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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0018
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK 
PM FOR A/S KIMMIT 
P FOR HMUSTAPHA AND RRANGASWAMY 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR UNSC MARR IS IR SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, SINIORA CRITICIZES U.S. 
AND ISRAELI POLICY, WORRIES ABOUT MARCH 14 INFIGHTING 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  In an August 27 meeting with NEA Deputy Assistant 
Secretary David Hale, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora 
complained that the U.S. has not come through on its 
assistance promises and that USG assistance has been dwarfed 
by Iranian support for Hizballah. He said U.S. and Israeli 
mistakes had made Iran stronger, and that Israel's recent 
prisoner swap with Hizballah has only served to strengthen 
Hizballah as well.  He appealed to the U.S. to push Israel on 
the Sheba'a Farms issue.  Siniora also asked for USG help on 
demining and cluster bomb removal. 
 
¶2. (C) On the Lebanese National Dialogue, Siniora worried 
that opposition parties were arguing for expanded 
participation and an expanded agenda in an effort to 
"fabricate problems" and delay the dialogue.  He surmised 
that infighting in March 14 could hurt its chances in the 
spring 2009 elections.  In reference to President Michel 
Sleiman's upcoming trip to Washington, Siniora told Hale and 
the Ambassador that it was essential the U.S. provide the 
President with concrete deliverables, or risk hurting his 
fledgling presidency.  End summary. 
 
U.S. SUPPORT: ILLUSIONS AND BOUNCED CHECKS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Visiting NEA DAS David Hale, accompanied by 
Ambassador, NEA/ELA Lebanon Desk Officer, and PolOffs, met 
with PM Siniora and his advisor Roula Noureddine on August 27 
at Siniora's office in the Grand Serail. DAS Hale opened by 
addressing any misperception that the U.S. commitment to 
Lebanon had weakened.  He pointed to the extensive support 
the U.S. is providing to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and 
Internal Security Forces (ISF).  He asked Siniora for advice 
on what further tangible actions the U.S. cold undertake to 
demonstrate its continuing suppot. 
 
¶4. (C) Siniora acknowledged that the USG had tried to help in 
certain ways, but said its financial and vocal support had 
not come close to equaling that provided to Hizballah by 
Iran.  He claimed he had heard many ideas from various U.S. 
officials, but that many of those had turned out to be 
"illusions," and U.S. "checks bounced."  He highlighted the 
need to safeguard Lebanon's democracy, and complained that 
with all the crises, attacks, and general instability in the 
country, Lebanon had received no real support.  "We were 
about to be put on our knees," in May, he said, and would 
have collapsed were it not for the resilience of the Lebanese 
people. 
 
U.S.-ISRAELI MISTAKES MADE HIZBALLAH STRONGER; 
PROGRESS ON SHEBA'A WILL MAKE THEM WEAKER 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (C) Siniora said the Sheba'a Farms issue should have been 
resolved with UNSCR 1701 in August 2006 as a way to undercut 
Hizballah and its Iranian and Syrian allies.  Furthermore, 
the Iraq invasion left a vacuum that has been filled by Iran. 
 "You brought them into Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza.  You 
increased the level of radicalization and violence in the 
region," he said.  He stressed that progress on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was necessary to prevent further 
radicalization, and he suggested that regional powers like 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia could play a constructive restraining 
role against Syria and Iran. 
 
¶6. (C) DAS Hale agreed that Iran was the overarching threat 
in the region, stressing that the U.S. has been working to 
find solutions that are relevant in each of the areas where 
Iran is attempting to wield its influence.  The U.S. was 
making progress in Iraq, in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
 
BEIRUT 00001266  002 OF 002 
 
 
process, and on the multilateral nuclear track with Iran, he 
said.  Hale also noted that in recent meetings, Egyptian and 
Jordanian leaders had expressed a desire to be helpful in 
Lebanon, perhaps by providing assistance to government 
institutions.  He said the Secretary had repeatedly raised 
the Sheba'a Farms issue with the Israelis, but they were not 
convinced that eliminating the Sheba'a excuse would have an 
effect on Hizballah.  He encouraged Siniora to approach the 
UN Secretary General about sending a technical team to 
Sheba'a to get the ball rolling.  But meanwhile, DAS Hale 
stressed, the Israelis are alarmed at the continuing flow of 
arms to Hizballah across the Syrian border and wanted to see 
concrete progress on implementation of UNSCR 1701, as does 
the USG. 
 
¶7. (C) Sidestepping DAS Hale's comment about arms flows to 
Hizballah, Siniora questioned the usefulness of a UN 
technical team in Sheba'a, and reiterated that Israeli 
withdrawal from Sheba'a would remove an important pretext for 
Hizballah's armed resistance.  He said he did not understand 
how the Israeli government could negotiate a prisoner swap 
with Hizballah and "give them victory" while refusing to move 
on the Sheba'a issue.  Siniora's advisor (and niece) Roula 
Noureddine commented on recent Israeli threats against 
Lebanon, saying it was odd for Israel to threaten the 
Lebanese government because of Hizballah, and yet say nothing 
about Syria's support for the party.  She wondered if the 
Israelis were silent because of their ongoing indirect 
negotiations with the Syrians. 
 
INTERNAL ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to the National Dialogue, Siniora was 
analytical, saying, "We have had patience and prudence, but 
every day there is a problem" that has prevented the dialogue 
from starting.  He assessed that the opposition parties have 
been "fabricating problems," suggesting additional 
participation and agenda items which have delayed the process. 
 
¶9. (C) Asked about March 14's preparations for the 2009 
parliamentary elections, Siniora said the March 14 parties 
need to find a coherent strategy and move out of "crisis 
management" mode.  Minute differences on which parties should 
be allowed to present candidates for certain seats in key 
districts are dividing the leadership, he said.  "Their 
opponents have weapons, will, organization, discipline, 
money, and media.  March 14 has the support of the people, 
but their lack of focus may lead to trouble (in the 
elections)." 
 
USG HELP: "DO NO HARM" 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Sison asked about plans for President 
Sleiman's upcoming trip to New York and Washington.  Siniora 
stressed that it would be essential for Sleiman to receive 
deliverables from the visit "or else you will be harming him." 
 
¶11. (C) Finally, responding to DAS Hale's question about what 
other concrete things the USG could do to help Lebanon, 
Siniora said there were many questions concerning the 
elections, and he wanted to make sure not to complicate 
matters further in that arena.  "Do no harm?" asked DAS Hale. 
 "Yes" Siniora responded.  He asked for USG assistance on 
demining and cluster bomb removal.  He worried about recent 
tension in Tripoli and elsewhere in the north, but stressed 
that it was important not to take sides.  He said he hoped to 
find creative ways to calm things in Tripoli, perhaps by 
encouraging civil society to engage the community and not 
leave the field solely to the Salafists and extremists 
generally-speaking. 
 
¶12. (C) DAS Hale has cleared this cable. 
 
SISON