VZCZCXRO7136
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0427/01 1051458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141458Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5696
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUSAKA 000427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/S, AND AF/PD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2018 
TAGS: SADC PREL ZA ZI
SUBJECT: SADC SUMMIT CONCLUDES WITH HALF-HEARTED RESULTS 
 
REF: A. LUSAKA 424 
 
     ¶B. LUSAKA 423 
     ¶C. LUSAKA 421 
 
Classified By: DCM Michael Koplovsky for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Heads of State Summit concluded with little to show 
for the leaders' efforts.  South African President Thabo 
Mbeki seems to have prevailed by containing efforts to forge 
a stronger SADC position on Zimbabwe.  The Summit communique 
calls for the immediate release of election results, but 
fails to address the widespread deceit, intimidation, and 
violence following the March 29 national elections in 
Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwean opposition party members, however, were 
pleased with the Summit, which they described as "an 
improvement" over Mbeki's mediation efforts.  Although the 
communique was weak, and lends truth to criticism about South 
Africa's dominance within SADC, it marks a step forward in 
calling attention to problems in Zimbabwe and points to 
Mugabe's growing isolation within the region.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On April 12, SADC convened a Heads of State Summit 
to discuss the deadlock following Zimbabwe's national 
elections on March 29.  The meeting began with strong opening 
remarks from Zambian President (and SADC Chair) Mwanawasa 
(Ref B), who said that he had called the Summit because of 
the failure of Zimbabwean officials to publish the results of 
the March 29 presidential election.  He recommended a 
solution that "reflects the will of the Zimbabwean people." 
He appealed to Zimbabwean leaders to put national interests 
above all other interests, to "embrace humility," and to turn 
over a new leaf in history "in order to make Zimbabwe, the 
SADC region, and Africa proud." 
 
¶3. (C) If Mwanawasa took umbrage from Mugabe's refusal to 
speak with him in the days preceding the summit (Ref C), he 
was careful to hide his annoyance.  Perhaps with a tinge of 
irony, however, Mwanawasa said that "it is unfortunate that 
owing to circumstances beyond his control, (Mugabe) is unable 
to be with us.  But he has sent three representatives and I 
hope they will be able to enrich our deliberations." 
Mwanawasa did not excuse Mugabe for his absence, noting that 
Mugabe is "expected to share his perspectives on the matter." 
 
 
¶4. (C)  Following the opening of the Summit, the SADC leaders 
withdrew to a closed session that was scheduled to last two 
hours.  Unable to reach agreement, the Heads of State 
deliberated for over twelve hours, concluding at 5:00 A.M. 
Mugabe's representatives refused to interact with the 
Zimbabwean opposition members, who were also present by SADC 
invitation.  Zimbabwean journalists told Emboff that Mbeki 
and Mwanawasa had "locked horns" throughout the meetings. 
The journalists also said that, according to their sources in 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Mbeki had blocked 
Mwanawasa's efforts to achieve greater results.  They also 
conveyed considerable disagreement over how to describe the 
situation in Zimbabwe, with Mwanawasa's camp preferring to 
call it a "crisis," and an Mbeki-led faction insisting that 
it be referred to as an "impasse."  Additionally, the 
Zimbabwean journalist had heard from their MDC sources that 
Mwanawasa had chided the Zimbabwe delegation "for several 
hours" over offensive statements about him in the Zimbabwean 
state press. 
 
¶5. (U) The communique (see Ref A for the full text) stated 
that Zimbabwe opposition candidates confirmed that the 
elections were held in a free, fair, and peaceful 
environment.  It urged election authorities to verify and 
tabulate results in the presence of candidates and/or their 
agents and to expeditiously release the results.  It 
encouraged all parties to accept the results, when announced. 
 If run-offs become necessary, the communique urged the 
Government of Zimbabwe to ensure a "secure environment." 
 
¶6. (C) It appears that Mbeki prevailed in containing efforts 
to call for stronger SADC action.  The communique failed to 
capture the vision outlined by Mwanawasa during his opening 
remarks.  In seeking consensus, it appears as though the SADC 
leaders complied with the lowest common denominator.  The 
communique makes no reference to the widespread deceit, 
intimidation, and violence following the March 29 polls in 
Zimbabwe.  Nor does it single out Mugabe for his presumed 
role in blocking the release of the election results. 
Although the communique calls for the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission to comply with the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
governing democratic elections, it fails to note that these 
protocols have already been breached. 
 
LUSAKA 00000427  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (U) Following the release of the communique, Zambian 
Foreign Minister Kabinge Pande together with MDC Secretary 
General Tendai Biti fielded questions from the press.  In his 
public statements, Pande said the situation in Zimbabwe "is 
not a crisis at all," echoing Mbeki's statement in Harare 
after his meeting with Mugabe on April 12 en route to the 
Summit.  He said Zimbabwe opposition leader Tsvangirai should 
be pleased with the outcome "because we've taken care of all 
his concerns." 
 
¶8. (C) Perhaps gratified by the show of support from some 
SADC Presidents, MDC leadership, who participated in the 
meetings to some extent, expressed satisfaction with the 
results.  Biti called the Summit "a major improvement" over 
Mbeki's attempts at mediation.  Biti went further to say that 
the communique "exposes the limitations of quiet diplomacy in 
comparison to the constructive engagement, which other 
countries pursued against the apartheid regime in South 
Africa."  He praised the SADC leaders for their courage in 
holding an emergency summit, which he said was "an 
acknowledgement that things were not right in Zimbabwe." 
 
¶9. (C) Comment.  In many respects, it was SADC, not Mugabe, 
that was on trial as the world watched to see whether SADC is 
capable of acting with impartiality and authority.  To some, 
SADC's half-hearted, mealymouthed resolution was a 
disappointment, and lends truth to criticism that South 
Africa continues to wield too much influence within SADC. 
According to the MDC, however, "SADC has acquitted itself 
fairly well."  Biti interpreted the communique "within the 
context of African diplomacy" to mean that Mugabe had delayed 
the results, abused the law, and perpetrated violence. 
Indeed, implicit in the communique--and explicit in many 
parts of Mwanawasa's speech--is the acknowledgement that the 
electoral process in Zimbabwe has gone awry.  Mwanawasa (and 
other like-minded Presidents) is to be praised for his 
leadership on the issue, and willingness to arbitrate (and 
confront Mbeki) throughout the night, despite his failing 
health.  Notwithstanding the weakness of the communique, the 
Summit marks a step forward in SADC's willingness to call 
attention to Zimbabwe and it points to Mugabe's growing 
isolation within the region. 
 
MARTINEZ