VZCZCXRO7032
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0265/01 0771530
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171530Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7687
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG RW UN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES - NAIROBI PROCESS: 13TH MEETING OF JMG TASK 
FORCE, MARCH 14, 2008 
 
REF:  Kinshasa 258 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The main agenda item of the March 14 meeting of 
the Nairobi process Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) Task Force was the 
DRC's plans for action against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (ex-FAR/IH). 
FARDC and MONUC are planning to do something at some point in the 
coming months, but March 15 will be no D-Day and significant 
operations will only build up over time.  The UNSC Resolution on the 
FDLR was welcomed by all delegations.  The Kisangani GDRC-FDLR 
meeting has been deferred until after consultations being organized 
in Rome.  There was no progress on JMG-Joint Verification Team 
collaboration, as the minutes of the JMG envoys' February 15 
Brussels meeting have still not been received.  MONUC is now 
struggling to find ways to siphon off personnel from existing units 
to meet the needs of operations against the ex-FAR/IH without 
detracting from its ability to ramp up its support to the Goma 
cease-fire.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The 13th meeting of the Nairobi process Joint Monitoring 
Group (JMG) Task Force actually ended ahead of schedule, running 
from approximately 1045 to approximately 1400.  It was professional, 
courteous, and reasonably focused throughout.  Colonel Augustin 
Mamba was again at the head of the Congolese delegation, and there 
were once again substantive matters to discuss.  A bit of time was 
spent on the minutes, but this was negligible compared to past 
marathons.  The main agenda item was, inevitably, the DRC's plans 
for action against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (the use of the term 
"FDLR" is banned at Task Force meetings, in deference to Rwandan 
sensitivities).  All delegations were present. 
 
DRC post-March 15 plans 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Mamba's presentation was fairly Delphic, much to the 
frustration of the Rwandans, who wanted details.  In general, he 
made it pretty clear that things have moved into a new phase and 
that FARDC and MONUC are planning to do something at some point in 
the coming months.  His references to the need to build assets and 
to the constraints on any operations prior to June, however, meant 
that his overall message was consistent with what we have been given 
to understand by other sources -- i.e., March 15 will be no D-Day 
and significant operations will only build up over time.  Mamaba 
made the following points: 
 
¶4. (SBU) He outlined the diplomatic steps that have led up to March 
15, emphasizing that the deadline itself was set by the DRC in an 
exchange of letters with the Rwandan government.  Diplomatic and 
political initiatives continue despite the expiration of the 
deadline. 
 
¶5. (SBU) He noted that the FARDC face conflict on two fronts: 
against the ex-FAR/IH on the one hand and against Congolese armed 
groups on the other.  While the Goma Acte d'engagement put in place 
a cease-fire with and between the latter, the launching of offensive 
operations ("la guerre que nous devons ouvrir aujourd'hui") against 
ex-FAR/IH may destabilize things on the armed group side and, if 
FARDC and MONUC are not careful, allow for opportunistic skirmishing 
or outright conflict to resume.  All the more so since in most areas 
the expected (MONUC) interposition forces have not yet been 
deployed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) He said the campaign that has been planned jointly with 
MONUC will be long and complex.  Ex-FAR/IH represents 5,000-7,000 
men deployed over an area in North and South Kivu that is 550 km x 
250 km, and in which there are up to 10 million inhabitants, 
including four major urban areas.  Ex-FAR/IH are dispersed among the 
civilian population, and control significant economic resources.  A 
few are indeed ex-FAR from the genocide period, but most are either 
people who came here as children or were born in the DRC.  If you 
count women and children, as many as 30 per cent of the total target 
population is in fact Congolese. 
 
¶7. (SBU) He said the aim of the ex-FAR/IH is to create sufficient 
pressure on the Rwandan government to bring about a return 
negotiated on more favorable terms.  The GDRC now considers the 
ex-FAR/IH its enemy.  However, this situation means that even as 
coercive actions begin, political and diplomatic activity must 
continue, and the expected meeting in Kisangani is consistent with 
this. 
 
¶8. (SBU) He stated that joint military operations with MONUC will 
commence immediately.  He said, as a military officer speaking to 
colleagues, he didn't need to explain his reasons for not being 
precise about when, where or how this will happen.  Operations will 
 
KINSHASA 00000265  002 OF 003 
 
 
be complicated by the humanitarian situation and the fact that the 
ex-FAR/IH have in the past showed a tendency to retaliate against 
attacks by attacking civilians.  Steps will need to be taken to 
protect the latter.  Joint military operations will require a 
considerable reinforcement in men and materiel.  Brigades that have 
been trained up by MONUC have been or will soon be deployed. 
Materiel is being secured.  Building up to full strength will take 
time. 
 
¶9. (SBU) He noted that operations of any significance can really 
only be conducted during the June-August dry season.  So joint 
operations will be conducted in two phases:  (1) immediate action by 
assets already deployed to limit the target group's freedom of 
movement; (2) later operations, with units presently in training, 
aimed at strengthening the FARDC's positions in the campaign's four 
main sectors:  a) Lubero-Kanyabayonga; b) Masisi-Humbo-Walikale; c) 
Shabunda-Mukungu-Mwenga; and d) Mulenge-Fizi-Uvira.  Mamba said he 
wanted everyone (local population and neighboring states) to be 
advised to expect significant FARDC movements in the coming weeks. 
(Comment:  There are surely Goma process cease-fire implications to 
this.  End comment.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) He said FARDC Chief of Staff General Dieudonne Kayembe 
would arrive in Goma March 15 to review plans in place and brief the 
senior civilian leadership.  He would be joined by MONUC Force 
Commander General Babacar Gaye and the Rwandan Chief of Staff.  This 
was the first the Rwandan delegation had heard of the latter, and 
during conversations at break-time and again at the end of the 
meeting they were understandably skeptical that this would happen. 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Note:  In a subsequent phone call, MONUC Eastern Division 
Chief of Staff Colonel Clive Newell confirmed that Kayembe and 
Eastern Division Commander General Bikram Singh, acting for Gaye (on 
leave), would arrive the following day to hold a joint meeting with 
FARDC and CNDP.  There is a meeting with the Rwandan Chief of Staff 
planned -- in Goma -- but this was not to take place until Monday 
March 17.  End note. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The conversation was then joined by a MONUC North Kivu 
Brigade IndBatt Major (G2).  The Rwandan delegation asked about 
MONUC's current planning for any pre-emptive strikes by the 
ex-FAR/IH, to which there was no real answer, and about MONUC's 
assessment of the target group's readiness, to which the major's 
answers were again evasive ("they're in small mobile units, hard to 
assess their strength or their intentions ...") 
 
Other Matters Discussed 
----------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) UNSC Resolution on FDLR:  This was welcomed by all 
delegations.  It will add a powerful tool, all agreed, to the DRC's 
"sensibilisation" campaign.  The Rwandans asked that it be given the 
widest possible coverage by local media.  The delegate from the 
World Bank's MDRP program said that he could confirm this was 
already happening in Kinshasa.  In sidebar conversations, a Rwandan 
delegate said that they were particularly gratified to the reference 
in the resolution to previous "French-led" efforts -- this would, he 
felt, help cut ground out from under the ex-FAR/IH. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Kisangani GDRC-FDLR meeting:  This could not be held as 
planned on Wednesday March 13, as only the FDLR moderates were 
willing to come.  It will be deferred until the others can be 
persuaded.  (We understand that this will happen following 
consultations being organized by Sant'Egidio in Rome.)  The Rwandans 
have always been skeptical and demanded to know who, exactly, is 
expected to attend, but the Congolese pointed out that the meeting 
has been given added legitimacy by its specific mention in the UNSC 
resolution. 
 
¶15. (SBU) JMG-Joint Verification Team (JVT) collaboration (reftel): 
The minutes of the JMG envoys' February 15 Brussels meeting have 
still not been received, despite multiple requests and promises, so 
there could be no progress on this. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Next week's agenda:  Will include a specific item, 
requested by Rwanda, on operations conducted and results achieved. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) In a conversation with U.S. delegates prior to the Task 
Force meeting, Newell was anxious for us to know that, in his 
opinion (NB not necessarily shared by MONUC Kinshasa) FARDC was 
 
KINSHASA 00000265  003 OF 003 
 
 
getting ahead of itself on operations against the 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe.  His main concern was that FARDC may start 
deploying deep into the various sectors without adequate support 
from MONUC, and that MONUC will need to scramble to join them. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Newell is now struggling to find ways to siphon off 
personnel from existing units to meet this need, but he is worried 
that this has to be done systematically and in ways that do not 
detract from MONUC's ability to ramp up its support to the Goma 
cease-fire.  He said FARDC senior command had sent MONUC for comment 
a draft order intended for its 8th (North Kivu) and 10th (South 
Kivu) regional military commands.  Newell said MONUC found much of 
the content of this directive to be lacking and developed a long 
series of questions and comments. However, Newell said he understood 
that FARDC eventually sent it out without reference to these.  End 
comment. 
 
GARVELINK