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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA520, GOMA NOTES 06/05/2008: NAIROBI PROCESS - JMG TASK FORCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA520 2008-06-12 14:59 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO7784
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0520 1641459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121459Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8116
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000520 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO CG RW UN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 06/05/2008: NAIROBI PROCESS - JMG TASK FORCE 
VISITS MWENGA 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The JMG Task Force traveled June 5 to Mwenga in 
South Kivu to observe actions being taken by the Congolese 
government against FDLR in the area.  Three battalions consisting of 
1,575 fighters are deployed throughout Mwenga town and district. 
Government representatives there inspired little confidence.  The 
commanding officer of the FARDC 12th Integrated Battalion claimed it 
was constrained by resources, but were otherwise capable of 
discharging their mission.  The territorial administrator appeared 
not to have been properly briefed, and may even be collaborating 
with the FDLR.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The Nairobi process Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) Task 
Force traveled June 5 to Mwenga, South Kivu to observe Congolese 
government measures against the FDLR in the area.  Mwenga is an 
important FDLR zone:  the headquarters of the FDLR Second Division 
is located in Kigogo, approximately 15 km from Mwenga town. 
 
3.  (SBU) The Task Force first visited the FARDC 12th Integrated 
(and retrained) Battalion, which is headquartered in Mwenga and 
consists of 750 soldiers.  It arrived in the area April 7 following 
training by MONUC at the Luberizi brassage center and is deployed 
for 90 km along the main Bukavu-Shabunda road.  According to the 
battalion commander, a FARDC colonel, it is constrained by 
resources, but otherwise capable of discharging its mission.  These 
"constraints," however, were transport, communications, food and 
medicine.  (Note:  In a later meeting, MONUC added ammunition to 
this list.  End note.) 
 
4.  (SBU) The colonel said the battalion does not venture far off 
the main road, if at all.  He said it has good relations with the 
local population, "except when it does not."  He said that that they 
do not collect taxes and had dismantled roadblocks set up by the 
battalion previously deployed there. 
 
5.  (SBU) According to the FARDC, the FDLR is deployed throughout 
Mwenga town and district.  FDLR forces consist of 1,575 fighters in 
three battalions, and are equipped with anti-aircraft guns, mortars 
and RPGs.  They are located in the forest and hills, where there are 
no roads.  The FARDC claims no contact with the FDLR. 
 
6.  (SBU) The Rwandan delegate pointedly asked what 750 FARDC troops 
could do against 1,500 FDLR fighters.  The FARDC response:  it is 
currently in the process of establishing a presence.  It planned to 
gradually build up forces in the area, then progressively engage the 
FDLR. 
 
7.  (SBU) The Task Force then called on the territorial 
administrator, who appeared not to have been briefed prior to the 
meeting, nor possess an understanding of the issues at hand.  He 
claimed, for example, that territorial administrators are not 
involved in the FDLR public information campaign; he said he had 
been told that the Amani program was responsible for this.  He said 
he was unfamiliar with the work of, and had never met with, MONUC 
DDRRR officers.  (Note.  In fact, MONUC DDRRR operates in the area 
and has produced defections.  End note.)  He claimed he has no 
contact with the FDLR, but then noted that an FDLR commander had 
invited him to his wedding (he said he did not attend). 
 
8.  (SBU) Congolese delegation chief Colonel Augustin Mamba was 
clearly uncomfortable with the administrator's statements.  He 
intervened frequently to "amplify," "complete" or "enrich" what the 
administrator was saying.  Finally, he invented a weather problem as 
justification for cutting the meeting short. 
 
9.  (SBU) The Task Force ended its trip with a briefing from MONUC, 
a standard presentation on implementation of the Nairobi process 
which emphasized the continuous training and other support it is 
giving to the 12th Battalion. 
 
10.  (SBU) Comment:  Task Force members asked few hard questions 
during the visit to Mwenga, but government representatives there 
inspired little confidence.  In general, the FARDC appeared to be 
doing little against the FDLR, while the territorial administrator 
is either completely unaware of the issues at hand or is actively 
cooperating with the FDLR.  According to OCHA, FDLR fighters are 
active members, even leaders, of his territorial security committee. 
 End comment 
 
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