VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKA #0775/01 2031052
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211052Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7082
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2275
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 9779
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0750
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

S E C R E T DHAKA 000775 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, AND DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2018 
TAGS: MARR PHUM PINR PINS PREL PTER PGON BG
SUBJECT: CHIEF ADVISER "GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC" 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
Summary 
========= 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Chief Adviser told the Ambassador on 
July 18 that he was "guardedly optimistic" that things were 
headed in the right direction.  Fakhruddin Ahmed hoped that 
the United States and other major external players would do 
what they could to help his efforts to get the parties to 
endorse institutional reform.  He reiterated Bangladesh's 
strong commitment against terrorism and promised to look into 
the question of possible U.S. human rights training for the 
RAB (Rapid Action Battalions).  End Summary. 
 
The Arrest Campaign 
====================== 
 
¶2. (C) On July 18, the Ambassador called on Chief Adviser 
Fakhruddin Ahmed; Foreign Affairs Adviser Iftekhar Chowdhury 
also sat in.  The Ambassador began the meeting by noting that 
he would be heading back for consultations and wanted to be 
able to reassure Washington that Bangladesh was on track to 
hold its national elections by the end of the year.  Chief 
Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed replied that the Caretaker 
Government was determined to stick to the timetable he had 
spelled out in April.  He expressed concern that recent 
articles in U.S. publications suggested that many Americans 
did not understand the situation on the ground in Bangladesh. 
 For example, the much ballyhooed arrest campaign had not led 
to a significant increase in the number of arrests in 
Bangladesh, which continued to average around 1,400-1,600 per 
day.  Similarly, the number of prisoners detained in 
Bangladesh's prisons had only increased slightly, from about 
85,000 to about 87,000.  Almost all those arrested were being 
detained under court orders.  Moreover, the Chief Adviser had 
ordered a review of all cases of individuals being detained 
under the Emergency Powers Rules:  "We will either place 
charges against them or release them." 
 
The Political Process 
======================= 
 
¶3. (C) The Chief Adviser asserted that he was "guardedly 
optimistic" that Bangladesh was headed in the right 
direction.  The Caretaker Government believed strongly that 
the country's political institutions and culture needed 
reforms, if democracy were to flourish in Bangladesh. 
Accordingly, the CTG had sought to strengthen and 
depoliticize the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Electoral 
Commission, and the Public Service Commission.  Similarly, 
the Caretaker Government was moving ahead with sub-district 
(upazilla) elections, in an attempt to decentralize power to 
some degree.  The question was whether the parties would 
allow these reforms to move forward once an elected 
government returned to power.  (Note:  Within 30 days of 
convening, the new Parliament will have to endorse or reject 
the various ordinances enacted by the Caretaker Government.) 
 
¶4. (C) Fakhruddin acknowledged that the parties' actions to 
date called into question their commitment to reform.  They 
were putting up extremely unattractive candidates for the 
municipal elections occurring on August 4;  many of the 
candidates were currently in jail on corruption charges. 
Fakhruddin asked that we pressure the parties to continue 
down the path of reform, including by fielding better 
candidates for the national election and by having the new 
Parliament endorse the institutional reforms enacted by the 
Caretaker Government. 
 
The Optimal versus the Likely 
=============================== 
 
¶5. (C) Foreign Affairs Adviser Chowdhury suggested that the 
optimal way forward would be to have a government of national 
unity following the election, with each party holding the 
same proportion of ministries as seats in the Parliament. 
This would be one way of convincing Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) not to boycott the election, since 
the BNP would receive at least some ministries.  Chowdhury 
admitted, however, that to date the Awami League, which 
expected to win the election, was not showing much interest 
in this formulation. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Chief Adviser acknowledged that there needed to 
be a plan B for moving the political process forward, in the 
event the parties rejected a government of national unity. 
With respect to pushing reform forward, he indicated that the 
CTG was considering the possibility of appointing a 
Constitutional Reform Committee that could provide proposals 
for the Parliament's consideration.  With respect to getting 
the BNP not to boycott the election, he hoped that the 
international community would pressure the party to 
participate.  He also agreed that there would be some 
pressure on Khaleda Zia from the many politicians within the 
party who hoped to win seats in an election.  Unless the 
government gave in to all the BNP's demands, Khaleda Zia's 
party was unlikely to come to a decision on whether to 
participate until the last possible moment before the 
national elections were announced, i.e., sometime in late 
October or early November. 
 
Transferring Wealth to the Rural Areas 
======================================= 
 
¶7.    (C) The Ambassador noted that the Bangladesh economy 
appeared to be weathering both national disasters and rising 
global food and fuel prices relatively well.  The Chief 
Adviser agreed, but warned that poorer Bangladeshis were 
being hit hard by the price increases, despite the safety 
nets the Caretaker Government had put in place.  Still, there 
was a silver lining to this cloud:  rising prices for food 
meant that, for the first time in decades, Bangladesh's 
farmers were seeing their incomes increase more rapidly than 
those of urban dwellers. 
 
Bangladesh Committed to the Struggle Against Terrorism 
============================================= ========= 
 
¶8.    (S) The Chief Adviser expressed particular dismay over 
recent articles in the U.S. media that had portrayed 
Bangladesh as being soft on terrorism.  He stressed that his 
government was determined to do everything possible to root 
out terrorism and had taken concrete steps such as outlawing 
the HUJ1-B and arresting a large number of terrorists.  The 
Ambassador replied that the United States viewed Bangladesh 
as a valuable partner in the War against Terrorism;  the U.S. 
Mission received excellent cooperation on counter-terrorism 
from the concerned GOB agencies. 
 
Working the Rapid Action Battalions 
==================================== 
¶9.    (C) To further strengthen counter-terrorism 
cooperation, the United States was interested in seeing 
whether it was possible to provide training to the RAB, the 
Ambassador continued.  To do so, however, would require some 
improvements in RAB's transparency and accountability with 
respect to human rights questions.  A team from Washington 
had been in Dhaka and had had good conversations with RAB on 
this issue.  In the team's final meeting, however, the Home 
Ministry had indicated that there would be no changes in 
current practices.  The Chief Adviser heartily endorsed the 
Ambassador's comment that he would not take this negative 
response as the final answer.  Fakhruddin agreed to look into 
the matter and also noted that he hoped that the National 
Human Rights Commission would help address issues such as 
alleged violations of human rights by RAB, once the NHRC was 
stood up in September. 
 
Comment: On Track for Now 
=========================== 
 
¶10. (C) The Chief Adviser appears committed to stepping down 
by the end of the year - and leaving a stronger democracy 
behind.  He understands that he might not get everything he 
wants in terms of reform but similarly understands that a 
return to the scorched earth politics of 2006 would be 
disastrous for Bangladesh.  We should do everything possible 
to help Bangladesh,s major political parties grasp this fact. 
Pasi