VZCZCXRO7025
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0226/01 1000414
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090414Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8700
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5177
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4001
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1112
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TY CY
SUBJECT: SOYER SUPPORTS SOLUTION PROCESS AT APRIL 4 MEETING 
WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Schlicher for reasons 1.4(a) an 
d (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: "Prime Minister" and head of the "governing" 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) Ferdi Sabit Soyer was upbeat, 
if a bit harried, during a forty-five minute meeting with 
Ambassador Schlicher on April 4.  He voiced strong support 
for keeping the Ledra Street crossing open and blamed the 
security forces on both sides, as well as Republic of Cyprus 
Parliamentary Speaker (and then-acting President) Marios 
Karoyian, for the April 3 closing of Ledra.  Soyer said that 
working groups and technical committees to be set up under 
the March 21 agreement must start work as soon as possible, 
but claimed that Greek Cypriot (G/C) demands limiting their 
terms of reference (TOR) to the 1977-79 high level agreements 
may delay the process.  Soyer said that Turkish PM Erdogan 
was fully behind a Cyprus solution, but sought a quid pro 
quo--an easing of Turkish Cypriot (T/C) isolation before 
Turkey made a reciprocal gesture to G/Cs, such as opening a 
Turkish port to their ships -- to jump-start Turkey's EU 
accession process.  Soyer assured the Ambassador that Chief 
of Turkish General Staff (TGS) Yasar Buyukkanit, whose recent 
visit to the island was seen as a needlessly provocative 
gesture in the south, was still on board with a solution. 
Lastly, Soyer promised to investigate "government" delays 
plaguing a prominent USAID project and look at ways of 
improving a deficient international property rights (IPR) 
draft "law" currently under consideration.  End Summary. 
 
Ledra:  Police on both sides to blame 
 
¶2.  (C) Soyer said that the T/Cs remain fully committed to 
keeping Ledra open and agreed with the Ambassador that its 
teething pains must be dealt with at the technical level, 
with UNFICYP, before they escalate into political problems. 
He reported that, just 12 hours after its April 3 
inauguration, he personally had taken control of the 
situation on the T/C side to prevent a crisis.  After 
initially defending T/C police for having stopped 
placard-wielding Greek Cypriot protesters -- which G/C police 
cited as reason to close the crossing for three hours -- 
Soyer blamed the security forces on both sides for their 
tactics, adding that neither institution actually favored a 
solution.  Soyer also alleged that acting RoC President 
Karoyian had intentionally aggravated the situation for 
political gain. 
 
¶3.  (C) Soyer pleaded that, should similar incidents unfold 
in the future, UNFICYP should immediately contact the 
civilian authorities of both sides and not depend on the 
local military/police authorities or others to pass the 
message up in a timely manner.  The Ambassador agreed and 
promised to pass this message on to the acting head of 
UNFICYP, Elizabeth Spehar. 
 
Technical Committees and Working Groups: Differences with 
G/Cs over terms of reference 
 
¶4.  (C) Soyer agreed with the Ambassador's statement on the 
importance of starting the work of the technical committees 
and working groups as soon as possible, so that the leaders 
could begin comprehensive negotiations on schedule.  He 
complained, however, that G/C negotiator George Iacovou had 
sought to include in the terms of reference the 1977-1979 
High Level Agreements, which was unacceptable to the T/Cs. 
They want broad TORs, including references to bizonality and 
bicommunality, as well as to the entire "UN Body of Work." 
(Comment: Local diplomatic missions are rather puzzled by the 
T/Cs newfound problem with the inclusion of the High-Level 
Agreements in the TOR, since the Agreements actually put the 
bizonal, bicommunal formula into play on the UN track after 
Makarios and Denktash agreed to it.  UNFICYP officials on 
April 7 claimed that Iacovou not only wanted the 1977-79 
agreements noted specifically, but other UN negotiating 
efforts as well. Iacovou and Nami met on April 8; the last 
meeting before that was April 1. End Comment) 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador told Soyer that the "labeling" of a 
basic engagement need not be controversial, and that a 
solution could be achieved if the parties focused on 
substance, not terminology, and negotiated in good faith.  As 
proof, he pointed to the March 21 agreement between Talat and 
Christofias, which finessed a similar "labelling" issue 
regarding the July 8 agreement.  The Embassy intended to 
support the process whenever and however possible, the 
Ambassador added; U.S. assistance funds already had been 
 
NICOSIA 00000226  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
committed to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to 
assist the work of the committees and working groups. 
 
Kyprianou to blame for continued G/C cases against Financial 
Aid Tenders 
 
¶6.  (C) Soyer was angry that the Greek Cypriots had not only 
NOT withdrawn court cases blocking the implementation of 
Financial Aid Regulation tenders, but had filed two more in 
the period since Christofias's election.  Such actions soured 
T/C public opinion against the EU.  Soyer added that he did 
not believe that RoC Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou really 
wanted to withdraw the cases.  The Ambassador noted that 
Kyprianou had indeed told him that he was looking for a way 
to make the cases disappear; he promised to raise the matter 
at his next meeting with the FM.  The Ambassador added that, 
as he saw it, the G/Cs should drop the cases since they could 
not sustain two wildly-divergent policies in Brussels -- 
trying to improve Cyprus-EU relations after the low point 
reached during the Papadopoulos era, while concurrently 
defying the will of the Commission with lawsuits. 
 
 
Erdogan Fully Supports Solution and wants Quid Pro Quo on 
Cyprus 
 
¶7.  (C) Soyer said that Turkish PM Erdogan had voiced full 
support for a Cyprus solution during a meeting the two had 
had in Ankara in late March.  Soyer added that Erdogan wants 
a quid pro quo on Cyprus:  the international community should 
"do something" regarding Turkish Cypriot isolation so that 
Erdogan in turn could "give something" to the Greek Cypriots, 
likely the opening up Turkish airspace and ports to G/C 
traffic.  This mutual action would jump-start Turkey,s EU 
accession process.  Soyer added that Turkish Deputy PM Cemil 
Cicek had seconded Erdogan's support--and desire to move on 
the EU front--during a phone call to congratulate him on 
Ledra Street. 
 
¶8.  (C) Soyer dodged the Ambassador's question regarding 
fallout in Cyprus from the AKP closure case; rather, he 
listed a number of reasons why Erdogan had stumbled 
(incursion into Northern Iraq/alliance with MHP over 
headscarves) and what he could do to get out of the present 
predicament (more democratic reforms). (Note: Many T/Cs 
believe that the solution process will grind to a halt if 
Erdogan is removed. End Note) 
 
Buyukkanit Still on board 
 
¶9.  (C) Soyer claimed that TGS Chief Buyukkanit still 
supported a solution on Cyprus along the lines of a bi-zonal, 
bi-communal federation based on political equality--the same 
deal Buyukkanit reportedly blessed when he met "TRNC 
President" Mehmet Ali Talat's in Ankara in January.  He 
attempted to soft-pedal statements that Buyukkanit had made 
during his March visit to the "TRNC" that Turkish troops 
would not immediately leave after a solution, arguing that 
even Christofias had admitted that a small number of Turkish 
troops would remain after a solution. (Note:  Most CTP 
insiders see the Buyukkanit visit as generally positive when 
compared with those of former TGS chiefs.  They blame the 
general's more dissonant tone near the end of the visit on 
Rauf Denktash's deleterious influence.) 
 
Soyer promises to look into IPR "law" and USAID project 
 
¶10.  (C)  The Ambassador urged Soyer to pass an intellectual 
property "law" that was in line with best practices and 
international standards and advised him to utilize available 
EU technical assistance to this end.  The Ambassador pointed 
out that a present draft "IPR law" was woefully inadequate 
and would send the wrong signal to the world, i.e., that 
Turkish Cypriot authorities tolerate intellectual piracy.  He 
also promised that the Embassy would continue to work with 
the T/C business community and Chamber of Commerce to fight 
counterfeit goods.  Soyer pledged to investigate the IPR 
draft and provide us an update. (Note: Departing the meeting, 
Soyer's assistant confided that the draft was indeed bad.) 
 
¶11.  (C) The Ambassador also asked Soyer to investigate why 
certain "state" agencies had not provided a USAID implementer 
with information to commence the next phase of the 
Geographical Information System, a computerized project on 
land use planning and management.  Without this information, 
the next stage of GIS, a project the T/Cs had pushed for, 
 
NICOSIA 00000226  003 OF 003 
 
 
cannot go forward.  Again, Soyer promised to look into the 
matter. 
 
¶12.  (C) The April 3 temporary closing of Ledra--and Soyer's 
displeasure with the actions of the Turkish Forces-controlled 
T/C police--underscore the complicated position that Soyer, 
Talat, and the other pro-solution Turkish Cypriots find 
themselves.  Turkish Cypriots often point out that they must 
manage not only the Greek Cypriots, but also a hydra-headed 
Turkey with common and opposing interests. The Turkish 
military is one very important element of that relationship, 
and while Soyer might have spun the Buyukkanit visit a bit, 
we agree with him that overall it did not go badly, and 
actually could have been much worse given the past relations 
between Talat and the Turkish military. Soyer's anxiety to 
get the technical committees and working groups started and 
move to negotiations as soon as possible is not surprising, 
given his "government's" shrinking popularity and its raison 
d'tre -- delivering a Cyprus solution. To move seriously 
toward this end, however, the T/Cs and G/Cs will have to come 
to agreement very soon on a mutually-agreed way publicly to 
discuss the basis of their re-engagement. End Comment 
SCHLICHER