VZCZCXRO2985
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0027/01 1341341
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 131341Z MAY 08
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0272
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0204
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0236
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0265

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000027 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD 
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/13/2028 
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PHUM
SUBJECT: US-BASED IRANIAN POLITICAL ACTIVIST DISCUSSES IRGC, SUPREME 
LEADER'S HEALTH, CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
REF: A) 2007 RPO DUBAI 0032; B) RPO DUBAI 0010 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000027  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard,  Acting Director, Iran Regional 
Presence Office, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(S//NF) Summary: US-based Iranian political activist Mohsen 
Sazegara held a wide-ranging discussion with IRPOff during a 
recent visit to Dubai.  He gave his assessment of Iran's goals 
in Iraq, identified what he called the "Gang of 7" most 
influential current and former IRGC officers, and discussed the 
political consequences of the Supreme Leader's reportedly 
continued ill health.  IRPO is unable to assess his access, but 
some of his information tracks with other reporting.  Sazegara 
also proposed a plan whereby the international community should 
block Iran's financial access to its oil revenues to force Iran 
to negotiate; asserting that the primary goal of the ensuing 
talks should be to aid Iranian civil society.  Sazegara is 
unabashedly a proponent of fostering a "velvet revolution" in 
Iran, and claimed to be working with others in the US and 
European diaspora toward that end.  End summary. 
 
Iraq 
 
----- 
 
2.(S//NF) In a recent conversation with IRPOff, Iranian 
political activist Mohsen Sazegara shared his thoughts on Iran's 
involvement in Iraq, Iranian leadership and the need for a 
"velvet revolution" in Iran.  Asked his assessment of Qods Force 
goals in Iraq and who controls Iran's policy on Iraq, Sazegara 
said that the Supreme Leader and Qods Force commander Qassem 
Soleimani are in control of Iraq policy and that their primary 
aim in Iraq is to disturb and hamper US efforts there.  When 
pressed about Tehran's ultimate goals--i.e. are their actions in 
Iraq an attempt to prevent a US attack on Iran, or are there 
other reasons?--Sazegara conceded that Tehran wants to "keep the 
US busy" but suggested that US withdrawal from Iraq is also an 
Iranian goal.  (Comment: Sazegara seemed to imply that Iran is 
more focused on the tactic of hampering US efforts in Iraq than 
on their overall Iraq strategy.  End comment.)  Asked about 
Iranian support of Shia groups who are fighting Iraqi forces, 
Sazegara acknowledged the support, and added that he even 
considered Iranian government support for anti-government Sunni 
groups in Iraq to be plausible.  The Iranian leaders are 
confident that they retain sufficient support among some 
elements of the Iraqi government, he asserted, without naming 
any specific groups or individuals. 
 
IRGC 
 
----- 
 
3.(S//NF) Among current and former IRGC officers, Sazegara 
identified what he called the "Gang of 7" most influential 
individuals.  They are head of IRGC Intelligence Morteza Rezai; 
head of IRGC Strategic Studies Bureau Mohammad Hejazi; IRGC 
Commander Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari, IRGC Qods Force Commander 
Qassem Soleimani, former IRGC Commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, 
Supreme Leader's advisor and IRGC veteran Mohammad Baqer 
Zolqadr, and head of state broadcasting Ezzatollah Zarqami, who 
was formerly an IRGC officer and a deputy culture minister, and 
according to open source information, a hostage taker. 
 
4.(S//NF) Sazegara identified the Strategic Studies Bureau of 
the IRGC as an internal think-tank that holds significant 
influence and is sometimes consulted by the Supreme Leader. 
Khamenei exerts control through the IRGC, the MOIS, and a 
"parallel security force" nominally called the Security Division 
of the Judiciary Power, he said.  When pressed on the "parallel 
security force" Sazegara said it was comprised of many of the 
individuals who were responsible for the murders of dissidents 
in the late 1990s, but did not elaborate further. 
 
Supreme Leader's ill health 
 
---------------------------- 
 
5.(S//NF) Sazegara claimed that Supreme Leader Khamenei is 
clinically depressed and sometimes leaves Tehran for mountain 
retreats for a week or more, leaving his son Mojtaba in control. 
 (Note: It has been widely reported in the international press 
that the Supreme Leader suffers from prostate cancer, however 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000027  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the claim that he suffers from clinical depression appears new. 
End note.)  On some occasions, Sazegara claimed, Khamenei goes 
to a Qods Force base in the city of Amol in northern Iran 
because the base is very secure and the scenery is lovely and 
relaxing. 
 
Rafsanjani trying to sideline Khamenei's son or Supreme Leader 
himself? 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------ 
 
6.(S//NF)  Sazegara said that Expediency Council chair 
Rafsanjani and the influential Assembly of Experts member 
Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani are both concerned that the Supreme 
Leader's son Mojtaba has grown too powerful. (Note: See ref A 
for more detailed reporting on Mojtaba Khamenei. End note.) 
According to Sazegara, Rafsanjani and Mahdavi-Kani are not the 
rivals that the press portrays them as, and Mahdavi-Kani is not 
seeking the chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts.  On the 
contrary, he said, the two men have collaborated on ways to 
limit the influence of Mojtaba Khamenei and have been advocating 
the creation of a "Vice Leader" position, although apparently 
without success.  Sazegara characterized Supreme Leader Khamenei 
as weak and fearful of losing power, citing this as the reason 
Khamenei has not designated a successor.  (Comment: If this 
report is accurate, it is another instance of Rafsanjani working 
to limit the power of the Supreme Leader while Khamenei is still 
in office rather than after [ref B].  While it could indicate 
that Rafsanjani is moving more openly against Khamenei, it is 
also possible that he is laying the groundwork for the 
leadership succession, which Khamenei himself has neglected to 
do thus far. End comment.) 
 
Military strikes? 
 
------------------- 
 
7.(S//NF) Sazegara expressed hope that there would be no 
military action against Iran, but said that if there were, then 
the best targets would be, for example, unmanned Iranian oil 
platforms in the Gulf.  This would be an effective show of 
strength and warning to the Iranian government, he claimed. 
Asked what the Iran government's response would be to such a 
hypothetical attack, and who would make the decisions, Sazegara 
said the final decision would rest with the Supreme Leader but 
he would be influenced by others.  According to Sazegara, 
Rafsanjani, Mahdavi-Kani, Judiciary chief Shahrudi and the 
Supreme Leader's advisor Ayatollah Nateq-Nuri would advise 
caution and counsel the Supreme Leader not to engage in war with 
the US.  Some in the IRGC--but not all--would also counsel 
stepping back, Sazegara said.  Asked what the "Gang of 7" would 
likely advise, Sazegara punted the question, saying that in 
addition to their advice, Khamenei would seek the assessment of 
the IRGC Strategic Studies Bureau.  Ultimately, Sazegara said he 
thought the chances were even that Khamenei would decide to 
either counter-attack or negotiate. 
 
Human rights and civil society 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
8.(S//NF) Asked about the effectiveness of USG statements in 
support of detained or imprisoned Iranian activists, Sazegara 
said that they are helpful because they bring international 
attention to specific cases.  Sazegara recounted his own 
experience as a political prisoner in the infamous Evin prison, 
saying that the catalyst that led to his release was the death 
in detention of Iranian-Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi, 
because the case brought greater international attention to 
Iran's human rights abuses. 
 
9.(S//NF) Sazegara characterized the relationship between the 
Supreme Leader and the Iranian people as defined by two 
absolutes: Khamenei's absolute control, and the people's 
absolute weakness.  Sazegara said that civil society groups have 
become fractured and marginalized and said that he and others 
are working to unify the groups and bring them back into 
relevance. 
 
Block Iran's oil revenue, then negotiate 
 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000027  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
10.(S//NF) Citing Iranian economist Mohammad Tabibian, Sazegara 
asserted that Iran's oil revenue is its key financial weakness 
and that though the banking sanctions are having an effect, for 
the sanctions to be truly effective, they must directly target 
Iran's oil revenue.  Sazegara suggested that once Iran's 
financial access to its oil revenue has been blocked, the 
international community should offer Iran a negotiations process 
similar to the Helsinki process, through which Iran would be 
allowed access to a specified percentage of oil revenue if it 
takes certain actions.  However, Sazegara cautioned against 
establishing parameters for how the Iranian government spends 
that revenue. Do not repeat the "Oil-for-Food" program that was 
implemented with Iraq, he warned. 
 
11.(S//NF) Sazegara asserted that the first item on the proposed 
negotiations agenda should be Iranian civil society rather than 
the issues of Iran's nuclear program or support for terrorism. 
In order of importance, Sazegara said that the conditions for 
releasing Iran's oil revenue should be that Iran: 1) issues a 
general pardon for all detained and imprisoned civil society and 
rights activists, political dissidents, and journalists; 2) 
allows for a free press (i.e. discontinues censorship of 
publications and arrests/intimidation of journalists and 
editors); 3) holds a free election without candidate 
qualification by the government.  He stressed, however, that the 
general pardon was the most important item.  Asked what would 
prevent the Iranian government from simply re-arresting or 
otherwise threatening the activists who would be released under 
the proposed general pardon, Sazegara had no recommendation and 
instead emphasized the importance of the general pardon for 
mobilizing civil society. 
 
¶12. (S//NF) Comment: Mohsen Sazegara is unabashedly a proponent 
of fostering a "velvet revolution" in Iran and claimed be 
working with other activists among the US and European diaspora 
to mobilize Iranian civil society toward that end.  IRPO is 
unable to assess his access, but some of his information tracks 
with other reporting.  Sazegara served as an IRGC officer in the 
years after the 1979 revolution and held several government 
posts in Iran until 1989.  He later embraced the reform movement 
and published several reformist newspapers.  He was arrested and 
imprisoned in 2003 and upon his release he left Iran for the UK, 
and then the US.  Sazegara is currently a scholar at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and also recently 
started a new think-tank called the Research Institute for 
Contemporary Iran.  In addition, he has set up two 
Farsi-language websites, www.rahbordonline.com and 
www.pishraftonline.com; the first is targeted toward students, 
and the second contains translated articles related to 
economics. 
ASGARD