VZCZCXRO3887
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0028/01 1481339
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271339Z MAY 08
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0275
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY 0268
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0239
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0207
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0003

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/27/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP IR JA
SUBJECT: READOUT OF JAPANESE DFM SASAE'S TRIP TO IRAN 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000028  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1.(S) Summary:  The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iran 
desk officer Junichi Sumi met IRPOffs May 26 to give an informal 
readout of Deputy Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs Sasae's 
trip to Iran May 23-26.  According to Sumi who accompanied 
Sasae, they met with a number of senior Iranian officials.  The 
most noteworthy comment of the readout was that Judiciary 
Advisor Mohammad Javad Larijani told Sasae that he wrote Iran's 
new proposal for comprehensive talks.  According to Sumi, 
despite no progress on the issue of suspension of enrichment and 
reprocessing in the Iranian proposal, the Japanese view Iran's 
proposal for talks as possibly worth exploring, although with a 
skeptical eye.  End summary 
 
2.(S) Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iran desk office 
Junichi Sumi, accompanied by Consul to Dubai Kenji Saito, met 
with IRPOffs May 26 to give an informal readout of Deputy 
Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs Sasae's trip to Iran May 
23-26.  Sumi noted that Sasae would be meeting with U/S Burns in 
Washington May 28.  According to Sumi, this meeting in Iran was 
the 17th Japan-Iran Vice-Ministerial Regular Consultation, an 
initiative that began in 1991.  Sumi added that a few more 
director general level meetings have been proposed for this 
year, to cover human rights and nonproliferation and 
disarmament. 
 
Interlocutors 
 
--------------- 
 
3.(S) Sumi said that Sasae and his delegation had dinner with 
Mohammad Javad Larijani, head of the Iranian Judiciary's human 
rights committee and brother of new Majles speaker Ali Larijani. 
 The party also met Senior Advisor to the President Mojtaba 
Samareh Hashemi; Secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Council Dr. Sa'id Jalili; Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki; 
and Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Special Assistant to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Acting Deputy Foreign Minister 
for Asian and Pacific Affairs Seyed Mohammad Ali Hosseini. 
(Comment: Sumi's only comment about Hosseini was that he was 
"unimpressive."  End comment) 
 
4.(S) Sumi commented that the Iranian officials seemed to have 
big expectations from the Japanese, particularly in terms of 
support for Iran's position on the nuclear issue, but the 
Japanese official said they had not delivered anything new to 
Iran.  Sumi, who speaks Farsi, was previously posted to Tehran 
and has been working on Iran issues since 2001. 
 
Javad Larijani 
 
----------------- 
 
5.(S) Sumi said unlike the other Iranian officials who stuck to 
familiar themes, Judiciary advisor Mohammad Javad Larijani gave 
clear explanations of Iranian views.  Sumi added that given how 
freely Larijani spoke with them, he assumed that Larijani must 
have close ties to the Supreme Leader.  (Note:  Sumi said that 
Javad Larijani also correctly predicted that his brother Ali 
would become Majles speaker a few days in advance.  Endnote) 
 
6.(S) Sumi said that when Larijani traveled to Japan in February 
- reportedly on his own initiative - he discussed the nuclear 
issue and promised the Japanese a non-paper on Iran's views. 
However, after the next IAEA report came out that was less 
positive on Iran, the Japanese government never received the 
non-paper.  Instead, Iran issued a proposal for talks, called 
the Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations.  Sumi 
thought it was possible that the promised non-paper had turned 
into the proposal document. 
 
7.(S) Sumi said that Mohammad Javad Larijani told the Japanese 
that he was the author of Iran's proposal, which Larijani 
reportedly called a "grand bargain."  (Note: Sumi said the only 
other Iranian official who used the term "grand bargain" was 
Iranian Ambassador to Japan Seyed Abbas Araghchi, who then asked 
that he not be quoted to Tehran.  Endnote)  Larijani reportedly 
told Sasae in plain terms that Iran now feels confident with 
high oil prices and is ready to play a role in the region and to 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000028  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
cooperate on Afghanistan and Iraq.  (Note: Sumi said that 
Ambassador Araghchi had also said that Iran's proposal 
demonstrated Iran's confidence.  Endnote)  Larijani maintained 
that Iran had played a positive role in resolving the Lebanese 
conflict, contributing to the Doha conference. 
 
8.(S) Larijani, who clearly regarded the proposal as a serious 
offer, claimed it was the first time that Iran announced 
willingness talk about all issues of concerns to all countries, 
including the Middle East peace process and Hizballah.  He 
indicated that although the wording was somewhat vague, more 
sensitive issues could be raised in the talks.  For instance, 
when asked by the Japanese about Israel, Larijani reportedly did 
not outright reject the possibility of discussing Israel in 
talks.  He did not respond, however, when Sasae asked if 
suspension could be part of discussions. 
 
Samareh-Hashemi 
 
---------------------- 
 
9.(S) Senior Presidential advisor Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi 
surprised the Japanese by extending his meeting with them to 
close to three hours.  Sumi noted that Hashemi was "alone;" he 
did not have any of "his" people with him, only a few Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs employees.  Sumi was also surprised by 
Hashemi's character.  He was expecting a hardliner along the 
lines as President Ahmadinejad, but instead said that Hashemi 
came across as "normal," and when he spoke to the group in 
English, he came off as "human" and approachable, someone with 
whom you could do business. 
 
Jalili 
 
----- 
 
10.(S) Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Sa'id 
Jalili reportedly spent most of the meeting discussing Iran's 
new proposal but, according to Sumi, said little that was new. 
Sumi noted, without going into detail, that Jalili had 
"interesting" views about other issues, such as North Korea. 
Jalili also asked about Japan's relationships with China and 
Russia.  Sumi noted that Jalili had a limp which he surmised may 
have been an injury from the Iran-Iraq war.  Sumi described 
Jalili's secretary as a real "Basij" who would not shake their 
hands. 
 
11.(S) Sumi said that when Araghchi left his position as deputy 
foreign minister to become ambassador to Japan, they assumed the 
position was a demotion, but instead he was surprised to find 
that Jalili and Araghchi have a good relationship and appear to 
talk regularly.  When the MFA had asked Araghchi, in advance of 
the trip, for a copy of the Iranian proposal, Araghchi 
delivered, via a phone call to Jalili. 
 
Mottaki 
 
--------- 
 
12.(S) The meeting with FM Mottaki also lasted much longer that 
expected, even though Mottaki was on his way to Syria. 
According to Sumi, he got the impression from FM Mottaki that he 
was irritated with the Japanese.  Sumi claimed that Mottaki is a 
strong advocate within the Iranian government for relations with 
Japan and surmised that perhaps Mottaki felt his faith in the 
Japanese had not borne fruit.  Iran reportedly took it as a "bad 
signal" when Japan implemented UNSR 1803.  Mottaki told the 
Japanese that they can do more both politically and economically 
in the Middle East.  Sasae explained what Japan was doing in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.  When asked why the Japanese 
FM had not made a visit to Iran, Sasae responded that he would 
go when the environment was right. 
 
Japan's take on Iran's proposal 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
13.(S) According to Sumi, Sasae indicated that Iran's proposal 
may be nothing more than an attempt to talk for the sake of 
talking, but on the other hand, it would be a shame to ignore 
it.  The international community could explore talking to Iran, 
while remaining skeptical of Iran's intent.  Sumi did not know 
whether if was true that Javad Larijani was the author of the 
proposal, but his own assessment of the writing of it indicated 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000028  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
that it was written by one person and by someone powerful enough 
not to be edited by others.  He felt it was very different from 
Iran's August 2006 response to the P5+1 package which he found 
very confusing.  Sumi added that Ambassador Araghchi told them 
separately that perhaps some of the elements of the new P5+1 
package could be accommodated in the proposed talks.  Sumi also 
said that Araghchi reportedly says bluntly to the Japanese that 
the Iranians have to talk to the US. 
BURNS