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DE RUEHLP #1851/01 2422151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 292151Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8366
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8287
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5644
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9585
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6802
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RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4187
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5721
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6516
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1250
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ASEC BL
SUBJECT: MIL-MIL RELATIONS: MOD OPTIMISTIC, DESPITE SIGNS 
 
REF: A. DAO REPORT SCI 6 808 0280 08 - DRASTIC CHANGES 
        IN US/BOL MIL-MIL RELATIONS EXPECTED 
        WITHOUT APOLOGY 
     ¶B. DAO REPORT 6 808 0276 08 - J2 REASSINGED TO 
        CONTRABAND TASK FORCE NEAR DESAGUADERA 
     ¶C. LA PAZ 1425 
     ¶D. LA PAZ 1023 
     ¶E. LA PAZ 99 
 
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Minister of Defense Walker San Miguel told 
EmbOffs August 22 that mil-mil relations are "good" and 
poised to improve following President Evo Morales' lead to 
improve relations generally.  San Miguel said 
"misunderstandings" are at the root of mutual suspicions of 
USG and Bolivian government intentions.  He said Morales 
might be ready to reconsider restrictions he placed on 
military assistance following a perceived slight from 
SouthCom Admiral James Stavridis and that even lifting a 
preexisting ban on training to WHINSEC was a possibility. 
 
¶2. (C) However, San Miguel's assessment is at odds with other 
recent indicators from our contacts.  Morales continues to 
restrict U.S. assistance and  Minister of the Presidency Juan 
Ramon Quintana told the military to replace all 
U.S.-sponsored military training.  Furthermore, the Bolivian 
Chief of Military Intelligence was reassigned for attending 
U.S. training; our training candidates are facing increased 
resistance obtaining GOB permissions; and Morales personally 
rejected in-country travel for our new Defense Attache.  End 
Summary. 
 
MOD Paints Rosy Mil-Mil Future 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Minister of Defense (MOD) Walker San Miguel told 
EmbOffs August 22 that mil-mil relations would "continue as 
they always have" and that Bolivian delays in providing 
participants or canceling participation in USG-sponsored 
training were "a question of (administrative) discipline," 
not a signal of deliberate distancing from U.S. military 
assistance.  "It is a reality that we need U.S. help," said 
San Miguel, emphasizing that the Bolivian government would be 
counting on U.S. help as it attempts to increase 
counter-narcotics efforts in the Yungas region, a "new 
challenge."  San Miguel was optimistic relations would 
improve following positive visits by WHA A/S Thomas Shannon 
and INL A/S David Johnson in July and August, respectively. 
"Evo wants to improve relations," San Miguel said. 
 
Explanations Needed to Defeat "Misunderstandings" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) Regarding the long-stalled agreement to provide status 
of forces guarantees for U.S. servicemen and DOD civilians 
working on humanitarian projects, San Miguel said there was 
"still hope" for a 2009 agreement.  (Note: President Morales 
froze the 2008 agreement and Bolivian participation in 
certain USG-funded courses following Admiral James Stavridis' 
January 17 presentation to the Center for Strategic 
International Studies (CSIS), which Morales (incorrectly) 
says portrayed him as linked to narco-terrorism due to use of 
a photo of Morales with Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad.  End Note.)  San Miguel told us he would 
approach the subject with Morales.  He opined the time might 
be right "to put this behind us" following a well-received 
explanation of the "misunderstanding" from Stavridis relayed 
to Morales from Armed Forces Commander Luis Trigo in June. 
He added, however, that such private explanations needed to 
be made public.  (Note: We understand that Admiral Stavridis 
is considering meeting with San Miguel at the Defense 
Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) the first week of September 
in Banff, Canada.  End Note.) 
 
We Can't Go On Together, With Suspicious Minds 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (C) San Miguel lamented that "misunderstandings" are at 
the core of suspicions from other ministries and President 
Morales himself about the motives of U.S. military 
assistance.  He complained that the bullets case, in which 
the former MILGP Commander had attempted to bring 500 rounds 
of ammunition to Bolivia for target shooting via a friend of 
the family last year, "caused me a lot of problems."  San 
Miguel said although "there was nothing to it," the incident 
enflamed mistrust and could have been avoided if the MILGP 
Commander had "simply asked me to authorize it." 
 
Reality vs. San Miguel 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Despite San Miguel's assurances to the contrary, all 
indications are that mil-mil relations are on the decline: 
 
--According to MILGP and EcoPol contacts, the military asked 
for President Evo Morales' permission on August 18 to send 11 
Bolivian officers to U.S.-sponsored peace keeping operations 
(PKO) training in Uruguay that begins the last week of 
September.  Bringing a routine training authorization to 
Morales' level during Evo's weekly MOD/Military working group 
meeting is unusual and reveals how reluctant commanders have 
become to make independent decisions that concern the United 
States.  J-3 (operations) Commander General Walter Ponozo and 
his aides asked various Embassy officials for any 
correspondence "like an apology" or, barring that, an 
explanation concerning Stavridis' presentation in order to 
present it as an attachment to the training request, 
apparently anticipating the question.  EcoPol provided 
Diplomatic Note 034/08, which provides an explanation of 
Stavridis' presentation.  Morales apparently made no decision 
on the subject, but reiterated that he was still waiting for 
a clear apology from Stavridis. 
 
--Later on August 18, Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana 
called General Ponozo to tell him in no uncertain terms to 
start looking for military training in other countries, 
mentioning Venezuela, Cuba, China, and Argentina.  Quintana 
allegedly said the Bolivian government would pay for 
alternatives in other countries to replace U.S.-sponsored 
training.  Ponozo told our DAO he will continue pressing for 
the PKO candidates, but opined that the training would 
eventually be canceled and that any training to the U.S., 
even within the scope of maintenance and repair, was also 
slatted to be replaced. 
 
--In June, seven Bolivian servicemen scheduled to compete in 
a Special Forces competition in San Antonio, Texas were 
pulled off the plane at the last minute at the behest of 
Quintana, according to our contacts.  San Miguel explained 
this incident as a "routine technical issue," saying the 
service commanders had not received proper clearance from MOD 
and that MOD was trying to send a message that it would not 
approve such requests after the fact, which had occurred in 
the past.  Despite the fact that the USG pays for the 
training, transportation, and usually provides food and 
lodging, San Miguel explained the soldiers in this case also 
did not received authorization for per diem from the Bolivian 
government for official overseas duty and "we don't have the 
money to send everyone."  (Comment: This is bunk.  When given 
a choice, Bolivian soldiers routinely forego this overseas 
pay as a pittance not worth the bureaucratic effort and 
certainly not worth missing out on an opportunity to receive 
U.S. training.  End Comment.) 
 
--Upon returning from a U.S.-sponsored training course at the 
Strategic Intelligence Congress in Orlando, Florida in 
August, Bolivian Chief of Military Intelligence (J2) General 
Eradio Ardaya was reassigned to an inconsequential 
counter-contraband post in remote Desaguadero near the 
Peruvian border.  According to DAO reporting (ref b), Armed 
Forces Commander Luis Trigo told him the reassignment was 
punishment for going on training to the U.S. without his 
permission.  Ardaya obtained the permission of the 
Vice-Commander, as Trigo was out of the country at the time, 
and considers this an excuse to replace him with a more 
politically malleable officer that will be less critical of 
Trigo and the government. 
 
--MILGP is experiencing increased delays obtaining candidate 
lists for USG-sponsored training from the military. 
Potential candidates report encountering resistance obtaining 
the required paperwork and permissions from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (diplomatic notes for travel, the first 
incident reported in ref d), the Ministry of Defense, and 
within their own services. 
 
--Although potentially still in play, the MOD appears to have 
caved to MFA resistance on approving an agreement on end-use 
monitoring that would provide $6 million in fund for Bolivian 
peace keepers over FY08 and FY09 (septel). 
 
--Morales personally denied our request for an orientation 
trip for Embassy's new Defense Attache to visit Bolivian 
military units throughout the country (a routine practice). 
General Trigo told RO that San Miguel was not opposed to the 
trip, but did not stand up to Morales on the subject. 
Apparently, Trigo did not object either. 
 
"We Will Improve" Training Glitches; Even WHINSEC Possible 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶7. (C) San Miguel told us he would look personally into the 
case of a Major Jorge Cadima, who is due to attend training 
at the end of September.  (Note: San Miguel made good on this 
promise and Cadima's paperwork problems were resolved.  End 
Note.)  San Miguel said there was no "intention to slow the 
process, (or) restrict training," but rather that the new 
military high command, specifically Trigo, was 
organizationally challenged.  We asked that the relevant 
services inform us if training is to be canceled, as unfilled 
spots cost us 70 percent of the course costs and 100 percent 
of unused plane tickets.  San Miguel advised we copy the 
Defense Ministry on all training correspondence with the 
military to avoid "misunderstandings" and ensure prompt 
turnaround on candidate nominations, noting that Vice MOD 
Wilfredo Vargas had made this suggestion previously.  San 
Miguel promised "we will improve on this." 
 
¶8. (C) San Miguel said a ban on military training at WHINSEC 
(Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation; 
formally the School of the Americas; ref e) was the only 
restriction on Bolivian participation in USG-sponsored 
training; "the rest is fine."  San Miguel explained that 
"WHINSEC is a special case," because "NGOs were telling us to 
stay away, some from your own country."  Even the WHINSEC 
ban, said San Miguel, could be reconsidered and overturned, a 
prospect VMOD Vargas has made to us several times.  "Service 
commanders want very much to resume this training." 
 
The Military Stands Up to Evo, Not 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Our DAO has received information that Air Force 
Commander General Daniel Salazar said during a recent U.S. 
military conference that he was drafting a letter on behalf 
of all service commanders to ask President Evo Morales to 
resign to prevent a violent conflict from developing in 
Bolivia and criticizing his leadership for unnecessarily 
dividing the country.  Salazar verified with RO that he did 
in fact make the comment, but that he could not get the other 
commanders, and especially General Trigo, to sign the letter. 
 He was not disposed to sending a letter solely on his own 
behalf.  We suspect that although the anti-Morales sentiment 
is likely true, it is unlikely he ever seriously approached 
the other commanders to send such a letter.  RO suspects 
Salazar  avoided meeting with him due to morning-after 
reluctance (or fear) to discuss the statement. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) MOD San Miguel's sunny optimism about the future of 
mil-mil relations in the face of solid evidence to the 
contrary calls into question either his grasp on reality or 
his willingness to get real with us.  Relations are not 
business as usual (refs c through e).  We do not doubt San 
Miguel would like our mil-mil relations to be on a positive, 
or at least an even, track, but he has to be aware of 
steadily growing negative influence of Quintana on military 
affairs and Trigo's acquiesce to the same.  While we continue 
to view San Miguel, Vargas, and most senior-ranking officers 
as favorably disposed to solid mil-mil relations, we are 
increasingly skeptical that these erstwhile "allies" will 
stick their necks out to achieve them. 
 
¶11. (C) A Stavridis apology is a red herring -- or yet 
another attempt by Evo and Quintana to show up the U.S. 
There is a movement afoot led by Quintana and other 
government radicals to distance Bolivia from the USG that is 
beyond the power of logic and explanation to reverse. 
Stavridis' January 17 presentation was used to justify 
decisions and a direction already well underway.  End Comment. 
GOLDBERG