VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #1060/01 1822132
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 302132Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1037
INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 001060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL, WHA/CAR WARD, RYAN, L, L/LEI FOR TORRES 
AND MUELLER 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR OIA FARRAR AND KRANTZ, ASSET 
FORFEITURE SECTION WELD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KJUS KCRM SNAR DR
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PROGRESS ON ASSET FORFEITURE 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  On June 13, a representative of the 
Department of Justice's (DOJ) Asset Forfeiture-Money 
Laundering Unit, accompanied by Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
(AUSAs) from the Districts of Puerto Rico and the Southern 
District of Florida and a Mexico City-based representative of 
the Internal Revenue Service, completed a two-day series of 
meetings with Dominican officials to discuss the particulars 
of six specific cases involving the seized assets of 
individuals convicted in the United States; the assets seized 
in the Dominican Republic were either instruments of or the 
fruits of the crimes for which the subjects were charged or 
convicted.  This group, accompanied by poloff and 
Embassy-based members of the DEA, DHS, and FBI who had been 
working these cases, attempted to determine the best manner 
to trigger the forfeiture of the seized properties and the 
sharing of assets and, in return, heard a number of concrete 
suggestions and a unanimous call by Dominican officials to 
develop a bilateral asset forfeiture sharing agreement with 
the United States.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Assets are ordered seized in the Dominican Republic 
in a number of ways, but most relevant to the discussion at 
hand are the seizures of assets of individuals sought for 
extradition and the seizures of identified assets of those 
otherwise charged with or convicted of crimes in the United 
States. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In the case of extraditions, U.S. extradition 
requests typically ask Dominican authorities to seize all 
assets with evidentiary value or in the possession of the 
fugitive at the time of his arrest.  In actuality, because 
these assets are not defined by U.S. authorities at this 
stage of the process, Dominican authorities seize the widest 
possible range of assets at the time of arrest.  Should the 
fugitive be declared "not guilty" following extradition and 
trial in the United States (a rare occurrence), the seized 
assets are simply returned.  Much more common is the scenario 
whre the extradited fugitive is found guilty at trial but 
none of the trial documents, including the inal court order, 
identify properties that were efinitively tied to the crime 
in question and, wth some exceptions, none of the court 
documents rder the forfeiture of said assets.  This creates 
a legal limbo, where assets remain in the custody f the 
Dominican government (i.e., seized and detriorating), but 
are not forfeited to the Dominicn government for use by law 
enforcement agencies shared with the U.S. government or any 
specific victim, or, in the majority of cases, released back 
to the defendant.  Dominican officials noted that, on 
occasion, failure to identify assets in the U.S. documents 
has resulted in the return of those assets to convicted 
individuals. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  In several cases, AUSAs have worked to identify 
specific assets in the Dominican Republic and have had these 
assets clearly identified in certified court documents, but 
the court documents fail to declare the assets subject to 
forfeiture.  Dominican authorities have interpreted the lack 
of a final U.S. forfeiture order as an impediment to local 
forfeitures. 
 
¶5.  (U)  In a few notable exceptions, assets were forfeited 
and proceeds shared among U.S. and Dominican authorities, but 
this was the result of lengthy ad hoc negotiations between 
Dominican and U.S. prosecutors and, because of the length and 
complexity of negotiations necessary, these arrangements are 
far from the norm. 
 
------------------------------------ 
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR FORFEITURE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Considering the above background, Dominican 
officials meeting the group made a series of suggestions 
concerning practical steps to speed the forfeiture of seized 
goods in the Dominican Republic. 
 
Octavio Lister (Chief, Attorney General's Anti-Corruption 
Unit), Daniel Miranda Villalona (Lead Prosecutor, Attorney 
General's Money Laundering/Financial Crimes sub-unit), Jose 
Hernandez Peguero (National District Prosecutor 
(DA-equivalent)), Mabel Feliz (President, National Council on 
Drugs (ONDCP-equivalent)), and Francisco Antonio Ovalle 
Pichardo (Administrative Director, National Council for Drug 
Control (DEA-equivalent)) all suggested that: 
 
--U.S. prosecutors be sensitized to the need to identify 
assets in the Dominican Republic in extradition requests, 
pleadings, charging documents, and other official documents, 
so that they might be properly attached.  A number of 
officials suggested that, in order to do so effectively, U.S. 
prosecutors should initiate contact directly with their 
Dominican counterparts (the latter group being better 
situated to search for assets hidden locally).  These same 
officials suggested that Embassy-based law enforcement 
personnel might best judge which local prosecutors would be 
suitable for contacting. 
 
--U.S. final court orders should clearly state what assets 
are subject to forfeiture (while not ordering Dominican 
courts to actually forfeit, as there is no extraterritorial 
reach). 
 
--U.S. prosecutors should present certified copies of final 
court documents identifying assets and confirming U.S. 
convictions to their Dominican counterparts, who will then 
present them to local judges who, according to Treaty and 
international practice, must incorporate and execute them. 
 
---------------------- 
DESIRE FOR CONSISTENCY 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) The above officials, joined by Attorney General 
Radhames Jimenez Pena and Assistant Attorney General for 
Extraditions and International Affairs, suggested that, in 
addition to the above steps, that the Dominican Republic 
would welcome negotiations as to a formalized bilateral asset 
sharing agreement.  A formalized agreement would introduce a 
note of consistency into the practice of forfeiture, with 
likely results being increased forfeitures and, accordingly, 
increased assets flowing to the benefit of Dominican law 
enforcement entities.  While the details of the possible 
agreement were not specifically addressed, Dominican 
officials signaled a general willingness to return assets to 
U.S.-based victims (minus expenses), with the understanding 
that the vast bulk of assets from "victimless crimes" (e.g., 
drug trafficking) would be transferred to and/or remain in 
the Dominican Republic. 
 
-------------------- 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U)  After Dominican interlocutors suggested that a lack 
of a universal tracking system makes it difficult to easily 
identify, preserve, and protect seized assets, DOJ suggested 
that it would be willing to supply and train Dominicans on a 
Thai-based CD-ROM tracking system (MCATS) with which it has 
had success in the past.  While DOJ would supply the 
materials and training, the Dominican government would be 
expected to supply meals and lodging to the cadre of 
trainers.  Attorney General Jimenez, in particular, appeared 
supportive of this initiative, but suggested that he would 
look to the United States to defray or eliminate the meal and 
lodging expenses entailed. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (U) Embassy understands that DOJ Asset Forfeiture Section 
will immediately begin to work with AUSAs to carry out the 
"practical suggestions" detailed and suggests that the 
Department take necessary steps, in combination with DOJ, to 
approve an initial round of formal negotiations with the 
Dominican Public Ministry with a goal to establishing a 
formal asset forfeiture and sharing mechanism.  Embassy also 
suggest that Department investigate the possibility of 
partnering with DOJ on the provision of the MCATS program, so 
that it may be provided cost-free to the Dominican 
government.  Undertaking these steps will ultimately benefit 
U.S. counternarcotics efforts, as Dominican law enforcement 
entities can use forfeited assets to build capacity. 
 
FANNIN