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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0541

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/K, PRM, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREF PINR PGOV PREL PHUM KN KS CH
SUBJECT: MORE INTERNAL PRC RESEARCH ON NK BORDER-CROSSERS: 
POLICY AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
 
REF: A. (A) SHENYANG 12 
     ¶B. (B) 07 SHENYANG 229 
     ¶C. (C) 07 SHENYANG 196 
     ¶D. (D) SHENYANG 38 
     ¶E. (E) 07 SHENYANG 31 
     ¶F. (F) 07 SHENYANG 78 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN. 
REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Northeast China is home to 10,000-20,000 
North Koreans, according to the internal research of 
another one of the few Chinese specialists studying North 
Korean border-crosser issues for the PRC Government.  PRC 
policy toward North Korean border-crossers shifted in 2002 
in part because of growing evidence of the involvement of 
some crossers in criminal activity, said the specialist, 
who noted that Chinese border officials remain frustrated 
by the laxity of the DPRK's border control.  A small cohort 
of scholars has explored certain policy alternatives to 
arresting and repatriating North Koreans.  A major push for 
policy change, however, remains unlikely, not only because 
of political considerations, but also because of the 
professional reluctance of scholars to advocate radical 
policy alternatives that are likely to be perceived 
negatively by superiors.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff met privately February 21 with WU Jianhua 
(STRICTLY PROTECT), a North Korea expert at the Liaoning 
Academy of Social Sciences (LASS) and part of a small, 
informal cohort of northeastern Chinese scholars 
researching North Korean border-crosser issues on behalf of 
the PRC government.  This is the fourth in an irregular 
series of reports exploring internal PRC thinking on North 
Korean border-crosser issues and the researchers sanctioned 
by the Chinese government to study them (see refs A-C for 
previous). 
 
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
-------------------------- 
¶3. (C) A government scholar also active on PRC-DPRK border 
security  and cross-border trade issues, Wu conducts 
classified, internal ("neibu") research on North Korean 
border-crossers.  Much of his research is field/survey- 
based, like that of the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences' 
ZHOU Weiping (refs C, A) and LASS' LU Chao (refs B, D), two 
other northeastern Chinese government specialists with whom 
Wu has collaborated in the past.  In the field, Wu--who 
studied in Pyongyang in the late 1980s, again in the early 
2000s and returns each year--has interviewed North Korean 
border-crossers living in Dandong, Yanbian and other parts 
of northeast China's borderlands.  He has also been 
permitted to interview PRC border authorities and detained 
North Korean border-crossers in situ at Dandong's detention 
center for apprehended North Koreans. 
 
ESTIMATES OF NORTH KOREAN BORDER-CROSSERS IN CHINA 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶4. (C) Wu's estimates of North Korean border-crossers in 
China are lower than those of other researchers in his 
cohort.  Though well-known methodological problems make 
reliable statistics difficult, Wu believes northeast China 
is home to roughly 10,000-20,000 North Korean border- 
crossers, primarily situated in Jilin and Liaoning 
provinces and, to a lesser extent, in Heilongjiang 
Province.  (Ref C and the Jilin Academy of Social Sciences' 
Zhou Weiping puts the number closer to 50,000, largely 
concentrated in Jilin Province's Yanbian Korean Autonomous 
Prefecture.) 
 
¶5. (C) Queried on his interviews of border-crossers 
detained in Dandong, Wu--echoing comments made by another 
scholar (ref C)--reported that PRC border police continue 
to (re)apprehend North Koreans that they have arrested and 
repatriated to the DPRK.  In interviews, certain detainees 
said they did not fear repatriation and, in some cases, 
rather defiantly declared that they would again return to 
China, according to Wu.  The ability of North Koreans like 
these to make multiple forays into China after repatriation 
underscores, in part, the corruption of North Korean 
 
SHENYANG 00000048  002 OF 002 
 
 
soldiers and other security personnel on the DPRK side of 
the border, Wu said.  It also suggests, in select cases, 
ties of some border-crossers to resilient criminal networks 
in North Korea, Wu asserted without offering further 
elaboration.  He repeatedly emphasized local Chinese border 
officials' frustration at the laxity of the PRC-DPRK 
border, putting the bulk of the blame squarely onhe DPRK. 
(NOTE: Corruption on the Chinese side of the border remains 
a problem on this front as well; see, for instance, refs E- 
¶F. END NOTE.) 
 
PRC POLICY EVOLVES: 2002 AS TURNING POINT 
----------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Turning to PRC policy toward North Korean border- 
crossers, Wu explained that until 2002, Beijing and local 
northeastern Chinese government officials benignly 
neglected North Koreans "living peacefully" in northeast 
China.  But in 2002, PRC policy toward North Korean border- 
crossers officially shifted, requiring the arrest and 
repatriation of "illegal migrants" to the DPRK.  The well- 
known, high-profile incursions into diplomatic facilities 
in 2002 was only one catalyst, according to Wu.  The other 
catalyst was the gradual accretion in China of evidence 
indicating the involvement of some North Korean border- 
crossers in criminal activities that Chinese officials 
adjudged to undermine border stability, Wu said. 
 
¶7. (C) In the years following, PRC policy has practically 
evolved to involve deterrence, principally by delaying exit 
permission to North Koreans who have successfully accessed 
diplomatic compounds in China.  While the PRC "allows" some 
to find refuge at foreign embassies or consulates within 
China, Beijing aims to "punish" (and hence deter) South 
Korea and other countries by imposing long delays for exit 
permission, Wu said. 
 
WHITHER PRC POLICY ALTERNATIVES ON NK BORDER-CROSSERS? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶8. (C) Asked about internal debates among government 
scholars on possible policy alternatives to repatriating 
North Korean border-crossers, Wu sounded somewhat 
conflicted.  On the one hand, he asserted that North Korean 
border-crossers today are not analogous to the 1970s-era 
Vietnamese, whom the PRC regarded as bona fide refugees 
and, consequently, accorded commensurate treatment.  On the 
other hand, even despite the fear of a "flood" of North 
Korean refugees into China, Wu acknowledges that the PRC's 
repatriation policy "undermines" China's "humanitarian 
image in the world."  Wu reported that he and a small group 
of other scholars have investigated some policy 
alternatives.  One proposal, for instance, would be to 
quietly establish certain "paths" (shuidao) to 
normalization for North Koreans who have lived in China for 
many years without incident.  (NOTE: Wu, who appeared quite 
nervous discussing the topic in general, would not 
elaborate further.  Ref C points to some specific paths to 
normalization being explored by other scholars. END NOTE.) 
 
¶9. (C) However, a radical shift in policy remains unlikely, 
and not just because of political calculations, Wu said. 
In the "Chinese system," Wu averred, scholars cannot 
professionally sustain advocating granting North Koreans 
refugee status as a possible policy alternative.  Such a 
move, he claimed, would be received as a condemnation of 
current policy and its makers.  He concluded that the 
"Chinese system," in this respect, is beset structurally by 
a reluctance of inferiors, like himself, to "fan shang," or 
go against one's superiors. 
WICKMAN