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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1274/01 2461020
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021020Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2885
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2808
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3040
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK 
P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 
DOD/OSD A/S LONG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 MEMBERS TO DAS HALE: HELICOPTERS 
AND SHEBA'A WOULD BE POWERFUL SIGNS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) In separate meetings August 28 and 29 with visiting 
NEA DAS David Hale, March 14 leaders welcomed U.S. 
commitments in Lebanon but expressed frustration that the 
U.S. had not yet provided helicopters to the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF).  Without helicopters, March 14 members claimed, 
the LAF could not assert itself effectively over Hizballah. 
Additionally, the March 14 leadership assessed positive steps 
to resolve the Sheba'a Farms issue would strengthen March 14 
candidates during the next elections and strip Hizballah of 
one of its arguments to draw support. 
 
¶2. (C) The March 14 leaders characterized ongoing violence in 
Tripoli as dangeous and  damaging to their electoral 
prospects i it continues for too long.  They stressed the 
ned to form the National Dialogue in accordance with the 
Doha agreement and pushed for the involvement of the Arab 
League throughout.  DAS Hale reaffirmed continued U.S. 
support to the "forces of moderation" in Lebanon and 
reiterated the importance of full implementation of UNSC 
Resolution 1701.  DAS Hale also advised March 14 leaders to 
engage with U.S. officials continue to explain the challenges 
Lebanon is facing in their own words.  End summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Visiting NEA DAS David Hale, accompanied by 
Ambassador, NEA/ELA Lebanon Desk Officer, and Poloffs, met 
with members of the March 14 Secretariat at their 
headquarters in Achrafieh on August 28, including Secretary 
General Fares Souaid,  Dory Chamoun (National Liberal Party), 
Antoine Haddad (Democratic Renewal Movement), MP Moustafa 
Allouch (Future), Camille Ziadeh (Lebanese Forces), MP Samir 
Franjieh, and Zaher Raad (Progressive Socialist Party). 
On August 29, DAS Hale, accompanied by Ambassador, Poloff, 
and Senior LES Political Advisor, met with MP Boutros Harb, 
Dory Chamoun, Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammad Safadi 
(Tripoli Bloc), Minister of Justice Ibrahim Najjar (Lebanese 
Forces), and Michel Mouawad. 
 
LAF ASSISTANCE SHOULD 
INCLUDE HELICOPTERS 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) March 14 leaders welcomed DAS Hale's message of 
continued U.S. support for Lebanon.  However, they were 
adamant that to make an effective difference in building the 
capacity and capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), 
the U.S. should provide helicopters as part of its military 
assistance package.  Chamoun explained that helicopters would 
be perceived as a more powerful and visible sign of U.S. 
support than tanks or military training.  DAS Hale replied 
that the U.S. was considering helicopters as part of the 
matrix of military options currently being discussed with the 
LAF.  However, he cautioned that helicopters do not replace 
the need for sound LAF leadership. 
 
SHEBA'A COULD PAY 
ELECTORAL DIVIDENDS 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The March 14 leaders argued that concrete steps toward 
resolution of Sheba'a Farms, if not a complete solution to 
that issue, could pay dividends for March 14's candidates in 
the 2009 parliamentary elections.  Indirect negotiations with 
Israel could be useful, they said, suggesting Jordan's King 
Abudullah II could act as the third-party negotiator.  DAS 
Hale replied that the U.S. supported regional and U.N. 
diplomatic efforts to resolve Sheba'a. 
 
¶6. (C) They also expressed concern and bewilderment at 
Israeli engagement with Hizballah, instead of the GOL, to 
coordinate prisoner releases.  Harb and others said this only 
strengthens the hand of Hizballah in Lebanon and reflects 
badly on the government.  The leaders requested the U.S. use 
 
BEIRUT 00001274  002 OF 002 
 
 
its influence with Israel to make the case that this type of 
involvement encourages, rather than diminishes, Hizballah. 
 
BUT TRIPOLI 
COULD CAUSE LOSSES 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Many of the leaders feared that ongoing violence in 
the northern city of Tripoli could severely damage March 14's 
chances of electoral success there.  Allouch and Safadi, both 
from Tripoli, characterized the situation as dangerous and 
getting worse.  Allouch was particularly concerned that if 
the violence did not end soon, it would create tension in 
other areas.  More people, he predicted, would move away from 
March 14 and take up more extreme views.  Safadi refused to 
speculate as to who was providing weapons and money to some 
of the armed groups, but said that some leaders in Tripoli 
have played both sides of the fighting against each other. 
DAS Hale called the supply of weapons or money to armed 
groups a dangerous game.  March 14, he said, has serious 
electoral challenges ahead and Tripoli could complicate 
matters more if it is perceived that March 14 is somehow 
involved with the armed groups. 
 
MARCH 14 COMMITTED 
TO DOHA AGREEMENT 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Harb, Chamoun, and Souaid expressed their desire to 
see the National Dialogue begin sooner rather than later (no 
start date has been announced).  However, they cautioned that 
both the form and content of the dialogue process remain 
problematic.  They claimed that the March 8/Aoun opposition 
wants to expand participation and dilute the agenda to draw 
the focus away from the issue of Hizballah's weapons and the 
National Defense Strategy.  March 14 leaders expressed their 
preference that the dialogue reflect what was agreed in Doha 
in May 2008.  SYG Fares Souaid said that March 14 was 
especially keen to have Arab League participation in the 
dialogue throughout the process and not just during the 
opening session. 
 
UNSCR 1701 AND 
COMMUNICATION ARE KEY 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) DAS Hale reaffirmed U.S. commitment to Lebanon.  He 
offered U.S. support for moderate voices in Lebanon, saying 
the future of Lebanon is important to the future of the 
Middle East region.  However, he told March 14 that the 
unimpeded flow of weapons across the Syrian border into 
Lebanon is of great concern.  He pushed for full 
implementation of UNSCR 1701, which calls for the complete 
disarmament of Hizballah, as essential to strengthen the 
institutions of the state, such as the LAF and the Internal 
Security Forces. 
 
¶10. (C) Furthermore, DAS Hale advised March 14 to increase 
its engagement with U.S. officials to effectively explain 
Lebanon and its challenges. 
 
¶11. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this message. 
 
SISON