VZCZCXRO3144
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0666/01 1221449
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011449Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0698
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0338
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000666 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, 
AND AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
PARIS FOR KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU SU CD LY
SUBJECT: CHAD: ERDIMI BLAMES STALLED TALKS ON CHAD, LIBYA 
(C-AL8-00761) 
 
KHARTOUM 00000666  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) RFC leader Timan Erdimi says that the talks in Tripoli 
between his movement and Chadian representatives have stalled 
because of Deby's lack of sincerity to participate in real 
political dialogue and Libya's pro-Deby bias.  Though some 
RFC representatives remain in Libya to signify Erdimi's 
preference for negotiations over war, a military solution may 
be the only option if Deby's government refuses serious 
negotiations.  The National Alliance (AN), though delayed in 
mounting a new offensive due to "logistical problems," 
remains poised to launch another coup attempt and was 
excluded from the Tripoli talks by the Libyan authorities. 
Erdimi claims that the RFC and the AN have overcome the 
ethnic divisions that plagued them during the February coup 
attempt and that while the views of AN leaders on a post-Deby 
political structure differ from his own, powerful military 
elements in the AN share his vision for a transitional 
government.  End summary. 
 
------------------- 
Libya Talks Stalled 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) President Timan 
Erdimi told PolCouns and Poloff on April 30 in Khartoum that 
the negotiations in Tripoli between his movement and the 
Chadian government have stalled, blaming both President 
Deby's regime and the Libya government for the break-down in 
dialogue.  Chadian negotiators have demonstrated neither a 
willingness to engage in substantive talks nor real 
flexibility in discussing power-sharing issues, preferring to 
buy time using false pretenses.  Libyan authorities continue 
to back Deby "and only Deby," said Erdimi, and to exclude 
representatives from the National Alliance (AN) from 
participating.  (Note: In discussions with Poloff, AN leaders 
have also claimed that Libya did not invite them to the 
negotiations.  End note.)  For these reasons, Erdimi returned 
in frustration to Khartoum in mid-April.  He admitted, 
however, that the Chadian rebels are "caught" because of 
Libya's negative role: Constructive dialogue cannot occur in 
the current venue, but if the talks are moved and held under 
more neutral auspices, the "Libyans will cause trouble." 
 
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Prefers Dialogue but War May Be Only Option 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Sudan expressed initial support for the Tripoli talks, 
claimed Erdimi, but has since pushed him to withdraw his 
negotiators because of the lack of progress.  He has resisted 
this pressure, however, to demonstrate his preference for 
political dialogue over war, which he said would be 
"catastrophic."  Reporting that his forces remained centered 
in Borak, Chad, Erdimi said that as long as the RFC is at 
least formally engaged in negotiations it will not attack 
Deby's government.  Nonetheless, a military solution may be 
the Chadian rebels' only option if Deby's government refuses 
serious talks, predicting that the rainy season (which would 
prevent a new rebel offensive) will not begin until July. 
"If the U.S. doesn't want Idriss' regime changed by force, 
the only solution is dialogue," said Erdimi, who urged the 
USG to press Deby's government to negotiate in earnest. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Sudan, AN Free to Pursue Regime Change 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Since Libya did not invite AN representatives to 
Tripoli--and dislikes Front du Salut de la Republique (FSR) 
leader Ahmed Soubian--the Sudanese Government "is free" to 
pursue regime change in N'djamena through the AN.  The allied 
forces of the FSR, Mahamat Nouri's Union des Forces du 
Developpement et de la Democratie (UFDD), and Abdelwahid 
Aboud's UFDD/Fondamentale remain near Ade and have delayed an 
offensive due only to "logistical difficulties."  Downplaying 
any tribal tensions between his Zaghawa movement and the AN, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000666  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Erdimi said that "even now, we prefer that others 
participate" in negotiations.  He blamed the friction between 
RFC and AN fighters during the February offensive in 
N'djamena on "those without a national perspective," implying 
that the Chadian rebels have since overcome these differences. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
New Chadian Government "Changes Nothing" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Erdimi stated that the appointment of a new Chadian 
government "changes nothing," claiming that even those 
ministers drawn from the political opposition are "Deby's 
people."  Internal Chadian tensions resulted from Deby's 
mistreatment of the Arab population and "political-military 
problems", he explained.  "Idriss insulted the Arabs, who 
represent 20 to 25 percent of the population," said Erdimi. 
"You cannot have elections or democracy without them, and 
Deby is the great handicap to ending the ethnic problems." 
If Deby either accepts a credible power-sharing arrangement 
or is forced from office, a disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) program for the rebels could contribute 
to building a multi-ethnic national military.  He claimed 
that the rebel groups are willing to participate in such a 
program. 
 
------------------------ 
RFC, AN Positions Differ 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The positions of the RFC and the AN leaders on a 
post-Deby political strategy differ in the timing for a 
transition to full democracy, however.  Erdimi portrayed the 
AN plan for a "National Forum" that prepares the country for 
elections after six-months as unrealistic.  Instead, he 
believes that the national forum of rebel movements, 
political opposition leaders, and civic activists could 
legitimize an interim administration that assures security 
and governs during a two to three-year "transitional period." 
 The interim administration would focus on building Chad's 
governing institutions, attracting international support, and 
executing a DDR program.  Criticizing Nouri, Soubian, and 
Abdelwahid for not appreciating the amount of organization 
and funding necessary for elections, Erdimi claimed that 
influential field elements within the AN agreed with his 
approach, mentioning UFDD's Adiman Hasballah, who he said 
commands 3,000 of Nouri's fighters. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7. (C) Though Sudan has provided Erdimi with a large and 
well-appointed house in an upscale Khartoum neighborhood 
(that is much nicer than the small apartment he occupied 
before he left for Tripoli), he offered no indication that 
the Sudanese authorities are restricting his movements.  He 
demurred when asked whether the GOS is pressing him to delay 
or initiate a renewed offensive against Ndjamena.  Despite 
his pro-Arab rhetoric, Erdimi disparages Nouri and Soubian's 
abilities.  He believes that, among the main rebel leaders, 
only he is qualified to govern Chad.  In a power-sharing 
arrangement that keeps Deby as President, Erdimi will 
continue to demand the post of Prime Minister; if Deby falls 
from power, Erdimi will aspire to replace him.  His argument, 
however, that inter-ethnic tension among the rebels have 
decreased and that a DDR program is easily made operational 
are unconvincing when confronted with the likely chaos that 
would plague Chad in the event of Deby's sudden collapse. 
The one exception is if France, through back channel 
discussions with the rebels, takes responsibility for 
stabilizing the country after Deby's departure, though Erdimi 
denies he has had any contact with French officials. 
Whichever option is pursued, the looming rainy season means 
that it could be a long hot summer in Chad before the rains 
stop the "fighting season."  End comment. 
 
¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ