VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #0467/01 0881631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281631Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7207
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU IMMEDIATE 0055
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 0014
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1526
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0253
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8239

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018 
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR KFE RS GG MD BE
SUBJECT: BELGIUM ARTICULATES ITS POSITIONS GOING INTO 
BUCHAREST 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 450 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Lynn Gurian, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a tour d'horizon on issues to be 
discussed at the Bucharest summit, Belgium's Political 
Director for Multilateral Affairs told PolCouns on March 27 
that:  (1) CFE must survive; Belgium (GOB) welcomed Acting 
U/S Fried's continued openness in dealing with Russia on its 
concerns.  Fried's constructive approach minimizes the 
potential for the U.S. being blamed in the event of failure; 
(2) enlargement is a "done deal," unavoidable politically and 
needed to stabilize the Balkans; however, the NATO 
requirements will challenge Albania and Macedonia. NATO must 
go forward in discussions with Montenegro and Bosnia, though 
discussions with Serbia would be premature, something to be 
welcomed but not forced.  Belgium does not believe the 
Alliance should respond to every development in Europe with a 
plan to enlarge. (3) MAP - Belgium would not oppose progress 
on Ukraine and is ready to discuss it in Bucharest; Georgia 
is a more difficult case given the nation's more "shallow" 
public support. (4) Afghanistan ) Belgium is committed to 
action there, but Belgium's parliament is pressing for an 
exit strategy; Belgium will raise this issue in Bucharest. 
(5) Kosovo remains politically fragile; it is important for 
KFOR, the EU, and UN to work in active and close coordination 
there.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
THE RUSSIA FACTOR 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Political Director for Multilateral Affairs 
Jean-Arthur Regibeau began the discussion with CFE, stating 
&it is the cornerstone of peace and stability in Europe. It 
would be very negative if CFE disappeared."  He voiced 
repeated admiration for the diplomacy and stamina that Acting 
U/S Fried has shown in dealing with the Russians, saying 
Belgium "warmly welcomes" Fried's constructive and open 
approach. Regibeau noted the Russians are tough negotiators, 
although on some issues they have some (unspecified) 
"legitimate points."  Regibeau confirmed Belgium agreed with 
the U.S.-German CFE text of March 25, 2008, and would support 
it (reftel) unless substantially changed by other nations. 
Regibeau mused about Putin's plan to be in Bucharest, saying 
it is good Putin is planning to be there, but will he 
challenge NATO?  Regibeau revealed Russian diplomats were 
scheduled to call on him on March 28.  Regibeau will be part 
of Belgium's delegation to Bucharest. 
 
ENLARGEMENT AND MAP 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Belgium accepts NATO enlargement as a "done deal," 
Regibeau continued, noting it is "unavoidable" at the 
political level in the countries of the incoming tranche and 
should help to stabilize the Balkans.  He referred to 
challenges facing Macedonia and Albania to implement 
integration.  Belgium believes NATO must increase its 
dialogue with Montenegro and Bosnia.  With regard to Serbia, 
he thinks their joining NATO would be premature.  Belgium 
would welcome Serbia in the alliance once the political 
situation there is stabilized, but Regibeau does not believe 
in forcing the issue there. 
 
¶4.  (C) With regard to MAP, Belgium makes a distinction 
between the applications of Ukraine and Georgia, but does not 
exclude a rapprochement between them in Bucharest. Belgium 
believes Ukraine is on the right path in terms of gaining an 
"internal balance" and in "reacting responsibly" to Russia by 
avoiding provocations. Domestically, public support for 
Ukrainian pre-admission is "not fully ripe," Regibeau judged. 
Belgium believes NATO 
should take care not to be seen as a divisive factor within 
Ukraine's domestic debate. The recent agreement between the 
government and opposition to support MAP is a good sign. 
Belgium would not oppose movement on Ukraine's application; 
however, the preferred GOB position would be a compromise 
showing that NATO welcomes Ukrainian membership but, given 
the "shallow" public support, not come across as heavy 
handed. Belgium is ready to listen to the arguments of NATO 
colleagues on this matter, Regibeau concluded. 
 
¶5. (C) Georgia, Regibeau stated, is a more difficult case. 
Politically there are doubts about the validity of recent 
elections.  The government has also been aggressive with 
 
regard to Russia, answering provocation with the same level 
of response, i.e., "falling right into Russia's trap." 
Belgium shares with other allies the concern that such 
upping-the-ante of aggressive behavior not lead to a 
situation where, as a member, Georgia would be able to invoke 
Article 5 protection. Georgia's recent commitment to solve 
the &frozen conflicts8 by peaceful dialogue likewise seems 
to have "shallow" domestic support.  Referring to the lesson 
of Cyprus membership in the European Union as a comparison, 
Regibeau said it was a "mistake" to have let the island join 
before its internal political status was resolved. Belgium 
does not want to shut the door to Georgia at Bucharest and 
would like the nation to join through MAP provided the 
required steps are met.  NATO needs to be creative, he added, 
 in dealing with the issues of Georgia. 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  On missile defense, Regibeau cautioned that Belgium 
should be very careful and "stick with" its European 
partners.  The GOB will not block missile deployment, but he 
believes it is too early to decide on the matter; the GOB 
remains open to a common alliance agreement, but Regibeau 
advised caution here.    Regibeau queried rhetorically, what 
is the real nature of the Iranian threat and is MD the best 
way to address it? Belgium shares the views of southeastern 
Europe that the shield should cover all of Europe or it will 
divide the NATO security zone.  The issue is where a 
diplomatic approach should be tried before a military route. 
A political agreement with Russia should be sought. That 
solution would be easier to sell in Europe, he concluded. 
 
ISAF 
---- 
 
¶7. (C) Regibeau reiterated Belgium's recently announced 
increased contributions to ISAF, including four F-16's, more 
troops and deployment to Kandahar, as an example where the 
new Belgian government is committed to greater 
involvement in a priority arena.  However, he pointedly added 
that Belgium is in Afghanistan temporarily (though for an 
unspecified time at this point) and the Belgian Parliament 
will press for an exit strategy.  Belgium will make this 
point in Bucharesst. 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶8. (C)  Regibeau characterized Kosovo as &sensitive8 and 
the political situation there as &fragile.8  KFOR must 
continue to play an active role as a link with the UN and the 
EU.  He believes KFOR must intervene in the north of Kosovo 
or wherever needed.  Regibeau repeated the need for close 
coordination of KFOR, the EU and UN to keep the Serbs, 
through the Russians, from causing additional problems on the 
UN Security Council and to give Kosovo the stability and 
security it requires for its development. 
 
BELGIUM IN THE ALLIANCE 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) In general, Regibeau observed, Belgium questions 
whether enlargement is "always the best answer" to problems 
that arise for the Alliance.  Belgium sees the Netherlands 
and Germany as its most like-minded allies in NATO, based on 
the three countries' common histories of the past century. 
Its policy of rapprochement with its closest geographic and 
socio/historic neighbors enable the Belgian government to 
leverage support for NATO policies from the Belgian 
parliament. The GOB  formulates its policies in terms of what 
will be acceptable to parliament and the public.  Parliament 
actively holds the foreign ministry accountable, particularly 
on political-military issues (e.g., recently announced 
increase in Belgian contributions to ISAF) which pacifist 
lawmakers closely monitor.  Thus Belgium's sensitivity to 
prefer diplomacy to military action.  The GOB would also like 
to see NATO try more peaceful diplomacy first.  The best way 
to revitalize the Alliance is to let Europe have a sense of 
ownership, Regibeau mused; however the Europeans are divided. 
It will be important, he added, particularly vis-a-vis 
Russia, to show the Alliance stands together. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment:  Regibeau's perspective of Belgium's place 
and approach within NATO prior to Bucharest explained the 
GOB's views not only on the issues at hand but also on its 
 
current broader orientation to the Alliance.  Noteworthy is 
the government's sensitivity to parliamentary and public 
reaction.  Regibeau does not expect major changes in foreign 
policy with the new Leterme government and MFA officials have 
been positive about NATO issues.  However, Belgium will 
examine each issue seriously and wants to proceed with 
caution as well as strong Alliance consensus.     FOX . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.