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DE RUEHVEN #0110/01 1141702
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P 231702Z APR 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5676
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E//
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP//

UNCLAS USOSCE 000110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
JCS FOR J5 NORWOOD, COL SMITH 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: APRIL 22 PLENARY - VIGOROUS DEBATE ON 
ACCESSION AND NON-COMPLIANCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 40664 
     ¶B. STATE 40727 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified; please protect accordingly.  Not 
for Internet. 
1.(SBU) Summary:  At the April 22 Joint Consultative Group 
(JCG), Russia spoke at length about returning to a discussion 
about the terms for states wishing to accede to the a/CFE 
Treaty.  After Poland delivered a joint statement on behalf 
of CFE States Parties in NATO, the U.S., UK, and Germany (in 
a long but strong response) responded by rejecting Russia's 
contentions and urging Russia to take up the parallel actions 
package as the basis for resuming CFE before we discuss 
elements for a/CFE.  Russia says it is a chicken and egg 
situation - NATO wants the chicken (package), Russia wants 
the elements (eggs) - which comes first?  In addition, the 
U.S., Turkey, Norway, Romania, and Germany expressed concern 
about Russia,s non-compliance with the quarterly reporting 
requirements for Kushchevskaya under the flank document.  The 
next plenary will be on April 29, with a Hungarian 
presentation on "stationing and temporary deployments under 
a/CFE" and a Russia raising "specific elements to restore 
viability" to CFE. See para 7. The May 6 JCG is likely to be 
cancelled. End summary. 
 
Chicken or Egg? 
-------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) began his lengthy presentation by 
recalling that it had raised the subject of accession for new 
Treaty members previously on November 20, 2007, and not much 
has been said about it in the last five months.  Russia 
believes it is still an important issue, and it understands 
that work has been going on with the four prospective members 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). Reports on the 
subject would be welcome.  Following are key remarks of the 
Russian presentation: 
 
--Russia has seen problems since some of these countries 
joined NATO, including a noticeable increase in the military 
potential of its neighbors near its northwest border. 
Addressing this threat is an essential prerequisite toward 
restoring the viability of the Treaty.  Territory in these 
countries is not subject to limits and this has an impact on 
trust for the European continent; 
 
--In 1998, Russia made a commitment to show restraint - 
conditioned on the existing military situation -  in the 
Leningrad  Military District and Kaliningrad and Pskov 
Oblasts.  Russia must stress yet again, that the situation is 
radically different now.  The NATO military bloc has 
increased its membership and its armaments.  Russia is 
considering its own commitment again in light of this 
military escalation within NATO.  The military balance of 8-9 
years ago should be restored.  "Russia,s preference would be 
for this balance to be restored by NATO reductions instead of 
Russian increases;" 
 
--The territory of the Baltic states should be in the flanks. 
 How we determine the levels for these new states is 
important.  Russia has heard no rationale or response to its 
questions from last fall, and wonders why Allies are 
reluctant to respond.  Russia knows that NATO will discuss 
terms for accession and an effort is underway to map out the 
Baltics, future participation; 
 
--Russia reminds us of the December 8, 1998 NATO communique 
that includes a commitment concerning the use of restraint 
and flexibility with respect to the pending Adapted CFE 
Treaty.  But what is NATO doing to abide by that statement? 
According to the protocols for adaptation, each and every 
state of former Eastern Europe established levels for 
national and territorial ceilings (NC/TC).  This should hold 
for the Baltics as well (NC=TC).  There is no reason for it 
to be otherwise.  "I would be interested in hearing if anyone 
has a different perspective." 
 
--In reaching agreement on NC and TC for the Balts, we need 
 
to consider the reinvigoration of the NATO Alliance.  The 
March 28 NAC statement reaffirmed Allies willingness to 
ratify the a/CFE and to consider other measures.  However, 
there has been no follow-up so far.  Silent refusal by NATO 
to discuss these terms refutes, rather than affirms the NAC 
statement. (Statement will be in the Journal) 
 
3.(SBU) Poland, on behalf of each CFE NATO state, read the 
text prepared by the JCG-T on the previous day, recalling the 
paragraph on accession from the March 28 NAC statement. Begin 
Text: 
 
"Poland, on behalf of (list of NATO CFE states), wishes to 
recall for all delegations that the North Atlantic Council 
statement issued on 28 March 2008, states that "upon 
agreement by NATO and Russia on the parallel actions 
package... NATO members that are not Parties to the CFE 
Treaty will publicly reiterate their readiness to request 
accession to the Adapted Treaty as soon as it enters into 
force.  Following consultations with Allies, they will be 
open to discussions with all States Parties to the Treaty, 
including with Russia, on the conditions for their 
accession."  End Text: (see Journal) 
 
--Comment: At the JCG-T the day before, all Allies agreed on 
the need for a common response to the expected Russian 
intervention.  However, several Allies had instructions to 
quote directly from the March 28 NAC statement regarding the 
paragraph on accession, rather than the longer U.S. draft 
statement.  End Comment. 
 
¶4.    SBU) Germany (Richter) followed with its own lengthy 
remarks, recognizing the concerns Russia has with the "grey 
zone" on its border that is not controlled by arms control. 
However, the Baltics and Slovenia have the prerogative to 
ensure their own security and whether they want to be in the 
flanks or not under the a/CFE.  This is a matter for future 
negotiations, but at the end of day it does not matter 
whether ceilings are the same (meaning NCs and TCs are 
equal), but whether we can ensure national security for all. 
 
--According to the NATO principles from 1997-8 concerning 
restraint, Germany is prepared to talk about numbers, but 
NATO does not intend to increase its forces/numbers near the 
Russia,s borders, and have not so far.  Does Russia share 
this view or has something happened since 1998? 
 
--Within the JCG, Germany also supports the March 28 NAC 
statement, including the paragraph referenced by Poland on 
accession.  Four states have repeatedly notified their 
willingness to accede to the a/CFE.  This would expand the 
arms control network in Europe, and would yield a positive 
result for European security as a whole; 
 
--After agreement is reached to work on the basis of the 
parallel actions package, then we can discuss conditions for 
EIF, including work with states not currently represented in 
the JCG.  We should not discuss this without them; 
 
--Russia should not view this issue in isolation, but as part 
of NATO,s package.  Has Russia reviewed NATO,s offer yet? 
How does Russia plan to respond? 
 
¶5.    (SBU) Per Ref A, the U.S. (Neighbour) delivered our 
statement on the March 28 NAC statement paragraph on 
accession, and other provisos for discussion with the four 
prospective members. (see Journal). 
 
¶6.    (SBU) The UK (Gare) supported Germany and the U.S., and 
refuted Russia,s idea that we begin discussions on NC and 
TCs without the four states since they are entitled to be 
present for such discussions.  With respect to Russia,s 
claim of massive military force increases, she reminded that 
the UK provided two presentations on the subject, that proved 
that military forces had decreased by 50 percent.  This was 
certainly not the result of Russian reductions and NATO 
increases. 
 
--She expressed concern that Russia may be reconsidering its 
commitment to show restraint in Kaliningrad, Leningrad and 
Pskov, and asked for confirmation that this is not being done 
while negotiations on the parallel action package are 
underway.  She also urged Russia to resume Treaty 
implementation.  While Russia pleas for NATO to restore 
viability to the Treaty, Russia could also restore viability 
by restarting its participation. 
 
NATO enlargement threatens Russia... 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.    (SBU) In response to Allies replies: Russia agreed that 
it is not normal to discuss procedural issues for Baltics 
without their presence.  In fact, on November 20, 2007, 
Russia was ready to invite them to JCG meetings.  We need a 
procedural solution to do so.  So far, Russia has only 
received vague, general answers to its November 20 questions: 
 Would the Balts be in the flanks?  What would their NC/TC,s 
be? Would there be sizable ceilings for them? 
 
--NATO is engaging in sizable increases in Estonia and 
Lithuania - although not so much in Latvia. For example, 
Lithuania has 396 APCs - almost the same as the UK, exceeds 
Portugal and Norway, and is more than most other NATO states. 
 NATO is engaged in arms escalations. 
 
--Russia is not yet reconsidering its policy of restraint, 
but it is being asked to continue such restraint while the 
Allies are not doing so in the Baltics.  Russia prefers the 
military balance of 1999 and wants it to be restored, but not 
by Russian arms increases, but by its neighbors reducing 
arms.  Russia wants a constructive approach. 
 
--Russia challenged (again) the U.S. point that accession can 
only be done after the EIF of a/CFE.  This is a false 
premise, and Russia will not entertain the veracity of such 
an assertion.  The territory of three Baltic states was 
excluded from the CFE Treaty by a decision of JCG experts, 
and therefore they can join the current Treaty by the same 
mechanism.  Does not mean discussions cannot take place on 
the topic.  The point is not whether they are willing to 
accede -all know they are willing, but under what terms? 
 
--Russia acknowledges the statement made by Poland on the 
March 28 NAC statement paragraph on what is clearly a Bloc 
policy.  There are four Allies that should be able to consult 
accordingly.  A Bloc approach is not helpful, but reflects 
the reality on the ground. 
 
--In response to Germany, Russia wants to engage in 
substantive talks and not to wait for a year (until EIF 
a/CFE), but NATO is not prepared to do so yet.  Is Russia 
happy about NATO restraint?  How should such a question be 
answered?  Depends on the definition of substantial combat 
forces?  Russia has been waiting 11 years for NATO clarity of 
this concept.  In Russia,s view, a Lithuanian airfield is 
being prepared for substantial combat aircraft operations. 
The NATO Alliance has failed to take up the issue, including 
how this definition applies to combat aircraft. 
 
--Much has been said about the parallel actions package, but 
Russia sees a discrepancy as to the way ahead.  NATO wants 
agreement on the package before any elements can be 
discussed.  Russia wants to discuss certain elements, like 
accession of new states.  Which is the chicken, and which is 
the egg? What do we really stand to benefit by waiting to 
discuss the elements after the package has been agreed.  We 
will discuss them, now or later - the only difference is 
tactics.  The entire approach should be discussed further at 
the April 29 JCG Plenary. 
 
--Comment: Per Russia,s request for further discussion of 
"chickens and eggs" on April 29, USDel does not believe any 
new ground will be covered on this subject.  The March 28 NAC 
statement speaks for itself, and there is strong allied 
support in Vienna to maintain that position here. On April 
 
23, Hungary, as JCG Chair, received and shared with us 
Russia's outline of points for the April 29 discussion 
including: "When will it be more appropriate to start 
discussing the practical issues of restoring the viability of 
the CFE Treaty:  before or after the package solution has 
been agreed upon?"  Russia asserts that practical issues 
include: defining "substantial combat forces," collective 
ceilings for NATO, and accession. Mission welcomes additional 
Washington views. End comment. 
 
...NATO is not a threat to Russia 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.(SBU) Germany made several additional strong points: 
 
--Germany cannot see any plans in the Baltic states as a 
threat to Russia,s national security.   What is the threat 
to Russia,s northwest borders by 396 APCs in Lithuania? 
This number of APCs must have been taken from the Arms 
Transfers Register, which is only "raw material."  Such APCs 
have not yet been assigned to or modified for specific tasks 
(reconnaissance, look-alikes, etc.) and may not be covered by 
CFE, or some may not be used at all (i.e., spare parts). 
Russia should wait for specific information on their 
assignments before drawing conclusions. 
 
--NATO has made it clear it does not intend to station 
substantial combat forces there.  However, these states 
should have the ability to support the Alliance as a whole. 
The threat environment under the bloc approach is over, and 
we are in an era of cooperative security now. 
 
--Germany wants a formal response from Russia to the March 28 
NAC statement and parallel actions package, but it is not 
trying to prescribe how Russia responds.  Germany is 
interested in Russia,s ideas, and would welcome a response 
in the JCG. 
 
Kush non-compliance 
----------------------------- 
 
9.(SBU) Per Ref B, the U.S. (Neighbour) read the statement on 
Russia,s non-compliance with the quarterly information 
exchange requirements under the flank document for 
Kushchevskaya.  (JCG.DEL/16/08).  Turkey (Begec) supported 
the U.S. finding, and expressed disappointment that Russia 
has not implemented this obligation since its "suspension." 
Turkey is ready to maintain the flank arrangement and to work 
with the security concerns of all States Parties, but it 
expects reciprocity in return.  Romania (Neculaescu) and 
Norway (Schroder) also expressed regret about Russia,s 
non-compliance in this area. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Germany (Richter) pointed out that transparency 
provided by the quarterly reports agreed in 1996 during the 
first Review Conference, was the result of a Russian request 
for an exemption to the flank zone for certain places, 
including Kushchevskaya.  This is just one more example of 
the hole growing from the lack of information exchange, which 
will surely have an impact of overall European security. 
Germany reiterated its previous call from February 26 for 
Russia to engage on the approach in the parallel action 
package. 
 
Russia: "for the 1,001st time" 
------------------------------- 
 
11.(SBU) Russia impatiently shot back that at the previous 
meeting it had already reserved its right not to respond to 
such statements, and sees no need to keep trotting out 
previous Russian answers.  "So for the 1,001st time: Russia 
suspended all its obligations, including the flank document, 
and Russian law prohibits it from doing otherwise." 
Delegations should recall that CFE was signed at a time 
preceded by colossal strategic shifts, including the demise 
of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.  The Treaty was 
outdated soon after signature, especially the flanks.  Russia 
 
tried for five years after signature to change this and it 
was amended when others finally realized its negative impact 
to Russia,s security. 
 
--Russia was forced to accommodate many extra inspections, 
semi-annual notifications, and quarterly reports for 
Kushchevskaya.  This was an act of discrimination.  No other 
state was asked to accept such terms.  Russia accepted them 
for the sake of the arms control regime. 
 
--As a result of NATO enlargement, NATO states are the ones 
violating CFE in a flagrant manner by breaching in physical 
terms over 5000 tanks and countless APCs and artillery 
pieces.  The U.S. has exacerbated the situation by stationing 
in Bulgaria and Romania with new ceilings.  This makes lack 
of Kushchevskaya reporting pale by comparison.   This 
discrimination should end. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The U.S. responded briefly by recalling our 
explanations in the JCG last fall of U.S. activity in 
Bulgaria and Romania, and noted that there is no U.S. TLE 
present there. Turning to Russia's response on Kushchevskaya, 
the U.S. said Russia remains a party to the CFE Treaty and 
still has an obligation to provide this information since 
there is no Treaty provision for "suspension."  Also, we 
referred to Russia,s last (March 2007) quarterly report on 
Kushchevskaya and highlighted the large numbers of TLE 
located there. Turkey reiterated its right to raise issues of 
non-compliance with the Treaty to the JCG. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Germany reacted negatively toward Russia,s use of 
the word "discrimination" and said it was not appropriate for 
our negotiations.  All are subject to discrimination in some 
way or another - we are all different sizes, have different 
geography, military forces, etc.  Thus, we all have different 
duties with respect to information exchange.  Under 
Germany,s 4   2 Treaty, it agreed that no foreign troops may 
be present on certain parts of the combined German territory. 
 This was a compromise, and we all have to do so to enter 
into agreements.  We need a stable, transparent system for 
mutual confidence. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Russia, unable to resist the last word, took 
Germany,s point about preventing foreign troops on part of 
ones territory, but recalled that CFE prohibits Russia from 
stationing Russian troops on its own territory.  Perhaps this 
should be considered a "colonialist" view rather than 
discriminatory.  Lastly, Russia echoed Turkey,s point that 
it is prepared to take on board the concerns of others and 
hopes consultations will provide the basis for a common 
language. 
 
AOB: 
 
¶15. (SBU) TOI Chair (Fardellotti, Italy) drew attention to 
the reference document agreed by the JCG Treaty Operations 
and Implementation working group (TOI) last week, as 
circulated under JCG.TOI/8/08.  This TOI Chairman,s 
Statement, and its attachment will become the new version of 
the reference document for the "List of Notifications and 
Formats," replacing the 1991 version. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Norway announced that it will swap dates with 
Poland for chairing the JCG. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Poland, as current JCG-T chair, noted that on May 6 
an important meeting will be held in Brussels, and 
recommended that the JCG Plenary be canceled for that date. 
Hungary, as current JCG Chair, has consulted on the proposal, 
including with Russia, and says there is consensus to cancel 
the meeting on May 6. This will be formally agreed at the 
April 29 JCG plenary. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Hungary reminded delegations that it would be 
making a presentation to the April 29 JCG on "stationing and 
temporary deployments during a/CFE and beyond." 
 
¶19. (SBU) At the JCG-T, Germany said it would move its 
planned presentation to May 13 given the May 6 HLTF date. 
 
SCOTT