) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer underlined 
that this visit came at a "difficult and complex time," 
before highlighting NATO's view that Russia had used 
disproportionate force. He repeated that Moscow must live up 
to its commitments under the Sarkozy 6-point plan. At the 
same time de Hoop Scheffer emphasized that Georgia must stay 
the course of reform, which would remain essential on the 
path towards further Euro-Atlantic integration. 
 
¶15. (C) The conflict itself was a central theme in all 
discussions. For example, in the meeting with the President, 
Belgium condemned the Russian use of force and the subsequent 
recognition of the separatist provinces. Czech PermRep Stefan 
Fule recalled the 1968 Prague incursion by Soviet forces as a 
parallel to the August conflict in Georgia. His Lithuanian 
counterpart rejected Russian FM Lavrov's new principles of 
defending "Russian citizens," while the Canadian PermRep 
asserted that reversal of the Russian action would be 
essential to restoring regional peace and security. Spain, by 
contrast, stood alone by repeatedly calling for all 
communication on the issue to include Russia. 
 
¶16. (C) French PermRep Andreani often underlined the Sarkozy 
peace initiative, which many PermReps explicitly supported. 
Lithuania said EU observers must be able to deploy to all 
areas of Georgia. Lithuania and Canada led calls for an 
independent investigation into the outbreak of violence, 
while Norway also cautioned that any credible investigation 
would have to look into both sides' actions.  All PermReps 
underlined their support for Georgian territorial integrity 
and sovereignty. 
 
¶17. (C) Many Allies called on Georgia to continue its 
reforms. However, Czech PermRep Fule thought that while 
reform is important the MAP decision will be based on more 
political considerations. Italy hoped Georgia would look to 
the future and not to the past. The Italian asserted that 
Georgia needs to develop more economic and social strength 
rather than military strength. Bulgaria echoed this theme, 
encouraging Georgia to avoid new tensions and develop a modus 
vivendi with its northern neighbor. 
 
¶18. (C) German PermRep Brandenburg,s cynicism stood out, 
even though he claimed to be bringing a message of support 
for Georgia. He shared that Germany would provide 40 
observers for the EU monitoring mission, while calling for 
both OSCE and UN observers to continue their missions in the 
separatist areas. Brandenburg pointedly insisted that 
responsibility for the outbreak of conflict could be shared. 
He said there were questions that both Russia and Georgia 
should be asked, including the issue of Georgian preparations 
for the conflict and the withdrawal of the Georgian 
peacekeeping element from Tskhinvali in the month before the 
conflict. He reiterated the German call for NATO to have a 
"supportive role," and not to be part of the problem (Note: 
this in reality is a call for NATO to have the minimum 
possible role. End note). 
 
¶19. (C) Ambassador Volker's interventions complimented the 
Georgian people on their courage and resilience in their 
commitment to economic and democratic reform. He said the NAC 
visit was a symbol that NATO stands with Georgia, that NATO 
supports Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty and 
that the Alliance wants to see full implementation of the 
ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian forces. Ambassador 
Volker also saw the creation of the new NGC as a step that 
moves beyond the symbolism towards practical action. 
 
--------------------------------- 
NAC meeting with UN, EU, and OSCE 
representatives 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) While EU Representative for the South Caucasus Peter 
Semneby conveyed little new information to the NAC, OSCE 
Ambassador Terhi Hakala, and UNOMIG DSRSG Ivo Petrov provided 
useful perspectives. Hakala said she had met with Russian FM 
Lavrov on September 15 but Lavrov would allow only eight OSCE 
observers the right to patrol within the former conflict zone 
under the Russian approach to the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. 
Lavrov had said that further deployments must be agreed with 
the South Ossetians. Petrov warned that the UNOMIG mandate 
would expire on October 15 and said that he had no clarity on 
the future of the mission.  PermReps expressed strong support 
for the work of all three organizations. Germany asked 
whether the Georgians had  breached their obligations in July 
by failing to provide forces to the joint peacekeeping 
operation in South Ossetia. The UK PermRep quickly objected, 
asking whether it could be said that the Russians have any 
legal basis for any of their actions. 
 
¶21. (C) Breakout sessions offered the following options: 
 
-- Visit to the NATO Information Office and the Georgian Air 
Operations Center 
-- Roundtable with opposition members 
-- Meeting with the Deputy Ombudsman 
-- Roundtable with NGO and media representatives 
 
Ambassador Volker attended the NGO and media session, and 
found it to be a dynamic and useful exchange of views.  The 
briefing at the Georgian Air Operations Center was poorly 
done, with some of the delegation expressing themselves more 
confused after the presentation than before. We understand 
from several Allies that the sessions with the Deputy 
Ombudsman and with the opposition both injected a new 
perspective. Allies heard opinions on the nature of Georgian 
democracy that had not been heard in previous sessions with 
the government. Again, the significance of this to Allies 
seems to depend on pre-existing positions. 
 
¶22. (C) The final trip activity involved visits to the 1st 
Infantry Brigade barracks and to a refugee camp. Conflict 
damage at the base was varied, with the vast majority of the 
buildings intact, but some lying in ruins, apparently from 
aerial bombardment. While we were also briefed on Russian 
efforts to degrade the base while occupying it during the 
conflict, this was a short visit which seemed to have been 
designed more for visual impact than information sharing. The 
Refugee camp, run by UNHCR with assistance from Italy and 
France, held 2,200 IDPs in 250 tents. Most had fled to 
Tbilisi during the fighting, then had returned as far as 
Gori, but felt unable to go farther north. Many family 
members had made quick trips home to assess the possibility 
of return, or to tend to crops, but there seemed to be no 
sense that a general return would be possible and the camp 
was being winterized.  The UNHCR and International Rescue 
Committee representatives said that as of September 16 (40 
days after the Russian invasion), there were still 66,000 
displaced persons in Georgia unable to return to their homes. 
 
¶23. (U) Georgian media gave extensive positive coverage to 
the NAC visit.  All major Georgian television companies 
dedicated their primetime to the NAC meeting in Tbilisi.  The 
bottom-line of the Georgian print media reaction to the NAC 
meeting was one of NATO's strong support for Georgia and its 
territorial integrity, however, a lack of clear message on 
Georgia receiving MAP status in December.  The Georgians 
especially picked up on two specific messages from the 
SecGen; one, that no other country would have a veto over 
Georgia,s accession to NATO, and two, Georgia must advance 
democratic reforms. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
¶24. (C) First reactions from the NAC appear to be that the 
Georgians put on a solid trip and said the right things. 
Saakashvili was not unreasonable in his meeting, and the PM 
gave an exceptional performance.  We do know that SYG Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer remains unhappy with Saakashvili and delivered 
tough messages in their bilateral meeting. The SYG's staff 
says that de Hoop Scheffer felt Saakashvili tried to box him 
into saying things he did not want to say in their press 
conference, further alienating the SYG toward the President. 
 
¶25. (C) We do not assess that national positions will change 
much as a result of this visit.  Skeptics of MAP for Georgia 
were keen to encourage further reforms, and it seems that the 
GoG intends to call their bluff. Germany remains unhelpful, 
and appeared to use the visit more as a fishing expedition 
for critical material than an opportunity for an honest 
appraisal of the situation on the ground. German calls for 
NATO to play a "supportive role" and not become part of the 
problem should be seen for what they are:  a call for NATO to 
have the minimum involvement possible (Indeed, at a PermReps 
lunch on September 30, the German PermRep declared that NATO 
must 'remain neutral' in the conflict between Georgia and 
Russia). The new Spanish PermRep was happy to call for NATO 
to talk to Russia, even in meetings with our Georgian hosts. 
We conclude from this that Spain will continue to be a 
growing problem when dealing with issues involving Russia. 
 
¶26. (C) The Georgian Mission to NATO has shared Tbilisi's 
initial assessment that the PermReps, even the most friendly 
to Georgia, sounded more cautious about the possibility of 
MAP in December. We believe they are correct, with even some 
of the Balts prone to mentioning further reforms in the same 
sentence as MAP. Our Georgian contacts in Brussels attribute 
this slight change in NATO's tone on the conflict itself. 
They echo the fears we heard in Tbilisi about what Russia 
will feel free to do if NATO declines to grant MAP at the 
December Ministerial. 
 
¶27. (C) A long road to MAP has become longer as a result of 
the conflict. The next challenge is how best to use the 
newly-inaugurated NGC. This was conceived in a search for a 
political deliverable in the run up to the August 19 NATO 
Foreign Ministerial and no nation has yet successfully 
defined the paradigm of what the NGC is really supposed to 
be. Some of the more helpful Allies have made it explicitly 
clear that they do not see the NGC as a substitute for MAP, 
but already Italy has described the NGC as an intensification 
of NATO's intensified dialogue process. We will have to work 
hard with Georgia to ensure that early meetings of the NCG 
demonstrate further maturity from the Georgian side, and that 
these encounters have enough substance to make concrete 
strides in the NATO-Georgia relationship.  End comment. 
 
¶28. (U) This cable has been cleared by Embassy Tbilisi. 
VOLKER