VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0752/01 1540940
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020940Z JUN 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9051
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8318
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9559

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, CROSS-STRAIT 
RELATIONS 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language focused May 31-June 2 
news coverage on various new developments in cross-Strait relations; 
on DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen's interview with print media Sunday, 
in which she expressed concern over the KMT's approach to handling 
cross-Strait relations; and on Premier Liu Chao-shiuan's first 
administrative report to the Legislature last Friday.  The centrist, 
KMT-leaning "China Times" front-paged a banner headline June 2 that 
said "Beijing Authorities: Missiles Targeting Taiwan Will No Longer 
Increase and Will Be Gradually Removed."  The pro-unification 
"United Daily News" also ran a news story on page four on June 1, 
which quoted U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for East 
Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder as saying Saturday that the United 
States is not worried that cross-Strait relations will become too 
intimate. 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a "China Times" weekly 
column discussed the transition of power in Taiwan and its impact on 
the future direction of cross-Strait relations.  The article said 
for the near future, the core of Washington's cross-Strait policy 
will be to maintain a "dynamic" balance to ensure stability in the 
entire Asia Pacific region.  An editorial in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times," however, opined that the KMT's wishful thinking and 
unilateral trust in Beijing will push Taiwan into an abyss.  An 
op-ed piece in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
also questioned whether President Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT are 
tilting toward China.  An editorial in the conservative, 
pro-unification, English-language "China Post," on the other hand, 
said Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization will 
serve as a litmus test for the future development of cross-Strait 
relations.  End summary. 
 
¶3. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
"Change of the Ruling Political Party in Taiwan and Future Direction 
of Cross-Strait Relations" 
 
Huan Guocang, original partner to the Primus Pacific Partners 
company (Hong Kong), commented in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China 
Times" [circulation: 400,000] (6/2): 
 
"... Beijing is now in an era in which it is facing no direct and 
immediate security and military threats.  Beijing is not a global 
superpower; instead, it is a regional power with growing influence 
on global affairs, and its fundamental security interests lie in the 
Asia Pacific area.  It appears that Beijing's basic security 
strategy has been established in a relatively stable climate, in 
which China's continuous economic growth and social stability can be 
ensured, so that it can exercise its influence in international 
affairs.  For Beijing, over the past decade, the only possible 
source of a major military conflict or even a war was cross-Strait 
relations.  An antagonistic cross-Strait relationship will not have 
a significant impact on mainland China's political and economic 
development, but it can certainly create a negative influence on its 
security and international relations (in particular, Beijing's 
relations with Washington and Tokyo.) 
 
"But the KMT's return to power will be able to improve cross-Strait 
relations in the following four years, or even longer, and this will 
generate a profound impact on the international climate that Beijing 
is facing.  At least for now, relations between Beijing and 
Washington do not focus on security and military competition, but on 
political and ideological clashes, which, as a result, will bring 
along the clashes (and cooperation) of economic interests. 
Alleviated cross-Strait relations will be conducive to improved 
security and military relations across the Taiwan Strait and thereby 
advance relations in their entirety. ... 
 
"For Washington, Beijing's importance is far higher than that of 
Taipei.  At least in the near future, the core of Washington's 
cross-Strait policy will be to maintain a dynamic balance so as to 
ensure stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region.  The so-called 
'dynamic' refers to the changes in the internal and external 
conditions of the triangular relationship, the adjustments and 
revisions to the different stages of its policy objectives, and the 
various interactions among the three sides.  The interactions of 
these over the past two decades have, to a certain extent, changed 
the original positions, strategies and adaptability of the three 
sides, but the basic framework remains more or less the same.  Under 
certain conditions, a relatively tense cross-Strait relationship may 
become a 'card' played by Washington to bargain back and forth with 
Beijing.  But Washington does not want this card, which has its 
individual characteristics, to sabotage its plan.  This is why over 
the past eight years, an antagonistic cross-Strait relationship has 
contributed nothing to the DPP administration's efforts to enhance 
[Taiwan's] status in the international community, and instead, it 
has impaired Taiwan's economic developments.  If Washington's 
relations with Beijing remain fundamentally stable, Beijing's 
relations with Tokyo will improve quickly.  At least for now, most 
RELATIONS 
 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region have no direct and 
nonnegotiable conflicts with both sides of the Taiwan Strait in 
terms of security and military interests.  It should be the hope of 
every side to see Beijing and Taipei get along with each other in 
peace. 
 
"Both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be able to gradually develop 
mutual trust and expand mutual interests in the next four years. 
Taipei's 'involvement in the international activities' will be a 
relatively complicated issue.  But given the wisdom and 
open-mindedness of the caliber of talents on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait, a model which is acceptable to both sides should be 
able to be invented.  This is because a significant and thorough 
improvement in cross-Strait relations and the continuation of this 
trend for the next four or even eight years are in the basic 
interests of both sides of the Taiwan Strait and of international 
society." 
 
¶4. Cross-Strait Relations 
 
A) "Why Does Taiwan Need to Follow Beijing's Orders and Deliberately 
Curry Favor with It?" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] 
editorialized (6/2): 
 
"... Judging from the perspective of breaking the deadlock of 
cross-Strait relations, the meeting between [KMT Chairman] Wu 
Poh-hsiung and his Chinese Communist Party counterpart Hu Jintao has 
naturally achieved a certain effect.  But one cannot suddenly jump 
to a conclusion that cross-Strait relations have improved just by 
looking at the surface phenomenon.  On the contrary, an accurate 
assessment cannot be made until the impact of the contents of the 
Wu-Hu meeting are thoroughly reviewed and evaluated.  Frankly 
speaking, the achievements boasted by the KMT will likely create a 
false appearance of peace across the Taiwan Strait, but judging by 
the overall situation, more harm was done than good, and some of the 
issues will only bring Taiwan to tilt more deeply toward China 
economically and will entangle Taiwan with China more intensely in 
cultural, social and geopolitical arenas.  In particular, China has 
extended a goodwill gesture by saying that it is willing to consider 
Taiwan's participation in international organizations, or even, as 
relayed by Wu, China will be unlikely to launch missiles against 
Taiwan and will reduce the missiles targeting Taiwan.  It remains to 
be seen whether China will really make such concessions.  But should 
it really happen, it will certainly be a move away from Beijing's 
United Front tactics.  The KMT's wishful thinking and unilateral 
trust in China's goodwill will push Taiwan into an abyss.  Taiwan 
will meet a cruel death if it does not watch out. ..." 
 
B) "Questions for Ma That Won't Just Disappear" 
 
Liu Shih-chung, a Taipei-based political commentator, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (6/1): 
 
"... But whether Beijing will relax its diplomatic stranglehold on 
Taiwan is uncertain. Getting results in this regard constitutes Ma's 
greatest challenge.  Ma is using his mandate of 58 percent of the 
vote to assimilate the DPP legacy of building Taiwanese identity - 
but simply out of electoral concerns. Yet when the KMT contacts 
Beijing, Ma sets aside notions of a Taiwan-centered identity.  Is Ma 
doing this in the national interest? Is he a man of principle? Can 
he stand up to hardcore pro-unification forces, including the old 
guard led by former KMT chairman Lien Chan? Or is he simply an 
opportunist?  These are questions that cannot be answered for now. 
But the public needs them soon." 
 
C) "Taiwan's WHO Role - a Litmus Test" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (5/31): 
 
"... But nothing was more dramatic than the remarks made by mainland 
Chinese leader Hu Jintao on Wednesday when he told a high-level 
delegation from Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang that Beijing is willing 
to discuss the issue of Taiwan's involvement in international 
activities when regular cross-strait dialogue resumes. ...  It is 
encouraging, therefore, to see Hu's candor in responding to the 
issue that was 'out of the question' during the era of Lee Teng-hui 
and Chen Shui-bian with whom Beijing had refused to deal with. Hu's 
change of attitude promises a new era of detente and blossoming ties 
that would create a win-win situation for both sides.  The upbeat 
assessment is based on what has transpired in the first 
party-to-party talks -- both sides trying to rebuild the shattered 
mutual trust and to seek common grounds despite differences. Both 
sides were trying to avoid sensitive political issues in favor of 
practicality. ...  This commonness is cause for optimism for a 
RELATIONS 
 
win-win outcome from the cross-strait thaw, including Taiwan's 
status, or role -- whatever it may be -- in the WHO or WHA." 
 
WANG