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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018 
TAGS: PREL BR MARR OVIP
SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON THE VISIT OF DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM TO 
WASHINGTON 
 
REF: A. A) BRASILIA 236 
     ¶B. B) OSD REPORT DTG 251847Z MAR 08 
     ¶C. C) BRASILIA 175 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reason: 1.5 d 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY: Defense Minister Jobim's March 18-21 visit 
to Washington focused on Brazil's efforts to modernize its 
defense institutions and on possible avenues for bilateral 
cooperation and identified several areas for further work, 
particularly completion of a General Security of Information 
Agreement (GSOIA) and a possible Defense Technology Security 
Dialogue.  Jobim also used the visit to make the point that 
Brazil seeks defense modernization that will benefit its 
domestic industries, while keeping open the possibility of 
purchasing U.S. fighter aircraft.  Brazilian coverage of the 
visit, however, has largely ignored the real possibilities 
for cooperation and focused on Jobim's advocacy of a South 
American Defense Council (SADC).  In meetings with 
Secretaries Rice and Gates and National Security Advisor 
 
SIPDIS 
Hadley, Jobim remained cautious on enhancing bilateral 
defense cooperation, reflecting the more negative approach of 
the Ministry for External Relations (MRE) which had sought to 
curtail Jobim's trip and to inhibit the U.S.-Brazil dialogue 
on defense issues.  While there are good prospects to improve 
our defense relationship with Brazil, MRE obstruction will 
continue to be a problem.  Our best avenues for progress will 
be through completing the GSOIA (to which the MRE does not 
object), to look for opportunities to underline that Brazil 
will have the same access to U.S. military technology as 
other friendly nations and to try to get high level support 
within the Brazilian government for the Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA), which would allow the Defense Ministry to 
pursue cooperation with the U.S. military without the current 
MRE veto.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  As reported in ref b, Brazilian Defense Minister 
Nelson Jobim's visit to Washington focused on Brazil's 
efforts to modernize its defense institutions and on 
possibilities for bilateral cooperation. Coming out of 
Jobim's meetings, Mission has identified several priorities 
for the bilateral defense relationship, including the DCA, 
GSOIA, the Defense Techology Security Dialogue, a possible 
visit by Air Force Science Officers and closer engagement on 
Joint matters.  Jobim did not, however, express optimism 
about the DCA, even though the MOD has cleared on the current 
draft of the text.  The current DCA draft is with the MRE, 
which seems in no hurry to act on it.  Separately, MRE 
political military advisor Marcos Pinta Gama expressed the 
view that the DCA would require high level intervention and 
should be a deliverable for a future Ministerial level 
meeting.  On defense modernization, Jobim's message was 
clear: Brazil's priority will be to benefit its domestic 
defense industries.  Purchases from U.S. suppliers will be 
most competitive when they enable Brazilian production of 
future military systems.  Jobim understands the need for 
improving Brazil's military capabilities, but will seek to do 
so in the context of independent domestic production. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Air Force presentation on the F35 impressed the 
Brazilian delegation, both with the aircraft's capabilities 
and the cooperative approach being used for its production. 
Jobim did, however, express reservations about the plane's 
cost and the degree to which Brazilian industries would 
benefit.  This will be the determining factor for Brazil.  If 
there would be a possibility for integration of Brazilian 
made hardware or weapons, the F35 would be a leading 
candidate for Brazil's next generation fighter.  Pinta Gama 
underlined that Brazil will not be making a decision 
immediately, but in the context of requirements derived from 
the Defense Modernization Plan, to be completed in September. 
 At the same time, he expressed a lack of confidence in 
Minister for Planning Unger's leadership of defense planning, 
indicating that Jobim would do better. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Brazilian coverage of the visit has focused on 
Jobim's advocacy for the proposed SADC based on the 
assumption that the U.S. would oppose such an organization. 
 
BRASILIA 00000429  002 OF 002 
 
 
Folha of Sao Paulo commented that the SADC did not make sense 
as its purpose seemed to be to exclude the U.S.  Working 
level Brazilian staffers accompanying Jobim expressed 
surprise that the U.S. reaction to the SADC proposal was 
positive because of a divergence of views on what the SADC 
could do.  While the U.S. views a SADC as a means to improve 
South American military cooperation and facilitate 
peacekeeping, on the model of the African Union, the 
Brazilians see its value more in terms of reinforcing 
Brazilian leadership, moderating Venezuela President Chavez 
and facilitating common military production (primarily in 
Brazil). 
 
¶5.  (C)  While the Jobim visit served to clarify the 
prospects for future U.S.-Brazil military cooperation, Jobim 
remained reserved on the subject.  While he told SecDef Gates 
that he wanted to strength the defense relationship, he also 
stuck to rather shopworn talking points on why the U.S. made 
this difficult.  He dusted off the complaint that U.S. 
refusal to allow U.S. origin components in the Super Tucano 
aircraft to be sold to Venezuela led to Chavez purchase of 
much higher tech Russian fighters.  In his public remarks at 
CSIS, Jobim avoided the subject of defense cooperation and 
stuck to recent history and the SADC proposal.  It is likely 
that on his own Jobim would have been more forward leaning on 
defense cooperation but was somewhat constrained by the MRE 
(which sent a "handler" along for the trip).  As Jobim told 
Ambassador Sobel in February (ref a), he had pushed the 
Brazil-France SOFA through over MRE objections.  As a result, 
the MRE is now keeping a closer watch on Jobim as seen by the 
Brazilian Embassy's foot dragging over scheduling Jobim's 
visit.  While Jobim was telling Ambassador Sobel that he 
wanted a full schedule, including the visit to Norfolk and 
meetings with representatives of U.S. defense industries, the 
Brazilian Embassy in Washington was telling us that the visit 
would be curtailed.  Jobim's chief of staff, Murilo Barboza 
told embassy officers that the Brazilian Embassy had made 
several attempts to change the Minister's schedule in favor 
of a shorter, less substantive visit. 
 
¶6.  (C)  EMBASSY COMMENT:  Given the resistance from the MRE 
to the development of the bilateral defense relationship, the 
most effective way forward will be to pick the low hanging 
fruit, i.e. to push forward with areas of cooperation which 
the MRE will support.  Specifically, a GSOIA and the 
beginning of a Defense Technology Security Dialogue should be 
first steps.  The Brazilians are interested in the Security 
Dialogue as a means to improve their effectiveness in gaining 
access to U.S. technology through better compliance with U.S. 
export control regulations.  While pursuing these items, we 
should also continue to urge completion of the DCA, looking 
for high-level opportunities to make the case.  The main 
advantage of the DCA will be to allow the MOD and DoD to work 
together on supplementary protocols that could enhance the 
already good cooperation at the forces level without having 
to rely on case by case approvals from the MRE.  END COMMENT. 
SOBEL