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Viewing cable 08ABUDHABI743, US-UAE JOINT COUNTERPROLIFERATION SEMINARS HIGHLIGHT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ABUDHABI743 2008-06-24 07:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abu Dhabi
VZCZCXRO2575
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0743/01 1760713
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240713Z JUN 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1122
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 7810
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000743 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA MARK ADDED (12 & 15) 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
STATE FOR L, T, ISN/ECC, ISN/CPI, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ECON PREL KCEM KOMC ETTC AE
SUBJECT:  US-UAE JOINT COUNTERPROLIFERATION SEMINARS HIGHLIGHT 
IMPORTANCE OF EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
REF: ABU DHABI 701 
 
ABU DHABI 00000743  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED BUT SENSITIVE; PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  As part of the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
program, the US and the UAE held a two-day counter-proliferation 
workshop for prosecutors and judges in Dubai.  The workshop was held 
under the sponsorship of the UAE Minister of Justice, His Excellency 
Hadif J. Al Dhahiri, and highlighted the UAE's new federal law on 
export and import controls, Federal 13, which was passed in August 
2007.  In addition, a third day of discussions was held at the 
Sharjah Police Academy for UAE law enforcement officials.  In all, 
the three-days of discussions provided an opportunity for the US and 
UAE prosecutors, judges, and police to share experiences, best 
practices, and challenges in how to effectively implement and apply 
export controls.  In addition, UAE representatives discussed ways in 
which the US and the UAE could work together on these matters, 
including concluding negotiations on a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT).  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
2.  During the September 2007 legal and regulatory workshop, the 
legal advisor for the Dubai police discussed the need to conduct 
outreach to its prosecutors and judges on the new export control 
law.  (Law 13 of 2007 re: Commodities Subject to Import and Export 
Control, reftel.)  In February 2008, during the Counterproliferation 
Task Force (CTF), the UAE asked for this training and ISN A/AS 
McNerney said we would deliver.  Through support of the Export 
Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, DOJ/OPDAT 
proposed a series of seminars and workshops to UAE with respect to 
implementing its the new law, which contains significant criminal 
penalty provisions.  The purpose of the workshops was to advance the 
Export Control and Related Border Security's (EXBS) agenda by 
encouraging enforcement and familiarizing UAE prosecutors and judges 
with the challenges associated with enforcing export control laws 
and best practices for dealing with them. 
 
3.  On June 3-5, 2008, EXBS sponsored two export control seminars 
with interagency support and participation from DOS, FBI, ICE, 
DOC/BIS, and OPDAT: a 2-day seminar for prosecutors and judges at 
the Dubai Institute of Advanced Legal and Judicial Studies on June 
3-4, and a 1-day seminar for UAE investigators at the Sharjah Police 
Academy on June 5.  Both seminars focused on actual case studies 
drawn from US experiences and were presented by US law enforcement 
agents and prosecutors. 
 
4.  The seminars provided an opportunity for US and UAE prosecutors, 
judges, and law enforcement officials to share experiences, best 
practices, and challenges in how most effectively to implement and 
apply export controls, and to ensure that WMD, their delivery 
systems, related technologies, and advanced conventional weapons are 
not put into the hands of proliferators or those who wish to divert 
legitimate trade for improper purposes.  UAE officials participated 
actively asking questions and speaking candidly about proliferation 
risks associated with UAE's ports.  They also provided details 
regarding the first case being prosecuted under UAE's law, involving 
a transshipment of zirconium metal (septel).  Over 35 judges and 
prosecutors attended the first two days, and over 40 law enforcement 
officials attended the third day. 
 
5.  UAE officials also expressed willingness to establish legal 
mechanisms for cooperation with the USG in combating proliferation. 
However, the same officials noted that the potential for future 
cooperation through official legal channels on WMD remains 
obstructed on account of the absence of a formalized Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty (MLAT), and the inconclusive negotiations that 
were last held in Washington in February 2005.  Two of the UAE 
delegates to those negotiations attended the seminars. 
 
Opening Sessions Confirm Risks to UAE Ports 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  Charge opened the workshop, stressing the importance of 
effective export controls in halting the proliferation of goods and 
technology that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  He also congratulated the UAE for passing a comprehensive 
export control law and stressed the need for US-UAE cooperation to 
increase prosecutions of export control violations.  Counselor Bakri 
Abdullah Hasan of the Office of Public Prosecution in Dubai provided 
a detailed overview of UAE's new federal law on export and import 
controls.  Counselor Hasan also acknowledged that Dubai ports were 
used as transshipment points as part of the AQ Khan proliferation 
network.  He stated that this type of activity makes the UAE aware 
of the dangers and stressed the need to implement comprehensive 
export control laws and regulations. 
 
ABU DHABI 00000743  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
U.S. Presentations Emphasize Complexity of Export Control Cases and 
Importance of Bilateral Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7.  The U.S. delegation included law enforcement officials and 
prosecutors with experience investigating and prosecuting export 
control violations, including: (1) Thomas Madigan, Acting Director 
Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Industry and Security (DOC BIS); 2) Edward O'Callaghan, Chief of the 
Terrorism and National Security Unit in the U.S. Attorney's Office 
for the Southern District of New York; (3) Ryan Fayhee, Trial 
Attorney, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice; 
(4) James Warwick, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of 
Maryland; (5) John Burgess, Investigator, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement; (6) Jay Manning and James Ferris, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
 
8.  The workshop began with a brief discussion of U.S. law and the 
roles and responsibilities of each U.S. government agency. AUSA 
O'Callaghan overviewed the U.S. task force concept, and how "leads" 
are collected from a variety of federal and local sources as part of 
a cooperative effort to identify and prosecute export control 
violations.  Following this discussion, in-depth case studies were 
presented on four major U.S. export control cases: 
 
 -- Asher Karni case: This case focused on procurement of sensitive 
U.S. commodities for re-export to Pakistan (diverted through South 
Africa).  This case illustrated the importance of private sector and 
bilateral governmental cooperation.  Karni was arrested and pleaded 
guilty, while Khan remains at large. 
 
-- Cirrus Electronics case:  This case involved front companies in 
the U.S. and Singapore that were being used to procure U.S. origin 
controlled electronic parts to India without a license.  This case 
illustrated interagency cooperation between FBI and Commerce 
investigators and highlighted the fundamental need for bilateral 
cooperation agreements between the US and other important 
importing/exporting countries. 
 
-- U.S. v. Yousef Bousvash: This case involved an Iranian national 
who had attempted to obtain 15 shipments of U.S. munitions list 
items without a license, and to transship the items to Iran through 
a front company located in Dubai.  This case illustrated many of the 
sophisticated measures taken by criminals to divert goods to 
countries of concern, including setting up front companies. 
 
-- U.S. v. Haji Subandi, et al:  This case involved years of 
undercover operations before all brokers were arrested and charged 
with violating U.S. export control laws. 
 
9.  The interactive case study sessions were designed to cover all 
critical parts of export control investigations, from case 
initiation through trial, plea, and sentencing.  The case studies 
highlighted the international nature of export control cases, the 
need for advanced enforcement capabilities and undercover 
investigative skills, and the importance of establishing and 
maintaining strong bilateral cooperation relationships with key 
importing/exporting countries.  Each of the focus cases was 
initiated through anonymous or confidential sources and 
intelligence. The studies demonstrated that export control cases are 
very complex, can take years to be investigated and prosecuted, and 
often have mixed outcomes as reflected by the number of individuals 
charged with export control violations who remain at large in other 
countries. 
 
UAE Comments and Questions Regarding Case Studies 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
10.  By all accounts, the EXBS seminars represent the first 
organized effort by the UAEG to educate prosecutors, judges and 
investigators regarding UAE Federal Law 17 of 2007.  Nonetheless, 
UAE officials' comments throughout the event indicated a strong 
understanding of the importance of the law.  Many of the 
participants expressed deep appreciation for workshops and indicated 
that future programs would be welcome.  Some of the comments and 
questions included: (1) Role of undercover agents and concerns 
regarding potential entrapment of defendants when using undercover 
agents; (2) Role of prosecutors and judges in the U.S. judicial 
system; (3) Difficulties in implementing new legislation, especially 
one with many different agencies involved; (4) Time frame it takes 
in order to put these cases together; (5) Importance of 
international cooperation and intelligence sharing; (6) Concerns 
regarding pressure from companies to issue licenses as well as 
corruption within certain companies -- how to ensure companies 
comply with the law; (7) How the U.S. regulates companies; (8) 
Concerns regarding the extradition of foreign nationals; and (9) 
Jurisdiction over U.S. controlled items in other countries. 
11. UAE officials expressed concerns regarding regulating companies 
and the difficulty in doing so in this environment, especially when 
the UAE is trying to promote free enterprise.  Many raised concerns 
 
ABU DHABI 00000743  003.2 OF 003 
 
12.  (SBU) Through the course of the workshop, concerns were raised 
regarding the lack of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). 
Although a 9-member UAE delegation was sent to WashDC in February 
2005, no treaty was negotiated or signed, and there was a general 
sense of frustration expressed by some participants.  Two members of 
the UAE delegation to the 2005 talks were present in the workshop: 
Dr. Mohamed Al Kamali, Director of the UAE Institute of Training and 
Judicial Studies; and Judge Younis Yousif Al Redha, Chief Judge of 
the Sharjah Court of Appeals.  Judge Al Redha and Counselor Bakri 
Abdullah Hasan publicly expressed regret that USG does has not have 
an MLAT and an Extradition Treaty with UAE, which they described as 
necessary before UAE law enforcement and prosecutors can legally 
provide mutual legal assistance under UAE laws.  Participants 
expressed that these mutual legal assistance agreements would be 
critical to future cooperation among law enforcement channels on 
export control cases. 
 
Law Enforcement Officials Stress Cooperation and Intelligence 
Sharing 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
13. The second seminar was held on June 5, 2008 for law enforcement 
officials at the Sharjah Police Academy.  The seminar was well 
received by the approximately 40 police and law enforcement 
officials who attended.  U.S. attorneys explained the importance of 
working closely throughout the investigative process with their law 
enforcement colleagues to ensure a successful outcome. U.S. 
enforcement officials stressed the need for undercover operations, 
intelligence sharing, undercover informants, industry cooperation, 
physical surveillance, computer surveillance, and search warrants. 
Law enforcement officials seemed very interested in the new law and 
open to law enforcement cooperation in this area.  Inquiries were 
made as to what the U.S. shares with other countries as far as 
intelligence and how the U.S. goes about undertaking very long 
investigations, many of which take years to prosecute.  Officials 
also inquired about working with private ports and how to cooperaten 
with the private sector.  U.S. officials stressed the need to send a 
message which, by prosecuting individuals and companies, would deter 
future violations. 
 
14. Major Mohammed Al-Kitbi, MoI Coordinator for Anti-Trafficking in 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, gave a broad overview of the UAE export 
control law, highlighting the need for the UAE to implement the law 
to ensure its own security and to comply with obligations under 
international agreements.  He pointed out that the UAE is currently 
amending parts of the law to make it easier to implement.  One 
important change will be to increase the items on the control list; 
however, it was not clear if such amendments would increase the 
number of controlled commodities to include all the items on the 
four multilateral control regime lists. 
 
 
Positive Collaboration and Next Steps 
------------------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Overall the export control seminars achieved their aim, and 
the UAE expressed appreciation for the candid nature of the discussions 
and expressed interest in follow-up workshops and cooperation, 
including sending UAE officials to the U.S. to learn about DOJ's 
role in prosecuting strategic trade cases.  The lack of formal 
cooperation mechanisms, such as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 
was highlighted as an impediment to more formal cooperation and 
coordination in the law enforcement and judicial arenas. 
Quinn