VZCZCXRO9730
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0417/01 1071425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161425Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6566
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000417 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS ECON MD
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT VORONIN PUSHING FORWARD ON TRANSNISTRA SETTLEMENT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an April 14 meeting with DAS David Merkel and the 
Ambassador, President Voronin focused predominantly on Transnistria, 
underlining repeatedly that settling this conflict was Moldova's most 
pressing issue.  Voronin said he had presented proposals for 
confidence-building measures to Smirnov at their April 11 meeting, 
and was now waiting for the Transnistrian leader's promised response. 
 Voronin asked that the U.S. join the GOM, the guarantor states and 
the EU in presenting the status and roadmap documents to the 
Transnistrians.  DAS Merkel promised that the USG would review these 
documents (which the USG had received in 2006) and respond promptly. 
President Voronin was upbeat about the possibilities for rapid 
progress, suggesting either April 20 or May 10 as possible dates for 
a 5 plus 2 meeting to discuss these proposals.  END SUMMARY. 
 
When Voronin Met Smirnov 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In a cordial meeting with DAS David Merkel and Ambassador 
Kirby on April 14, Voronin delivered a lengthy monologue followed by 
responses to questions focused predominantly on Transnistria. 
Voronin described his April 11 meeting with Smirnov, the first 
meeting of the two men in almost seven years.  Voronin said he had 
presented Smirnov with proposals for confidence-building measures. 
Smirnov had promised that within two weeks, working groups would 
elaborate the TN proposals for the final document.  Voronin was 
upbeat about the possibilities for rapid progress, suggesting either 
April 20 or May 10 as possible dates for an extended 5 plus 2 to 
present and discuss the proposal Moldova has been reviewing with 
Russia since the fall of 2006. 
 
¶3. (C) Voronin noted that he was born in the Transnistria area, and 
felt strongly that the country should be united and the conflict 
settled.  Despite the seven-year gap since his last contact with 
Smirnov, Voronin suggested that the time was not completely lost, as 
various steps forward had been made. 
 
Voronin Wants USG to jointly Propose Status Document 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4. (C) Voronin said that Moldova had already elaborated a set of 
measures to be discussed in the 5 plus 2 format.  He said that there 
were three documents, the first on the status of Transnistrian 
autonomy, providing the main principles for autonomy, along with a 
declaration on guarantees and a roadmap.  The document on the 
principles and guarantees for a settlement to the Transnistrian 
conflict had been drafted in 2005, and passed to the USG, Russia and 
Ukraine in November 2006.  Though no copy was given to the 
Transnistrian side, the Russians, Voronin noted, passed a copy to 
them.  Voronin would like this set of documents to be presented to 
the Transnistrians by the guarantor and observer states rather than 
by Moldova.  Voronin asked the USG to join as a co-presenter.  DAS 
Merkel said he understood the tight time frame, and assured that the 
USG would review the documents and get back to the GOM promptly. 
Voronin stressed that his main priority was the reunification of the 
country, but not at any price, and said he hoped for Transnistrian 
participation in the 2009 parliamentary elections (i.e., a political 
settlement before the elections). 
 
Mistakes were Made 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) President Voronin reviewed at length the history of the 
conflict, which has passed through several stages since 1992.  He 
noted that there were greater possibilities for settlement at the 
very beginning, but many mistakes were made, and since then the 
Transnistrian position on independence had hardened.  He cited 
unsuccessful attempts at resolution before 2001, and the 2003 Kozak 
Memorandum disaster, before noting the positive impact made by the 
introduction of EUBAM in 2005.  He described Russia's blockade of 
Moldovan wine and agricultural products as part of an attempt to 
cause the Moldovan economy to collapse.  As a result, Voronin said, 
Moldova's production of alcohol decreased, but its economy proved 
resilient. 
 
Left and Right Bank Already have Some Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. (C) Voronin offered several examples of areas where the two banks 
were already cooperating.  Some 430 Transnistrian economic entities 
were already registered in Chisinau, of which more than 200 were 
exporting and importing.  In the first three months of this year, 
Transnistrian exports to the EU increased by 30 percent.  Thus the 
notion of a Moldovan economic blockade on Transnistria is not valid 
anymore. 
¶7. (C) Some 7,000 Transnistrian students are studying at Moldovan 
institutions of higher learning, Voronin said.  An association of 
Transnistrian students in Moldova, ASTRA, has been established to 
help address their special needs.  (Note: Voronin addressed ASTRA 
members at their conference in February.)  Transnistrian athletes 
 
CHISINAU 00000417  002 OF 002 
 
 
participate on Moldovan national teams and Transnistrian teams take 
part in national sports leagues.  The Chisinau airport offers the 
same services to Transnistrian residents as to right-bank Moldovans. 
Citizens on both sides of the river have full access to each other's 
territory and can travel freely.  Over 300,000 Transnistrians have 
Moldovan passports, which are issued to them free of charge.  Voronin 
concluded that the balance and mix of nationalities on both sides was 
approximately the same, and hence the conflict is not ethnic, but 
purely political, serving the interests of certain political elites 
and certain neighboring states. 
 
Schedule acceptable to Russia and Ukraine 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) President Voronin said he had raised these issues with the 
Russian Federation, and reported that Russia was "not against" the 
schedule he proposed for 5 plus 2.  Voronin had met with Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Ogryzko earlier in the day, and reported that 
Ukraine was also supportive.  He noted that Ukrainian president 
Yushchenko was planning to visit Moldova later in the month (April 
25-27). 
 
Voronin will not Settle at Any Cost; No Secret Deals 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶9. (C) DAS Merkel cautioned against agreeing to permanent neutrality, 
noting that Washington wanted Moldova to have the freedom to choose 
its partners.  It would be wrong for Moldova to make any decision 
that limited its freedom in conducting relations with the EU.  The 
President responded that he was not prepared to settle at any cost, 
and ruled out any steps that would lead to destroying the country. 
He reassured DAS Merkel and Ambassador Kirby that he would reach no 
secret agreements, and that he would consult with the USG along the 
 
SIPDIS 
way. 
 
Comment:  Progress on Transnsitria 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) President Voronin seemed pleased with the breakthrough 
created by meeting with his opponent.  Though his timeframe for 5 
plus 2 may prove to be overly optimistic, he appeared ready to keep 
pressing forward on bringing the sides to the negotiating table. 
Having met with his chief opponent, Voronin now appears to be buoyed 
by a greater sense of unfettered optimism.  Simultaneously, we have 
noticed in our own contacts with the Transnistrian side that a more 
pragmatic, less polemical approach to cooperation on MCC is emerging. 
 Voronin appeared eager to reach a Transnistrian settlement so that 
parliament can ratify it and necessary electoral code changes at 
least six months before the spring 2009 elections.  Meanwhile, the 
opposition remains highly skeptical of Voronin's motives and fears he 
is making a push for a Transnistrian settlement now so that his 
unpopular ruling communist party can win another four year term in 
office. 
 
¶11. (U) DAS Merkel has cleared this cable. 
 
KIRBY