VZCZCXRO8430
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0118/01 0451701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141701Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3153
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SW YI
SUBJECT: SWEDISH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO 
 
REF: A. STATE 12026 
 
     ¶B. STATE 13716 
     ¶C. STATE 14840 
     ¶D. STATE 14284 
     ¶E. STOCKHOLM 84 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1.  (C) DCM Silverman met February 14 to review Kosovo issues 
with MFA Political Director Bjorn Lyrvall and urge early 
recognition.  Lyrvall said: 
 
-- Sweden intended to recognize Kosovo, but internal 
procedures would delay the actual recognition until after a 
"Privy Council" meeting March 4.  In the meantime, Sweden 
would make a "statement of intention" very shortly after the 
declaration of independence.  It would be as forward-leaning 
as possible. 
 
-- The EU should have the ESDP Operations Plan approved 
before the anticipated February 17 Declaration of 
Independence. 
 
-- The ESDP may not be the right tool for policing northern 
Kosovo. 
 
-- Sweden shares our view that Kosovo is no precedent for 
Abkhazia.  End Summary. 
 
Sweden to State Intent re Kosovo Independence 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) DCM met February 14 with MFA Political Director Bjorn 
Lyrvall to discuss Kosovo policy issues (refs A and B). 
Lyrvall, who had been in Serbia on February 11, said that 
with Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence the 
international community was not entering the end-game stage, 
but only the end of the beginning stage.  Sweden, he said, 
would not be able to recognize Kosovo's independence 
immediately after the declaration (ref A).  This anticipated 
recognition was considered to be of such consequence that the 
King would convene March 4 the rarely convoked Foreign Policy 
Board that includes all leaders of parliamentary parties plus 
other dignitaries acting, in  Lyrvall's words, as a kind of 
"Privy Council."  However, the Government would issue a 
general statement of intention regarding Kosovo recognition 
shortly after the declaration of independence. It would go as 
far as possible without prejudging the outcome of the Foreign 
Policy Board consultations.  In the end, Lyrvall said, the 
Government would take the necessary action, whatever the 
result of the consultations.  Lyrvall said Sweden, as the 
largest EU donor to Kosovo, believed it deserved a place on 
the Steering Group, and hoped to be invited to the first 
meeting. 
 
EU  Response to Kosovo 
---------------------- 
¶3. (C) Lyrvall said the EU had made progress on the ESDP 
mission to Kosovo, having provisionally agreed February 13 on 
an Operation Plan that had been place under silence procedure 
scheduled to end February 15.  This would allow the ESDP 
Mission to be online prior to the expected declaration of 
independence (DI) on February 17.  Within hours of the 
anticipated DI, EU Political Directors would convene in 
Brussels February 17 to prepare a statement on Kosovo for the 
Ministers to approve at the February 18 GAERC.  This 
statement would be a platform document that Lyrvall expected 
would take note of the DI and call on EU states to respond in 
accordance with their domestic procedures and international 
law, but would not include a EU joint recognition of Kosovo. 
Lyrvall confirmed that EU states holding back on  recognizing 
Kosovo included Cyprus, Romania, and Spain. 
 
¶4.  (C) Sweden was concerned about the reaction of Serbs in 
northern Kosovo to an ESDP mission.  They could view the ESDP 
as an alien and illegal international presence.  The 
atmosphere would be hostile.  How would the ESDP respond if 
the Serbs in northern Kosovo decided to stage their own 
municipal elections, or Serb police in northern Kosovo wore 
Serbian uniforms?  The EU needed to address such 
contingencies, and it was not clear that an ESDP presence in 
northern Kosovo was the answer.  Separately, MFA Global and 
European Security Director Ambassador Nils Daag told Polcouns 
February 13 that there were signs that the Serbs were 
considering allowing an OSCE mission to continue in Kosovo, 
and that this mission could have a role in addressing 
sensitivities in northern Kosovo.  Daag also confirmed 
February 14 that Sweden and EU countries would not support 
Serbia invoking the Berlin Mechanism in OSCE, and this 
proposal did not appear to have sufficient support in the 
OSCE to proceed (ref D). 
 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000118  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Lyrvall underscored Sweden's concerns about ensuring 
a sound legal and administrative basis for the International 
Steering Group (ISG) and the International Civilian 
Representative (ICR).  A UN link needed to be maintained, and 
an appropriate division of responsibilities and hand-off from 
Special Representative of the Secretary General Rickert and 
UNMIK to the ISG and ICR.  The UN Secretary General would 
also need to be involved. 
 
Abkhazia 
-------- 
¶6.  (C) DCM also raised ref C concerns regarding possible 
Russian recognition of Abkhazia.  Lyrvall agreed with the 
U.S. assessment, said it was important to underscore that 
Kosovo was sui generis, and said he would review our 
arguments with a view to employing them. 
WOOD