VZCZCXRO1905
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTU #0962/01 2421602
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O 291602Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5532
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TUNIS 000962 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S, S/ES, NEA AND NEA/MAG FROM AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PMIL PHUM TS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO TUNISIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Madame Secretary, my team and I look forward to your 
visit to Tunis.  President Ben Ali and Foreign Minister 
Abdallah are delighted you are coming and will provide a warm 
welcome.  They will want to hear your thoughts on regional 
issues and to reaffirm strong US-Tunisian relations.  For us, 
your visit is an opportunity to welcome Tunisia's moderation 
and its economic and social progress.  We recommend you 
stress the value of our excellent, long-standing ties, but 
add that more is possible.  If the Tunisians make progress on 
US concerns, we would be ready to respond in ways that 
address Tunisian interests. 
 
¶2. (C) Specifically, your visit will allow you to: 
-- welcome Tunisia's moderate positions on key regional 
priorities while seeking greater GOT engagement; 
-- commend recent progress on counterterrorism cooperation, 
but urge further steps; 
-- ask Ben Ali for assurances on humane treatment for past 
and future detainees transferred from Guantanamo; 
-- underscore the need for more political reform against the 
backdrop of Tunisia's 2009 presidential and legislative 
elections; and, 
-- offer the GOT an additional $4.1 million in military 
assistance that will help in the fight against terrorism. 
End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) Tunisia styles itself "a country that works".  Ben Ali 
and other Tunisian leaders often contrast their successes 
with the problems elsewhere in the region.  There is much in 
what they say.  While Tunisians grumble privately about 
corruption by the First Lady's family, there is an abiding 
appreciation for Ben Ali's success in steering his country 
clear of the instability and violence that have plagued 
Tunisia's neighbors.  Recent events have underscored this 
accomplishment and the continuing threat: Tunisian security 
forces took down a terror cell in December 2006-January 2007; 
we were reportedly among the group's targets.  In late 
February, al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
kidnapped two Austrian tourists who were in the desert along 
the Tunisian-Algerian border. 
 
¶4. (C) Tunisians also widely recognize, and welcome, the 
country's social successes.  Tunisia is a model for the 
region on women's rights; its 1956 Personal Status Code 
abolished polygamy and required consent for marriage, among 
other protections.  Women today play an important role in the 
public and private sectors. 
 
¶5. (C) There is also real economic progress.  GDP growth has 
averaged five percent over the past decade, and the Tunisian 
people enjoy a relatively high standard of living.  About 80 
percent of Tunisians are considered middle class, and live in 
family-owned homes.  Notwithstanding the progress, 
unemployment remains very high, officially estimated at 14 
percent.  But it is generally acknowledged to be higher in 
certain regions and much higher in the 20-30 age bracket, 
particularly among university graduates.  The average 
Tunisian's purchasing power is under pressure due to world 
commodity price increases.  These strains have manifested 
themselves most acutely through protests and arrests in the 
southern mining basin of Gafsa province.  The GOT responded 
with a very heavy show of force. 
 
¶6. (C) In the political arena, however, progress is barely 
perceptible.  Ben Ali announced recently that he would be 
running for a fifth term in Tunisia's next elections, most 
likely in October, 2009.  There is no chance the elections 
will be free or fair; freedom of expression and freedom of 
association are severely constrained, and independent 
opposition parties are not allowed to operate effectively. 
Indeed, one authentic opposition candidate is no longer 
eligible to run, due to a recent constitutional amendment. 
When asked about political freedom, Ben Ali will insist the 
GOT is making progress, but that it takes time.  He may point 
to such steps as the lifting of the prior review of books and 
newspapers.  While welcome, the GOT has often found ways to 
limit the impact of such advances. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
President Ben Ali and Foreign Minister Abdallah 
 
TUNIS 00000962  002 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  (C) President Ben Ali wil welcome your visit and 
meeting.  He wil wish to spend much time on regional issues, 
including developments in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Iran and Mauritania.  He may also emphasize, 
as he has done in other recent discussions, that US-Tunisian 
political ties are strong, but that we should do more to 
deepen our economic links.  If Ben Ali is "on his game," he 
will be affable, open and engaged.  Ben Ali will have just 
turned 72, however.  He reportedly has health problems and 
they may affect the quality and tenor of the meeting. 
 
¶8. (C) Foreign Minister Abdelwaheb Abdallah is delighted that 
you are coming.  He speks fondly of his previous 
interactions with you,including during his June, 2007 visit 
to Washington and at the Annapolis Conference.  Abdallah can 
be charming in meetings, but he rarely departs from standard 
GOT talking points.  He has been known to open his meetings 
with lengthy soliloquies about Tunisia's political, social, 
and economic successes and moderate positions on regional 
issues.  This is the spin that Abdallah himself crafted 
during his years as Presidential Advisor responsible for 
domestic media control and international media spin.  During 
his three-year tenure as Foreign Minister, Abdallah has 
maintained significant influence -- if not control -- over 
the local media. 
 
----------------------------- 
International/Regional Issues 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Tunisia is like-minded on Iran, recognizes the 
importance of restoring stability in Iraq before the 
Coalition departs, and backs the Annapolis negotiations on 
the Israeli-Palestinian situation.  The GOT has maintained 
its Embassy in Iraq with a Charge d'Affaires, and has 
provided some training to GOI officials.  However, the GOT 
assiduously avoids getting out in front of the Arab League 
consensus on most foreign policy issues.  Moreover, when 
other interests are at stake, the GOT is prone to waffle. 
Ben Ali surprised us by attending the Arab League summit in 
Damascus this spring, after telling A/S Welch that he would 
not go. 
 
¶10. (C) It is not clear that the GOT has a guiding principle 
for its foreign policy other than to "get along with 
everyone."  The GOT has declined to condemn publicly the coup 
d'etat in Mauritania, although it has signaled its private 
objection.  Likewise, it has been silent on Russia's recent 
military actions in Georgia.  To the extent that GOT leaders 
speak in generalities about their moderate foreign policy 
stance, we remind them that Tunisia's moderation does not 
help us, unless its views are made public and its influence 
is used actively in international fora. 
 
-------------------- 
Guantanamo Detainees 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) Based on humane treatment and security assurances 
provided by the GOT, the United States transferred two 
Guantanamo detainees in June, 2007.  Following the transfer, 
credible allegations surfaced that one of the detainees was 
mistreated while in Ministry of Interior custody (slapped and 
threatened with rape as well as the rape of his wife and 
daughter).  In February, A/S Welch raised the return of 
detainees with Ben Ali.  Ben Ali provided the somewhat vague 
response that they would be accepted in accordance with the 
Tunisian Constitution.  Your visit represents an opportunity 
to confirm that past and future transferees will be treated 
in accordance with Tunisia's constitutional guarantees on 
human rights and humane treatment, as well as its 
international commitments, notably the Convention Against 
Torture. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Counterterrorism/Security Cooperation 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Tunisian officials are rightfully concerned about the 
terrorism threat posed by violent extremists.  As Tunisians 
often tell us, they "live in a bad neighborhood".  Indeed, 
the core members of the terror cell the GOT took down in 
January, 2007 had infiltrated from Algeria.  But the cell 
then recruited from the local population, mushrooming from 
four to 40 people in just six weeks.  The GOT's success in 
taking down the group was welcome, but there is clearly some 
support for extremist ideologies among Tunisians.  We would 
like to help the GOT deal with this, but it would require the 
 
TUNIS 00000962  003 OF 004 
 
 
GOT to admit there is a domestic problem, and to share 
knowledge about its extent.  That is not happening: the GOT 
maintains that the threat of terrorism in Tunisia is due to 
external factors, whether border infiltrations or incitement 
broadcast on pan-Arab satellite TV. 
 
¶13. (S/NF) Tunisian cooperation in the intelligence arena has 
been uneven.  On the positive side, we have some successful 
programs being run through GRPO.  We also have good 
intelligence sharing on Tunisians who are outside the 
country.  On the negative side, however, intelligence sharing 
on the threat inside Tunisia is thin, although it has 
improved somewhat in recent months.  The improvements are 
probably in response to a commitment made by President Ben 
Ali to A/S Welch in February to cooperate on counterterrorism 
"without reservation." 
 
¶14. (C) The GOT places a high value on its historic and 
robust military-military relationship with us.  In FY 2008, 
Tunisia is receiving approximately $8 million in Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), nearly all of which is used for 
maintenance of its aging of US-origin equipment, which needs 
major upgrades.  In addition to FMF, the Mission received 
almost $10 million in Section 1206 funding in FY 2008.  We 
are using the funding to provide the Tunisian military with 
night-vision goggles and ground surveillance radar.  We also 
have a robust program of military exercises and training with 
the Tunisians. 
 
¶15. (C) You will be able to inform the GOT that we can 
provide $4.1 million in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds 
(originally intended for Mauritania) to meet GOT requests for 
unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision equipment for 
Tunisia's UH-1H helicopters, and associated training.  The 
Administration has proposed approximately $2 million in FMF 
in FY 2009 for Tunisia.  GOT leaders view FMF as a barometer 
of the US commitment to Tunisia, and thus have complained 
about cuts in FMF levels in recent years.  We have told them 
that we continue to seek ways to help their military combat 
the threat of regional terrorism.  We have traded texts on a 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), but the GOT has not 
replied to our latest draft delivered over a year ago.  In a 
meeting with Minister of Defense Morjane in May, Secretary 
Gates noted the United States would like to complete a SOFA 
with Tunisia. 
 
------------- 
Economic Ties 
------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Ben Ali and other Tunisian officials frequently call 
for greater US economic engagement, by which they mean more 
investment.  Today, some 70 US companies are operating in 
Tunisia, with close to $1 billion in investment since 1994. 
Trade between the two countries remains small, with 
agricultural commodities the largest US export to Tunisia. 
In March, we held a meeting of our Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA) council and discussed intellectual 
property, services, market access, and investment.  One key 
to improving US trade and investment is a further opening up 
of Tunisia's economy.  Notably, Tunisia still does not permit 
most types of franchising, although they are working on a new 
services law. 
 
-------------------- 
Bilateral Engagement 
-------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) While we enjoy a long-standing and generally positive 
bilateral relationship with Tunisia, difficulties remain. 
The GOT is slow to engage, often unresponsive, and 
periodically takes counterproductive steps.  Most recently, 
the GOT rejected all nine American Fulbright Scholars 
planning study here this coming year.  Strong reclamas 
resulted in the GOT accepting four scholars, but the process 
was tough.  Underlying some GOT actions is a distrust of our 
motives, and specifically the Freedom Agenda.  GOT leaders 
bristle at public criticism.  For example, Abdallah convoked 
me to express his "disgust" that Tunisia was condemned for 
its treatment of journalists in President Bush's May 1 
statement on World Press Freedom.  But the difficulties are 
also the result of the controls imposed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  These controls limit the Embassy's ability 
to engage with other agencies, and with universities, 
business organizations and even the country's labor union. 
While these restrictions affect all Embassies, not just ours, 
the effect is to limit the quality and depth of our 
relations. 
 
¶18. (C) In our contacts with Tunisian officials, they 
 
TUNIS 00000962  004 OF 004 
 
 
emphasize our strong ties of over 200 years.  But they rarely 
move from the general to the specific.  Your visit is an 
opportunity to make clear that more is possible.  If Tunisia 
is prepared to open up and do more on issues of concern to 
the United States, e.g., regional challenges and/or political 
liberalization, we are prepared to look for ways to deepen 
our relationship. 
 
Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm 
GODEC