VZCZCXRO7495
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0084/01 0321620
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011620Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3119
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0265

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000084 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SW YI
SUBJECT: SWEDISH MFA ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND ESDP MISSION 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) The Swedish position on Kosovo recognition appears to 
be starting to move in a positive direction.  Sweden 
supported the January 30 approval of an ESDP mission.  MFA 
contacts tell us Sweden will likely join in recognizing 
Kosovo, but would prefer for this to occur with substantial 
EU unity and to be followed by the acquiescence of the UNSYG. 
 Our British colleagues in Stockholm report that ultimately 
Sweden is likely to be in the second tranche of EU states 
recognizing Kosovo.  FM Bildt is personally establishing the 
Balkans policy for the government, but seeks political cover 
for Kosovo recognition from the Foreign Policy Board, which 
is convened by the King.  Sweden is still hoping that the 
combined lack of an Italian government, Spain's election, and 
its own consensus-driven process will persuade other members 
to delay EU recognition until March.  End Summary. 
 
Timing the Recognition of Kosovo 
-------------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) We discussed Kosovo January 31 with FM Bildt's Staff 
Director Karin Olofsdotter and separately with MFA Western 
Balkans Head Lars Wahlund.  Both emphasized timing issues on 
the recognition of Kosovo.  Both noted that Kosovo was taken 
up on the margins but not addressed substantively at the 
January 28-29 GAERC.  Sweden takes the position that EU 
policy on Kosovo -- and the decision on an EU mission -- 
should be settled before operational matters such as proposed 
deployments of riot units to Northern Kosovo are decided. 
The policy discussion that took place January 30 in 
connection with the approval of the Kosovo ESDP, supported by 
Sweden, addressed this this issue.  Sweden's preference is to 
have the maximum number of EU countries join in recognizing 
Kosovo soon after it declares its independence; in Sweden's 
view, the best time for this is mid-March. 
 
¶3.  (C) A March date, Wahlund said, would accommodate timing 
issues in Spain, Italy, and Sweden.  Spain was concerned 
about the Basque issue being stirred up by Kosovo recognition 
prior to the March 9 Spanish elections.  Italy also needed 
time in order to form a new government and have it set its 
policy on Kosovo.  Sweden, per Olofsdotter and Wahlund, 
treated the Kosovo recognition issue of such magnitude that 
it was deemed essential to convene the Foreign Policy Board 
(FPB) under the auspices of the King as a venue to establish 
a consensus between the governing alliance and the opposition 
parties on the issue.  The FPB, which includes the leaders of 
all parties in parliament and other dignitaries, was next 
scheduled to meet March 3.  When we challenged Wahlund on the 
necessity of waiting until March for a scheduled meeting of 
the FPB, he acknowledged that it could be convened earlier on 
an emergency basis. (Comment: there is no requirement, other 
than political cover, to convene the FPB on this question.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Separately, Charge spoke with UK DCM Nick Griffiths, 
who said Sweden's approach to Kosovo was coming around within 
the EU.  EU countries are likely to address recognition in 
three tranches.  The first tranche would include the UK, 
France, and Germany, accompanied by several other countries. 
Sweden would likely be in the second tranche with a few other 
countries that would recognize Kosovo shortly after the first 
tranche.  The third tranche would be made up of those most 
recalcitrant. 
 
How and What of Recognition 
--------------------------- 
¶5.  (C)  Wahlund underscored Sweden's reservations about what 
recognition of Kosovo would mean.  Sweden hoped that there 
would be a joint EU decision to recognize Kosovo, rather than 
"six or ten" EU countries recognizing it initially and a 
public display of disunity contributing to policy confusion. 
Olofsdotter said Bildt reacted strongly to the EU "big three" 
presuming to set Kosovo policy without wider discussion. 
Wahlund emphasized that Kosovo's status would be peculiar. 
It would be independent of Belgrade, but not of the 
international community.  It would remain subject to UNSCR 
¶1244.  Kosovo's sovereignty would be limited.  Theoretically, 
the international community could take back what it had 
transferred.  Sweden would like to see the eventual full 
sovereignty of Kosovo conditioned on implementation of the 
Ahtisaari plan.  Only after this implementation would Kosovo 
be supported to join international organizations such as the 
UN and OSCE.  This would likely take, per Wahlund, 5-10 
years. 
 
¶6.  (C) Sweden's view, according to Wahlund, was that the 
UNSGY Ban Ki Moon would play a key role in the recognition 
process.  If the EU was mostly united in recognizing Kosovo, 
that would weigh in favor of the UNSYG supporting the 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000084  002 OF 002 
 
 
recognition and taking the right actions.  If there was "no 
scandle," Ban could interpret the recognition in an 
appropriate way.  Per Wahlund, the Swedes did not agree with 
the Brits interpretation of the legalities regarding 
recognition.  Wahlund said "there was too much common law." 
The Swedes considered UNSCR 1244 to be controlling, which 
left its administration in the hands of the UN executive, 
UNSYG Ban.  Sweden say his acquiescence as essential. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶7.  (C) Seeking consensus between the government and the 
opposition on major foreign policy issues is the practice in 
Sweden.  Using the FPB as a tool to achieve that consensus 
and its schedule as an additional argument to delay Kosovo 
recognition until March seems to us a choice, not an 
imperative.  In an added twist, Olofsdotter noted that she 
did not know PM Reinfeldt's position on recognizing Kosovo. 
It is a token of how much FM Bildt controls Sweden's foreign 
policy agenda that an issue of sufficient magnitude to merit 
a FPB review had apparently not yet been discussed with the 
Prime Minister. 
SILVERMAN