VZCZCXRO3159
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0305/01 1221507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011507Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4921
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5554
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0391

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY IS TU
SUBJECT: FM MUALLEM ADVISOR VIEWS TURKISH CHANNEL AS "BABY 
STEP" AWAY FROM IRAN 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 798 
 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 271 
     ¶C. DAMASCUS 263 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1 
.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  Samir al-Taqi, Orient Center Director and 
informal advisor to FM Muallem, told us April 30 that his 
mid-April trip to Ankara had helped to pave the way for a 
positive April 26 exchange between Turkish PM Erdogan and 
President Asad in Damascus on continuing indirect discussions 
between Syria and Israel on the Golan.  Al-Taqi said the 
President's public announcement of Syrian participation in 
the talks provided a strong indication of Syria's desire to 
see the process advance.  According to Al-Taqi, 
Syrian-Iranian relations remain strong, but Bashar's embrace 
of the Turkish channel represents a recognition of diverging 
Syrian and Iranian interests and signals a victory for regime 
moderates like FM Muallem.  While this assessment represents 
a very generous reading of recent events, Turkey's influence 
over Syria promises to raise the profile of more pragmatic 
regime figures.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (C)  Al-Taqi, who had just issued a public denial to 
Israeli press reports outing him as the Syrian representative 
in the three-way talks, said Bashar's public acknowledgment 
of Syria's participation in the discussions at the Baath 
Party Central Committee meeting the previous week had come in 
response to a request by Erdogan.  Bashar's public remarks, 
assessed al-Taqi, represented more than a commitment to 
pursuing a diplomatic track with Israel; the Syrian 
President's stance reflected his desire to take a "baby step" 
away from Iran. 
 
¶3.  (C)  In al-Taqi's view, Bashar believed Syrian-Iranian 
ties were strategically important and would continue to 
remain so.  At the same time, the Turks had convinced Bashar 
that Syria's isolation could not be overcome without pursuing 
peace with Israel.  Bashar, argued al-Taqi, recognized Iran's 
desire to prevent any peace track -- Golan and Palestinian -- 
from moving forward.  But Bashar had come around to the view 
that Syria's interest in regaining the Golan could now be 
realized with the help of Turkey, and perhaps eventually, the 
United States.  Syria had no illusions that the process would 
progress rapidly. The SARG was also mindful that other 
events, such as an attack by Hizballah or sustained violence 
in Gaza, could kill the talks at this early stage.  According 
to al-Taqi, the SARG was nonetheless determined to 
participate in the Turkish-brokered process as long as it 
remained tenable. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Al-Taqi said he had few details to divulge on 
Erdogan's April 26 one-on-one session with Bashar, except to 
say that Erdogan urged Syria to cooperate with the 
international community in responding to U.S. revelations of 
Syrian-N. Korean nuclear cooperation.  Bashar adamantly 
denied any nuclear cooperation with N. Korea but listened 
closely to Erdogan's counsel of exercising restraint over 
Hizballah and Hamas.  As evidence, al-Taqi pointed to FM 
Muallem's April 28 meeting with Hamas leader Khaled Meshal. 
The meeting's objective, he continued, was to "contain 
Meshal" after Israeli military operations in Gaza the 
previous day.  Muallem reinforced Syria's continuing support 
of Hamas, al-Taqi added, but the "message of restraint was 
clear."  Muallem was not the usual SARG interlocutor for 
meeting Meshal, and Muallem used the opportunity to urge 
Hamas support for ongoing negotiations of a "tahdiya" 
(calming), he said. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Returning to the nuclear issue, al-Taqi opined that 
the U.S. revelations had actually had a positive influence on 
pushing Bashar to embrace the Golan track.  Al-Taqi was "65 
percent pessimistic" against the likelihood  that Lebanon 
would see a president elected on May 13, but he did believe 
the SARG was trying not to appear as the major obstacle. 
Turning to the U.S. view of the Turkish channel and 
negotiations on the Golan, al-Taqi commented that Syria 
probably could get by without any near-term declaration of 
U.S. support for the process, so long as the U.S. were 
willing to let the talks lead where they may. Al-Taqi added 
that Syria believed its pursuit of the Turkish channel would 
eventually help to improve relations with the West.  Israeli 
PM Olmert was likely to raise the subject with President Bush 
 
DAMASCUS 00000305  002 OF 002 
 
 
in mid-May, he added. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment:  Al-Taqi's involvement in Syria's 
engagement of Turkey lends some credence to suggestions that 
FM Muallem's standing within the SARG has rebounded after 
orchestrating what many Damascenes saw as the SARG's solid 
performance at the Arab League Summit.  While the hard-liners 
who discredited Muallem's efforts to win Syrian support for 
the Annapolis process still hold significant influence, 
Bashar has now publicly acknowledged the government's 
engagement in indirect discussions with Israel.  Turkey's 
sway over Syria has not yet carried over to Lebanon, but our 
Turkish Embassy contacts are suggesting that putting distance 
between Syria and Iran may yet have positive influence in 
this area as well.  Although this assessment undoubtedly 
represents a very generous reading of recent developments, 
Turkey's involvement promises to raise the profile of more 
pragmatic Syrian regime figures. 
CORBIN