VZCZCXRO9386
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0305 0791442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191442Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6447
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PBTS MD
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENCOURAGES OPPOSITION LEADERS TO COOPERATE ON 
TRANSNISTRIA SETTLEMENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby, for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Ambassador Kirby met leaders of the three largest 
opposition parties to discuss recent 3+2 talks in Vienna and to 
discuss a future, acceptable settlement on Transnistria.  The 
Ambassador shared his view that any durable solution would require 
broad political support, including that of the key opposition 
parties.  By including the three opposition leaders, he encouraged 
them to move away from knee-jerk opposition to any settlement 
approved by President Voronin and towards the notion of a widely 
supported settlement in the interests of the entire country. End 
summary. 
 
The Ambassador Seeks Opposition Buy-In on TN Peace 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (C) On March 17 Ambassador Kirby invited Serafim Urechean, head of 
the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN), Dumitru Diacov, head of the 
Democratic Party (PD), and Iurie Rosca, head of the Christian 
Democrats (PPCD) and Deputy Speaker of Parliament, to review the 
recent 3+2 meeting in Vienna.   The Ambassador described the 
essentials of a settlement acceptable to the USG:  a unified Moldova 
that is separate from Romania, with Russian troops out of Moldovan 
territory.  The agreement should be worked out through the 5+2 
process, be acceptable to the majority on both sides of the Dniester 
River, and ideally gain 80 to 90 votes in the 101-seat Moldovan 
Parliament (in which the PCRM currently holds 55 seats). 
 
¶3. (C) Discussing the general background, the Ambassador described 
the positive and energetic work of the Finnish OSCE chair.  The 
Ambassador went on to note that the talks in Vienna were being held 
in the context of Transnistrian disappointment that the Russian Duma 
had not "invited" Transnistria to be independent following Kosovo 
UDI.  In order to move towards a better environment for the creation 
of a lasting settlement, the Ambassador said there was a need to 
encourage confidence-building measures, such as the ecology of the 
Dniester River, railroads and road transportation.  He stressed that 
Moldova's stability and openness to investment from risk-averse 
investors depended on a solution which "both sides of the Dniester 
believe can be trusted." 
 
Opposition Leaders Glad to Be Included 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Urechean, leader of the largest vote-getter among opposition 
parties, thanked the Ambassador for this briefing and complained that 
Voronin and his government never briefed the opposition about their 
talks with Russian and Transnistrian leaders.  Urechean accepted the 
Ambassador's argument that an earlier solution (i.e., before March 
2009 Parliamentary elections) would be better than a later one, even 
if the GOM got credit. 
 
¶5. (C) Rosca noted the need for patience, while also questioning 
whether Transnistria could participate in Moldova's 2009 elections. 
The Ambassador stressed the need for an inclusive settlement first. 
Rosca replied with a precondition ("the Russian Army goes first"), 
and the Ambassador responded that the 5+2 talks were the place to 
discuss such matters.  Diacov gave an optimistic assessment that all 
parties wanted a solution to the Transnistria conflict, and suggested 
that 100 percent of the MPs would vote for a good solution. 
 
¶6. (C) In discussing Voronin's recent statement about preparing a 
document for 5+2 partners to sign recognizing Moldovan neutrality, 
the Ambassador that Russia was no longer talking about foreign states 
guaranteeing Moldova's neutrality, but had retreated to the more 
neutral "recognizing."  The Ambassador stated that the USG respected 
the neutrality declared in Moldova's constitution, and noted that 
Moldova was not yet ready for NATO, nor NATO ready for Moldova. 
However, he warned his guests that Moldova should not bind itself 
forever on the issue, and, in the present, should not give up a 
possible future with NATO in return for nothing in the negotiating 
process for a settlement. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  We speculated that in their opposition to President 
Voronin, the three politicians would be inclined not to cooperate 
with any Transnistrian settlement the GOM might negotiate before the 
2009 elections (and Voronin's retirement).  However, the Politician's 
appreciated being briefed on the talks in Vienna.  They left the 
meeting with an understanding that, even though Voronin was not 
including them in his conversations, their support for a negotiated 
TN solution was important for Moldova.  Implementing a durable TN 
resolution will need more than just a narrow majority in parliament; 
it will require broad-based political support.  We are preparing the 
way for that support to be possible. 
 
Kirby