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DE RUEHIL #2001/01 1520528
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O 310528Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7173
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8652
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8006
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3321
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9803
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5543
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4284
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER EAID
SUBJECT: CODEL SCHIFF MEETS WITH MUSHARRAF 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Codel Schiff -- U.S. Representatives Adam 
Schiff (D-CA), Allyson Schwartz (D-PA), and Wayne Gilchrest 
(R-MD) -- met May 27 with President Pervez Musharraf.  The 
President recounted his three-stage plan to transition 
Pakistan to a full-fledged democracy.  He outlined that 
Pakistan now needed to grow its economy, fight terrorism and 
solidify its democratic institutions, but the current 
coalition government was distracted by "unimportant issues." 
Political turmoil was becoming economic turmoil.  Instead, 
Musharraf argued, Pakistan required bold leaders to tackle 
the economic downturn and to fight terrorism; he had left 
both issues, just months ago, on good footing.  Asked if 
Pakistan's defense budget would ever receive true scrutiny by 
the parliament, Musharraf offered up the military's civilian 
leaders, but reminded the Codel not to expect Pakistan to 
follow the U.S.'s oversight example.  End summary. 
 
The Road: Behind and Beyond 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Asked by Codel Schiff to comment on Pakistan's 
transition to democracy over the next several months, 
Musharraf recounted his view of events since coming to power, 
describing the "civilian dictatorship" of the 1990s and his 
three-stage plan to bring true democracy to Pakistan.  After 
putting the country back on secure economic footing and 
returning day-to-day governing to civilians, Musharraf said 
the country had entered the final stage in which he was 
"legally re-elected," resigned from the position of Chief of 
Army Staff (COAS), and completely turned the government over 
to popularly-elected political parties. 
 
¶3. (C) Pakistan now needed (1) to sustain economic growth 
above six percent; (2) to fight terrorism, "in Pakistan's 
interests;" and (3) to secure democratic institutions. 
"But," Musharraf continued, "there has instead been political 
turbulence."  He described the coalition between Pakistan 
People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) 
as "unhealthy" and "unnatural," noting their historical 
rivalry.  He hoped the new GOP could last for its full 
five-year term, Musharraf claimed, but feared the PML-N's 
"insistence" on other issues, i.e., the restoration of all 
the pre-November 3 judiciary and diminution of presidential 
powers if not impeachment, was keeping the government "in 
limbo." 
 
¶4. (C) Musharraf argued that such political turmoil had an 
obvious and immediate effect on the country's economy, which 
had entered a downturn.  Both the Pakistani Rupee and the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) had lost considerable value in 
just the last 40 days.  He noted Pakistan's economy in 2006 
and 2007 "was perfectly fine."  Political mismanagement was 
the cause of the economic distress.  The PPP-led GOP was not 
addressing the "real issues" of the people, instead "focused 
on totally unimportant issues," Musharraf concluded. 
 
Leaders Must Be Bold 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Pakistan required bold leadership, and the new GOP was 
more concerned about taking popular positions, Musharraf 
said.  Consequently, it was not fighting terrorism, instead 
"they want the Army to do everything."  He also noted that 
alleged terrorist Sufi Mohammad had been released by the new 
GOP, and, though he made inciting comments immediately upon 
release, was not re-charged.  "Maybe the politicians are 
scared for their own lives," he stated, repeating again that 
the PPP needed to be bold; its moderate, secularist 
credentials were unimpeachable. 
 
¶6. (C) Musharraf argued that the GOP should negotiate from a 
position of strength, keeping up military pressure in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  He claimed that 
al Qaeda was "under pressure," and when their hideouts were 
identified, the Army would not hesitate to strike.  He also 
warned of spreading talibanization from across the Afghani 
border and now into Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province 
(NWFP).  He claimed that a peace accord in South Waziristan 
was not possible because the militants insisted on (1) a 
broad prisoner release, and (2) continued cross-border 
"trade." 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002001  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Musharraf said that his administration and the USG had 
jointly produced a plan for FATA development, but complained 
that "not a penny has come."  Inadequate social development 
support was part of the reason for spreading radicalization. 
 
Oversight 
--------- 
 
¶8. (C) Having heard at a previous meeting that Pakistan's 
defense spending was a one line-item in the budget, Codel 
Schiff asked Musharraf if he could imagine a scenario where 
parliamentary committees would scrutinize this amount and 
require testimony from defense officials, civilian and 
military.  Musharraf answered that the Army budget was 
already open to scrutiny and that the Defense Minister and 
Secretary were regularly questioned by parliament.  There 
were also internal audit controls. 
 
¶9. (C) However, to spell-out the defense budget in sub-totals 
would "create too much delay" in the legislature, adding, 
"there needs to be some independence of the Army." 
Additionally, many elements of the defense budget needed to 
be kept secret because of "the constant threat from India," 
though Musharraf quickly added that that threat had subsided 
during his tenure.  Musharraf concluded: "Don't try to equate 
your system to ours." 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was not cleared by Codel Schiff. 
 
PATTERSON