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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000821 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR MATT BRYZA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KPKO MARR AJ GG RU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FEARS RUSSIA'S 
NEW ERA IN SOUTH CAUCASUS 
 
REF: A. STATE 89769 
     ¶B. STATE 87763 
     ¶C. STATE 90980 
     ¶D. BAKU 812 
     ¶E. BAKU 813 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  President Aliyev's International Relations 
Advisor sees Russian actions in Georgia as "the beginning of 
a new era," with Azerbaijan's energy export routes, and 
consequently, the country's independence and sovereignty, 
ultimately at risk.  Russia's acts were premeditated, with a 
goal of reasserting Moscow's influence over the South 
Caucasus and its important energy transport routes, and 
Azerbaijan now fears the Russians will not withdraw. 
Nonetheless, Moscow has not made any direct threats to 
Azerbaijan; Baku has intentionally been "prudent" in its 
relations with Russia.  President Aliyev welcomes the visit 
this week of Vice President Cheney, while being pessimistic 
on prospects for near-term resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.  Regional stability and security are essential, as 
Iran also continues to be a threat.  Azerbaijan continues to 
send assistance to Georgia, but Baku is skeptical of Turkey's 
proposal to form a Caucasus "platform."  End Summary 
 
Russians Attack Weakest Link, Eye Energy Transport 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶2. (C)  Echoing themes raised by President Aliyev and Foreign 
Minister Mammadyarov in discussions on events in eorgia 
(reftels), the President's International Relations Advisor 
Novruz Mammedov told the Ambassador on August 29 that the 
Russian invasion of Georgia is the "beginning of a new era," 
and one which poses very serious difficulties for Azerbaijan. 
 The main aim of the Russian move, Mammedov said, was to "cut 
the route" that allowed the West access to Azerbaijani, 
Caspian and Central Asian hydrocarbons by attacking "the 
weakest, and the key, link in the chain -- Georgia." 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were just an excuse, and are lost 
unless someone is willing to go to war for them, Mammedov 
maintained. 
 
¶3. (C) Mammedov suggested that the most serious long-term 
danger from the current situation is the likelihood that "the 
Russians won't leave."  Moscow's forces are consolidating 
positions in Georgia in buffer zones that are in close 
proximity to key energy transport facilities, including the 
railroad, Azerbaijani facilities at the port of Kulevi, and 
pipelines crossing Georgia, which will give them effective 
control over energy transport.  Mammedov said that while 
there is no hard proof, some in Azerbaijan are convinced that 
the recent attack on the BTC pipeline in Turkey was a 
Russian-inspired action, given Russia's close ties with the 
Kurds. 
 
¶4. (C) Mammedov said that the Russians had prepared their 
actions in Georgia for some time, and that in retrospect it 
was possible to see it coming.  Medvedev and Putin have been 
"united and firm" in their desire to re-establish Russian 
influence in the Caucasus, and this has become increasingly 
evident in their interactions with Azerbaijan in recent 
months.  Although Russia has not made any direct threats to 
Azerbaijan after Georgia,  Azerbaijan reads Putin's and 
Medvedev's comments that what happened to Georgia "could 
happen to you," and that "the South Caucasus belong to us," 
as clearly directed at Azerbaijan. 
 
¶5. (C) Mammedov said that the Russians had now "shown their 
true face" to the world by actions in Georgia in complete 
defiance of international norms.  Given its history with the 
Russians, "Azerbaijan has always known they could do 
something like this," and for this reason, Azerbaijan has 
always been "prudent" in its dealings with Russia.  Russia in 
recent times has been "very irritated" by Azerbaijan's 
support for Nabucco and the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk-Gdansk 
pipelines; considering that the Russians sent troops to 
massacre Azerbaijani citizens in 1990 "when there was nothing 
here" that threatened Russia's vital interests, it is 
entirely possible that they would take strong steps to 
protect their interests today, given Azerbaijan's role as an 
independent energy supplier. 
 
Implications for Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Mammedov said that President Aliyev is now more 
pessimistic than ever with respect to a resolution of the 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Since a resolution, he said, 
could mean that Azerbaijan would send its energy resources 
west through Armenia, "the Russians will never permit it." 
Aliyev believes that Russia will now support Armenia more 
forcefully vis-a-vis Azerbaijan. 
 
Iran Still A Worry 
---------------- 
¶7. (C) Mammedov said that President Aliyev is "deeply 
worried, deeply concerned" about developments and 
Azerbaijan's difficult position, because "it is not only 
Russia Azerbaijan has to worry about -- it is also Iran." 
Given the opportunity, Mammedov said, Iran would "do even 
worse" than Russia.  It is critical to restore regional 
stability.  The most important thing the United States and 
the West can do now from Azerbaijan's point of view is to 
"coordinate the world" in a strong united response to make 
the Russians realize they've committed a grave error, and to 
work together to "save Georgia." 
 
V.P. Visit Will Irritate the Russians 
--------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) "If the US and all its allies can coordinate the EU 
and others, we can do something," Mammedov said.  However, 
Azerbaijan sees this as "problematic" given the political 
transition in the United States. "We cannot be sure if 
decisions taken in the coming months will endure."  Mammedov 
said the President is looking forward to the visit of Vice 
President Cheney, but added that in his personal view the 
visit "will irritate the Russians even more against us.  We 
know the visit was planned before events in Georgia.  They 
don't.  They won't believe us even if we tell them so -- even 
if they believe us they won't say so, it is not in their 
interests to do so." 
 
Azerbaijan Continues Assistance, Criticizes Turkish 
Proposal 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶9.  (C) Mammedov outlined the support Azerbaijan has provided 
to Georgia in the form of food, medicine, equipment and 
finances and said Azerbaijan will continue to help Georgia. 
Azerbaijan itself has suffered up to a billion dollars in 
losses already from the conflict.  The cutting of the 
railroad line in Georgia had slowed exports and blocked many 
imports, with "thousands" of railroad cars stranded on either 
side of the border.   He dismissed Turkey's proposal for a 
"platform" for Caucasus stability 
as amateur diplomacy, saying that Turkey was all over the map 
-- first they had proposed a Caucasus Union to include the 
US, Iran, Russia and the Caucasus countries ("impossible"), 
then a "Caucasus forum," and now the platform.  Aliyev had 
agreed to look at the proposal in the event it developed into 
"something good" for Azerbaijan, but remained very skeptical 
anything would come of it. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C)   Mammedov, like many high-ranking Azerbaijani 
officials, sees Russia's actions in Georgia with a view to 
energy exports and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, critical 
interests for Azerbaijan. From Baku's perspective, Moscow's 
main objective is control of Caspian energy resources, with 
Georgia being the chokepoint on non-Russia access to markets 
via Turkey or the Black Sea.  Like other observers here, 
Mammedov worries that Russia's military action in Georgia and 
subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have 
strengthened the hand of the Armenians, and weakened 
Azerbaijan's leverage over Yerevan at the Nagorno-Karabakh 
negotiating table.  The USG message to Azerbaijan in coming 
weeks and months should center on these two issues: regional 
security and stability to enable oil and gas exports to the 
West, and a strong message on Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity with a goal of reaching a peaceful solution to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
DERSE